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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis examines the involvement, leadership, and impact of the Black 
Seminoles during the Second Seminole War.  In Florida, free Blacks, runaway slaves, 
and Blacks owned by Seminoles collectively became known as Black Seminoles.  Black 
Seminoles either lived in separate communities near Seminole Indians, or joined them by 
cohabitating or intermarriage.  Throughout this cohabitation, Blacks became an integral 
part of Seminole life by taking positions as advisers, counselors, and trusted interpreters 
to the English (who were rapidly advancing plantation society into territorial Florida). 
 By the advent of the Second Seminole War, Black Seminoles, unlike their 
Seminole Indian counterparts were not given the opportunity to emigrate westward under 
the United States government’s Indian Removal Policy.  The United States government’s 
objective became to return as many Black Seminoles, if not all, to slavery.  Therefore, it 
became the Black Seminole’s objective to resist enslavement or re-enslavement (for 
many) on American plantations. 
 The Introduction explains the objective and focus of this study.  Moreover, it 
explains the need and importance of this study while examining the historiography of the 
Second Seminole War in relation to the Black Seminoles.  The origins and cultural 
aspects of the Black Seminoles is the topic of chapter one.  By examining the origins and 
cultural aspects of the Black Seminoles, this study establishes the autonomy of the Black 
Seminoles from their Indian counterparts.  Chapter two focuses on the relationship and 
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alliance between Seminole Blacks and Indians.  Research concerning Black Seminole 
involvement throughout the war allows chapter three to reconstruct the Second Seminole 
War from the Black Seminole perspective.  A biographical approach is utilized in chapter 
four in order to understand the Black Seminole leadership.  This chapter examines the 
lives of the three most prominent Black Seminole leaders during the war.  The overall 
impact of the Black Seminole involvement in the war is the focus of chapter five.  
Chapter six summarizes this study and provides the historiography of the Second 
Seminole War with a perspective that has remained relatively obscure. 
 It is clear that  from the onset of the war, the United States government, military, 
and state militias grossly underestimated both the determination and the willingness of 
the Black Seminole to resist at all cost.  Throughout the war, both United States’ military 
and political strategies were constructed and reconstructed to compensate for both the 
intensity with which the Black Seminoles fought as well as their political savvy during 
negotiations.  This study examines the impact of the Black Seminoles on the Second 
Seminole War within the context of marronage and subsequently interprets the Second 
Seminole War itself as a form of slave rebellion. 
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Introduction 
 
 
From 1817 to 1858, the United States government engaged in a bitter conflict 
with the Seminole Nation.  This conflict would result in three distinct wars.  The First 
Seminole War (1817-1818) is best defined as a retaliatory expedition to suppress the 
Seminole and black resistance to the encroachment of the Georgia plantation system in 
the Florida territory.  The Second Seminole War (1835-1842) was conducted under the 
auspices of the Indian Removal Policy of the 1830’s.  This war was a result of the 
American plantation societies’ relentless efforts to enslave the Black Seminole 
population.  The Third Seminole War (1855-1858) erupted as a result of the United 
States’ attempt to remove the “last remnants of the Seminole Nation from their homes in 
the Everglades.”1  Research indicates a gradual process by which the United States 
attempted to acquire the Florida Territory and rid itself of the Seminole population while 
enslaving those Blacks who had become a part of or associated with the Seminole Nation. 
The Second Seminole War is regarded as the longest, deadliest, and most costly 
Indian war in American history.  Recently, Florida historians have began to revisit the 
Second Seminole War with the assertion that the war itself was the largest slave 
insurrection in North America.  Although Florida historians have made convincing 
arguments, there has not been an extensive study dedicated solely to Black Seminole 
efforts during the war.  By focusing on the Black Seminoles involvement and leadership 
during the war, this research will reconstruct the Second Seminole War from the Black 
Seminole perspective, thus further bolstering the recent assertions made by Florida 
historians.2
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 This study has three primary goals.  The first goal is to document the autonomy of  
Black Seminole society, thus countering the historiographical tendency to characterize 
Blacks as wholly dependent upon Indians.  The second goal is to examine the Second 
Seminole War from the Black Seminole perspective.  There have been several book- 
length studies on both the Second Seminole War and the Black Seminoles.  However, 
there has not been a comprehensive study that examines the Second Seminole War with a 
central focus on black involvement.  The third goal of this study is in essence a 
culmination of the first two.  It is the assertion that the Second Seminole War was indeed 
a slave rebellion.  Evidence will demonstrate that Seminoles in general resisted the 
enslavement of Black Seminoles.  Evidence will also demonstrate that the efforts of the 
U.S. military to place Blacks in bondage was not only a major underlying theme 
throughout the war, but at various points, the primary objective. Thus, this study will 
attempt to confirm the Second Seminole War as the largest slave rebellion, in United 
States’ history. 
 Scholarship on the Second Seminole War began in 1848 with John T. Sprague’s 
Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War.  In his work, Sprague reconstructed 
the Second Seminole War, also known as the Florida War, from the Perspective of the 
United States administration and military.  In doing so, he provided a defense of the 
military’s conduct against the Seminole Indians.  In regard to the Black Seminoles and 
runaway slaves, his work set the precedent for relegating them to the role of Blacks in the 
company of Indians.3
 Ten years after Sprague’s work appeared, Joshua Giddings opposed Sprague’s 
defense of the United States by examining the Second Seminole War from the Black and 
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Indian perspective, thus defending them and condemning the United States.  Giddings’ 
scholarship on the government’s efforts to return Blacks (to whom he refers to as exiles) 
of Florida to slavery takes the approach of an indictment of American policies and 
treatment of both Indians and Blacks.  By examining both legislative measures and 
military operations of the war, along with an interpretation of the hardships endured by 
the Indians and Blacks, Giddings’ work invokes sympathy.  However, in his attempts to 
evoke sympathy for Blacks, his work depicted the “exiles” as a group of downtrodden 
people pitted against insurmountable odds.4
 Sprague’s and Giddings’s nineteenth-century scholarship set a trend for the 
historiography concerning the war as well as its participants.  Scholars would begin to 
utilize Giddings’ work and focus their attention on Blacks.  In 1943, Kenneth W. Porter 
wrote an article entitled “Florida Slaves and Free Negroes in the Second Seminole War, 
1835-1842.”  He divided Blacks in Florida into three categories: plantation slaves, free 
Blacks, and Indian Blacks.  Indian Blacks were described as living with the Seminole 
Indians to various degrees but more importantly identified as having Indian customs and 
similar interests.  Porter continued to focus on Blacks in his 1964 article entitled 
“Negroes and the Seminole War, 1835-1842.”  He revealed that the bond between those 
Blacks who fled from slavery and Seminoles had long been established.  The relationship 
he describes is one that developed out of mutual admiration.  Blacks who were 
considered Seminole slaves lived an autonomous life to a large degree with little or no 
supervision.  Porter’s work culminated in a book entitled The Black Seminoles in which 
he examined their lives from 1812 to 1882.  Although Porter establishes the autonomy of 
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Blacks within Seminole society, he does not thoroughly examine this autonomy 
throughout the war.5
 Historian John K. Mahon’s History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842, first 
published in 1967, was the first book-length study in the twentieth century.   Mahon 
examined the war from its earliest beginnings (The First Seminole War) through its 
ending in 1842.  His approach is similar to Sprague’s in that he focused on the voices of 
American soldiers to create a comprehensive study of the war.  Mahon provides insight 
into Seminole Indian culture in his first chapter of his book entitled “Origins of the 
Seminoles,” yet depiction of black participation in their culture as well as the war itself is 
minimal at best.  History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 became the 
cornerstone for recent scholarship on the war from the government’s perspective.6
 Since then, historians have revealed much about the government’s participation in 
the war.  Scholarship has appeared from an array of perspectives, including George 
Buker’s book on the United States Navy’s navigation of the Florida Swamps, Michael 
Welsh’s work on the war legislation of T.H. Benton, Phillip Koerper’s study of the 
Alabama volunteers, and John C. White’s Master’s thesis examining the American 
military strategy during the war.  As the scholarship presented from the U.S. perspective 
increases, the minimizing of black participation remains often a constant feature in the 
historiography.  For example, the most current book-length study, The Seminole Wars by 
John and Mary Lou Missall (2004), attempts to provide a somewhat balanced approach in 
examining the war from the perspectives of Seminole Indians and the United States, yet 
the Black Seminole perspective still receives very little attention.7
 4
 Only recently has the impact of Blacks on the war received the scholarly attention 
it warrants.  For example, Cheryl Boyetts’ 1996 work on the alliance between Blacks and 
Seminoles during the war demonstrates the high visibility of Black participation.  Also, 
Bruce Twyman’s examination of the impact of Black Seminoles on North American 
politics provides “a frame of analysis for examining how the African Slave responded to 
being placed in political bondage.”8  Recent studies that focus on the Black Seminole 
leadership have provided a more thorough examination of a variety of aspects within 
their society.  By utilizing this focus, recent studies are able to respond to the work by 
Porter.  The autonomy of black society becomes much more visible when personal lives 
are examined both inside and outside of Seminole society.  The biographical 
examinations of prominent Black Seminole leaders by Larry Rivers,  Canter Brown, and 
Philip Tucker extend the significance of the Black Seminoles outside of Seminole 
society.  Rivers and Brown’s article entitled “The Indispensable Man” provides an 
examination of the relationship between Blacks and the United States beyond their 
involvement with Seminole Indians.  Tucker’s work, entitled “John Horse:  Forgotten 
African American Leader of the Second Seminole War,” compares this Black Seminole 
leader with other American frontiersmen during this period.  In doing so, the lives of 
Black Seminoles are viewed in a wider context than the Black/Indian relationship.9
 The development of Black Seminole society was a process.  This process was 
dictated by not only the cultural character of its members but also by outside influences 
that periodically changed with the growth of the Florida territory.  The interactions with 
Spanish, British, and English Settlers and Indians at various points in time contributed to 
the development of the Black Seminole culture.  African cultural traditions were 
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constantly being combined with various outside influences.  As the population increased, 
newly arrived runaways introduced a variety of cultural traits.  What is unique about 
Black Seminole society in Florida was their uncanny ability to preserve their culture in a 
distinct manner despite the ever-changing political climate or contact with various 
outside influences. 
 This study is interested in the development of a Black Seminole society with a 
degree of cultural and political autonomy (to a certain degree).  It is not concerned with  
individual or group cultural characteristics (that may be corresponded with the various 
regions in Florida) which extend beyond the realm of identifying the Black Seminole as a 
whole.  The various regions of Black Seminoles are recognized in examining the military 
efforts during the war.  Distinctions between runaway slaves and Seminole Indian slaves 
are only pertinent in this study when examining the interactions with English settlers and 
the United States.  Black Seminoles alike were all cognizant of the harsh reality that any 
one of them could become a victim of a slave catching/stealing expedition.  However, 
there were divisions within Black Seminole society between those Blacks who resided in 
Seminole Indian villages and those who resided outside Indian villages or towns created 
by themselves.  Nevertheless, regardless of their living situation, Black Seminoles were 
afforded the ability to express their own cultural identity. 
 The African-derived cultural traits of Black Seminoles are illustrated in R.L. 
Hall’s study on Afro-religious retentions in Florida, Rebecca Bateman’s ethnogenesis 
work on the naming patterns of Black Seminoles, and Ian Hancock’s study that examines 
the connection between Black Seminoles and the Gullah language.  Terrance Weik’s 
archaeological study of a Black Seminole village provided more evidence of the African 
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cultural presence within Black Seminole life.  Weik verifies the existence of  
ethnographic materials unique to the Black Seminole village.  While examining the 
origins and development of Black Seminole society in a chronological fashion, outside 
cultural characteristics are included, examined, and considered vital aspects of the 
developmental process.10
 Scholarship dedicated to the interaction and alliance of Black Seminoles with 
Seminole Indians provides the necessary groundwork for establishing the autonomy of 
Black Seminole society.  George Klos demonstrated, for instance, that the working 
relationship between Blacks and Seminole Indians created a dependence by the Indians 
on Blacks in agriculture and trade.  This dependence allowed Blacks to create an 
existence of their own, thus expanding their autonomy.  However, like Porter, Klos fails 
to demonstrate the extent of this autonomy during the war.11   
 William C. Sturtevant and Howard Cline have enhanced our understanding of the 
relationship between Blacks and Seminole Indians with their scholarship on the history 
and culture of the Seminole Indians.  Sturtevant examines the origins of the Seminole 
Indians.  He explains how their culture was derived from traits of the Creek culture and 
primarily from adaptations to the environment.  Cline examines how the Seminole 
Indians were primarily composed of Creeks but included a mixture of other Indians.  
Collectively they become known as the Seminoles.12
 Black Seminoles also earned the respect and admiration of the Indians through 
their military contributions.  Jane Landers demonstrated how the Blacks’ defense of 
themselves as well as their allies contributed to the cultural ethos of their society.  The 
Black Seminoles’ resistance to enslavement and their military efforts to secure their 
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freedom are duly noted by Porter.  Correspondence between the U.S. military, territorial 
administration, and the federal government outline not only the specific strategies utilized 
to gain control over Black lives, but also the unyielding desire to obtain as many slaves in 
the territory as possible.  The evidence, when combined, provides the premise for 
understanding the mounting tensions in the Florida territory prior to the war.  The aim of 
the present study is to examine these mounting tensions not from an all-encompassing 
viewpoint, but from the Black Seminole perspective.  This study will build on the works 
of Landers and Porter by contextualizing the threat of enslavement.13   
 Since Black Seminoles left virtually no written records, this examination of their 
participation in the Second Seminole War will rely heavily upon U.S. military records.  A 
clearer Black Seminole perspective on the war can be gained through focusing on their 
leaders.  There were three primary Black Seminole leaders during the war.  They had the 
most contact with Whites, thus the majority of the information collected from the military 
records revolve around their interactions and their recorded movements.     
 Studies that examine the Black Seminole leadership in terms of their perceptions 
of the world around them offer conceptual models for rethinking the nature of maroon 
societies and slave rebellions.  For example, Eugene Genovese contends that “those 
Indian settlements that provided refuge for Blacks absorbed them in such a way as to 
separate them from the slaves culturally as well as physically.”  He goes on further to 
state, “By the end of the eighteenth century the danger that large scale maroon activity 
would trigger significant slave revolts had passed.”  However, an examination of the life 
of Black Seminole leader John Caesar indicates just the opposite.  This study will 
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demonstrate how Caesar was a primary instigator of the destruction of plantations in East 
Florida by primarily Black Seminoles and plantation slaves.14
 Richard Price, in Maroon Societies, delineates the distinction between a maroon 
society and a slave revolt by stressing the idea of autonomy.  Historians have traditionally 
viewed Black Seminole society as a maroon community.  However, the Black Seminoles’ 
use of violence to repel the attempts of white Floridians and the United States military to 
enslave them is also equivalent to a rebellion. 15   
By utilizing Bruce Twyman’s descriptions of the five levels of slave rebellion, 
this study is able to examine the progression of Black Seminoles from solely a maroon 
society to a community in armed rebellion.  Twyman examined six conditions relevant to 
characterizing slave rebellions.  These conditions were:  central government control, lack 
of central government control, treaties and/or concessions to rebels by the central 
government, rebels’ alliance with powers hostile to the central government, regional 
autonomy of the rebelling group, and the creation of a sovereign state of those in revolt. 
The applicability of one or more of these conditions determined the level of rebellion.16
According to Twyman, the Black Seminoles represented the level D rebellion.  
This type of rebellion consists of a weak central government, rebel alliances with powers 
hostile to the central government, and a degree of regional autonomy for the insurgent 
group.  Twyman does not include the condition of having a treaty with or offering other 
concessions to rebels by the central government.  However, in 1841 the U.S. government 
retracted the directive to return Blacks to slavery, thus allowing Blacks to emigrate west 
with their Indian allies which represented a concession by the central government.  
Therefore, of the six conditions that Twyman utilized to define the nature of a rebellion, 
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the Black Seminoles’ resistance satisfied five.17  Characteristic commonalities that exists 
between the pre-determining conditions of a slave revolt and the levels of rebellion 
demonstrate a continuum in the development of rebellion. 
For most rebellions, the extent of their ability to negotiate or institute policies 
involving freedom rested solely on their military ability to resist submission.  The Black 
Seminoles were a unique case in that their leadership during negotiations also played an 
integral part in developing those policies.  Their military contributions undoubtedly 
preserved their autonomy, along with the government’s inability to completely subjugate 
them. During the war, however, their positions as interpreters and counselors contributed 
highly to their ability to garner concession from the United States to allow safe 
emigration. 
Marion D. Kilson theorized three types of slave revolts by examining sixty-five 
cases of slave rebellions.  The first type of revolt was the Systematic Revolt.  This form 
of rebellion aimed to overthrow the slave system itself and establish a “Negro” state.  
Kilson notes the conspiracies of Gabriel Prosser and Denmark Vessey as prime examples.  
The Second Seminole War resembled this form of insurrection, yet its overall aim was 
not to overthrow the plantation society.  For example, plantation raids sought the 
destruction of plantation growth and the retardation of the infringement on Seminole 
land.  However, the complete overthrow of the system was not explicitly sought, even 
though Black Seminoles encouraged slaves to rise up against their masters.18
The Unsystematic or Vandalistic Revolt “represents a haphazard expression of 
opposition to the slave system aimed at the destruction of slaveholders and their 
property.”19  The Seminole Nation (both Indian and Black alike) was interested in the 
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destruction of slaveholders when their property claims infringed upon their living 
arrangements.  At times, these were expressive retorts to some injustice they felt they had 
received, but they should never be considered as haphazard since their resistance tended 
to be collective and organized. 
A Situational or Opportunistic Revolt was designed to facilitate escape from 
servitude and was situationally determined.  By its simplest definition, this type of revolt 
best characterizes the Second Seminole War.  Black Seminole leaders’ military strategy 
and negotiated policies were dictated at times by outside influences such as the strength 
of white opposition in a particular area and alliance with Indians.  Thus, the Black 
Seminoles’ actions were situation ally determined at times.  Due to the character of the 
war, the rebellion displayed, during various times, the characteristics of all three types.  
However, when examining the overall impact, the Second Seminole War was a 
Situational or Opportunistic Revolt.20
To reiterate, the intent of this study is to re-examine the war, as well as the 
historiography concerning the war, primarily from the Black Seminole perspective.  In 
order to achieve the goals of this study, this study seeks to answer the following 
questions:  What was the correlation between the origins of Black Seminoles and their 
perception of freedom?  What was the correlation between their culture and their 
perception of freedom and how did it differ from their Seminole Indian counterpart?  
What was the nature of their relationship with Seminole Indians?  What expectations did 
Black Seminole leaders have regarding the outcome of the war?  Did those expectations 
differ from those of Seminole Indians?  Did the Seminole Indians at any point during the 
war become more concerned with being separated from the Black Seminoles than 
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emigration?  What was the overall impact of the Black Seminoles on the Second 
Seminole War?  To what degree, if any, did their participation change the character of the 
war?  How does the Second Seminole War compare with the existing ideologies of a 
slave rebellion?  Does the Second Seminole War fit the criteria of a rebellion?  If so, at 
what point in time do we recognize the shift of the Black Seminoles from a maroon 
society to a slave rebellion?  This research will examine both the participation of the 
Black Seminoles during the Second Seminole War from their perspective and the 
character of the Second Seminole War. 
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Chapter I 
Origins and Cultural Character of the Black Seminoles 
 
 
 The earliest recorded evidence of Blacks in Florida dates back to 1513 and relates 
to the Spanish exploration and settlement of Hispanola.  During this time Spain declared 
exclusive sovereignty over land from the Florida Keys to Newfoundland and west to 
Mexico.  In 1526, the Spanish settlement San Miguel de Gualdape (near present day 
Sapelo Sound, Georgia) was ostensibly the first colony with a number of African slaves.  
The Spaniards almost immediately became aware of the potential danger of an alliance of 
non-whites in Florida.  As a result, special legislation prohibited Blacks from living and 
trading with Native Americans.  However, due primarily to harsh living conditions 
worsened by disease and starvation, many slaves joined the Guale Indian rebellion, 
setting fires to the settlement.  The rebellion eventually destroyed the colony.  Those 
Africans who participated in the rebellion were assumed by the Spanish to have migrated 
to remote parts of Florida and blended into Native American communities.1
 The Spanish would continue to be unsuccessful at establishing a permanent 
settlement and a foothold in the southeast until 1565 when Pedro Menedez de Aviles 
established San Augustin (present day Saint Augustine) among the Timucuan Indians.  
Menendez was granted permission through a royal charter to import five hundred slaves; 
however, according to Landers, “evidence suggests that fewer than one hundred [African 
slaves] may have accompanied the first settlers.”2
 The Guale Indians would continue to resist Spanish encroachment and control 
throughout the sixteenth century.  In 1576, a major revolt again occurred which lasted 
four years.  Many of the Guale who participated were killed, and nineteen of their towns 
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were destroyed by fire.  In 1583, a black labor force was sent from San Augustine to the 
settlement of Santa Elena (present day Parris Island) to rebuild Santa Elena after the 
Spanish regained control of the area.  Santa Elena became the northernmost settlement of 
the Spanish.  The Guale would continue to rebel against the Spanish until 1597, when 
another series of revolts was suppressed.  As a result, the Guale settlements, particularly 
on the coast, went into a long period of decline and were eventually transformed into 
mission sites.  By the end of the sixteenth century, Spanish settlements, particularly Saint 
Augustine, were operating on a dwindling supply of slave labor and reliant upon Havana 
for imported enslaved workers.3
 In the early seventeenth century, African slaves were in demand and quite 
valuable in Florida.  By 1606, Spanish Florida contained one hundred slaves, of which 
forty belonged directly to the Spanish Crown.  Spanish Florida would continue to rely 
upon the importation of black slaves from Havana.  In 1618, Florida officials would again 
request slave laborers from Havana to replace the dwindling supply of slaves caused 
primarily by disease, starvation, and ceaseless exploitation.  Throughout the mid-
seventeenth century, yellow fever and smallpox were especially prevalent in the area and 
deleterious to the health of black slaves and others.4
 Spanish authority and exclusive control over the southeast were challenged in 
1670 with the establishment of an English colony in Charles Town (Charleston 
hereafter), South Carolina.  Disputes over uninhabited lands quickly developed between 
the British and Spanish crowns.  Both the English and Spanish understood the importance 
of Blacks in their quest to develop and protect their interests in the region.  Blacks’ 
“linguistic abilities, cultural awareness, knowledge of the frontier, and military skills” 
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increased their importance in diplomacy, trade, and information gathering.5  Three years 
prior to the establishment of Charleston, the Spanish governor reported the arrival of the 
first runaway slaves from the English in Carolina.  It was reported that eight men, two 
women, and a small child had escaped in a boat to St. Augustine.  Although the English 
both requested and demanded the return of the slaves, the Spanish welcomed their arrival.  
This trend would not only continue but increase to the degree that the Spanish King 
enacted the Edict of 1693 “granting liberty to all [runaway slaves] . . . the men as well as 
the women  . . . so that by their example and by my liberality  . . . others will do the 
same.”6  According to Tolagbe Ogunlege, two distinct black communities began to 
evolve in Florida:  autonomous maroon settlements in the wilderness of Florida which 
cooperated with Spanish authorities in the area of present day Pensacola and St. 
Augustine regions, and a black settlement called Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose.7  
Both communities established a relationship with the Spanish such that they aided in the 
protection of Spanish interests. 
 During the eighteenth century, the majority of slaves arriving in Carolina came 
from west central Africa, including Angola, Senegambia, Winward Coast, Sierra Leone, 
and the Gold Coast.  Of the 63,401 African slaves shipped to Carolina between 1733 and 
1807, their origins wereas follows: 
  Senegambia   20% 
  Winward Coast  23% 
  Gold Coast   13% 
  Whydah, Benin, Calabar 4% 
  Kongo    17% 
  Angola   23%8
 Runaway slave advertisements and notices in South Carolina indicate that during 
the 1730’s, approximately 57 percent of the runaways came from the Kongo-Angola 
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region.  During the 1740’s, the percentage of Kongo-Angola runaways increased to 61 
percent.  Between 1735 and 1765, Kongo natives made up the majority of the former 
slaves listed in the Saint Augustine records of black marriages.9
 Black maroon settlements in the wilderness, which Ogunleye refers to as “self-
emancipated Africans,” existed by utilizing a Pan Africanist perspective in the social, 
political, religious, and military organization of their communities.  These maroon 
communities established close relationships with the neighboring Native Americans.  
These two communities lived for the most part in harmony and provided the foundation 
for what would later become the Seminole nation. 
 According to Ogunleye, these black maroon settlements “created a dobale or a 
culture that paid homage to no one particular African culture but instead recognized and 
showed respect to the various cultures in their midst by fusing, synthesizing, and 
combining many African cultures.”  By fusing various African cultures, a Pan Africanist 
ethos evolved within the community.  This type of Pan-African culture existed with 
minimal European interference.  These Pan-Africanist cultural traits manifested 
themselves in a variety of cultural forms that distinguished their communities from both 
Spanish society and Native American communities, regardless of their close proximity.  
Research has shown that these cultural traits were most prevalent in communication, 
artistic expression, and religion.10
 The maroon settlements used an African writing system to communicate amongst 
themselves.  This writing system was created by blending the dialects present in the 
community as a whole.  W.H. Simmons, an observer of the black communities during 
this time, recalled seeing paintings on various trees throughout the settlements.  Simmons 
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noted that these “paintings of noblest fine arts is not beyond the inventive power of 
savages.”11  The “fine arts” Simmons observed were actually  African scripts utilized in 
communication.  Also, during the Second Seminole War, object scripts were discovered 
which denoted military strategies.12  The exact form of writing, whether it be the 
Adinkra, Nsibidi, Sona, Aroko, or even a combination of various writing systems, is not 
known.  Further research is needed to identify the writing systems and object scripts. 
 Simmons observed more concrete illustrations of cultural expressions.  Distinct 
African dances were performed.  He witnessed both Black and Native American ritual 
dances.  According to Simmons, Native Americans’ dance were “highly martial and 
graceful” while the dances of Blacks were “lively, vulgar, and awkward.”13  Simmons’ 
unfamiliarity with African cultures and personal bias against Blacks appear responsible 
for his negative descriptions.  Nevertheless, he does indicate a significant difference in 
the dance patterns of Blacks and Native Americans.  It is also important to note that 
within the context of ritualistic dances and rites, the two groups maintained a degree of 
cultural distance.  According to Seminole Indian and historian Susan Miller, Blacks, 
regardless of their living arrangement, were not participants in the Seminole busk ritual.14  
Thus, regardless of the close relationship that developed between the two, certain cultural 
expressions were unique for each group. 
 In time, maroon communities developed into separate settlements, villages, and 
towns adjacent to Native American settlements.  The first noted town was Angola.  It was 
located near present-day Tampa Bay along the Manatee River and closely associated with 
a large community, not adjacent but in the vicinity.  Evidence such as a letter from British 
merchants suggests the possibility of Blacks inhabiting the region as early as 1772.  
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However, during the Patriot War from 1812-1814, Blacks were noted as fleeing the 
Alachua County region after thwarting the attempts of Georgia planters to subdue them.  
According to Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, “The negroes now separate and at a 
distance from the Indians on the Hammoc or the Hammoc not far from Tampa bay.”15
 On the Manatee River, Angola provided Blacks with access to the Caribbean, 
Cuban merchants, and the broader Atlantic world.  Also, lines of communication with 
Spanish officials in Havana were strengthened through Cuban merchants.  It is these 
merchants’ records (fishermen primarily) that reveal the name Angola as being utilized in 
reference to this black settlement.  By 1818, Angola’s existence was known by the United 
States, Spanish, and British authorities.  In 1821, Angola was destroyed by the United 
States.  Its inhabitants either fled south to the Florida Keys where they were taken to the 
Bahamas with the aid of the Spanish or resettled to the immediate east just north of 
present day Bartow on the Peace River in closer proximity to Native Americans.  This 
settlement was known as Minatti.  Native Americans who also fled the Alachua County 
region relocated to the east of Angola along the Peace River in present-day Polk 
County.16  These particular Native Americans became known as the Seminoles, thus, 
those Blacks affiliated with the Seminoles became known as the Black Seminoles (a 
closer examination of their relationship will be discussed in the following chapter).  By 
the advent of the Second Seminole War (1835), there were five distinct Black Seminole 
towns in which the majority of the Black Seminole population lived.  They were 
Pilaklikaha, King Hadjo’s Town, Bucker Woman’s Town, Mulatto Girls’ Town, and 
Minatti. 
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 Terrance Weik’s archaeological findings at Pilaklikaha provide insight into Black 
Seminole culture.  These findings reveal how Pilaklikaha differed from both Seminole 
and plantation communities.  The first example is the “asymmetrical, non-geometrical” 
layout of the town unlike the “family-homestead” of the Seminole or the normal “linear” 
layout of the slave quarters in plantation society.  Pilaklikaha’s length to width ratio was 
larger than that of Seminole communities yet smaller than the typical slave quarter.17
 The second example relates to the pottery found at Pilaklikaha.  “Triangular 
punctuates” on the rim sherds recovered at Pilaklikaha were not recovered at nearby 
Seminole Indian sites.  Weik discovered that tiny triangles were inscribed on the rims of 
pottery.  It has been suggested that these markings were individualistic creations of Black 
Seminoles much like a “personalized maker’s mark.”  These markings indicate an 
African presence, given that identical triangular markings are found on eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Ghanaian pottery.18
 A surface survey of Pilaklikaha uncovered a black glass bead.  Blue green, and 
clear beads were later discovered.  According to Weik, blue beads were also found on 
various plantations and in African American burial sites in North America, including 
Seminole sites such as Weekiwachee and the Fort Brooke Cemetery.  Although the 
particular spiritual usage of beads in the Black Seminole culture is not known, their 
frequent usage as adornments for pouches and clothing has been established.19
 Throughout the shift from black settlements to Black Seminole villages and 
towns, the “emancipated Africans” maintained their Afro-religious values.  According to 
Ogunleye, they believed, trusted, and relied upon the “supernatural intervention of their 
African Gods and departed ancestors for the well-being of their communities.”20  
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Throughout both black settlements and Black Seminole villages and towns, shrines and 
altars dedicated to various deities and ancestors were located.  According to the practices 
of their faith, these deities were fed, while women would extract their breast milk to place 
on the tombs of deceased children.  The dead were buried facing the east.  During 
religious ceremonies and worship services, call-and-response and counterclockwise 
dancing and singing were commonplace, all of which are traditional African religious 
expressions.21
 Known African cultural retentions, particularly in the area of religious expression, 
seem to confirm Rebecca Bateman’s supposition that the “Black Seminole naming 
system represents strong evidence for the existence of a naming system which bears 
striking similarities to the Kongo-Angola naming system.”  The act of naming a child 
was considered a religious matter that warranted a ritual ceremony in many West African 
cultures.  Historical evidence clearly suggests a strong Kongo-Angola influence in the 
Black Seminole culture, especially in the practice of naming.22
 By focusing on three of the largest extended Black Seminole families among the 
Oklahoma Seminole freedmen whose founders can be directly linked to Florida, Bateman 
traces the ethnological roots of words to distinct African origins.  “For example, the word 
Pilaklikaha very well may have been derived from the word Pakala, which is a challenge 
stance in the Kongo.”23
 Although “slave names” such as Pompey, Scipio, Caesar, Primus, Venus, Diana, 
and Daphne are more prevalent among the list of Blacks emigrating from Florida to 
Oklahoma, the West African names such as Dembo, Dindy, Cuffee, Mungo, Juba, Quaco, 
Cudjo(e), Sukey, and Rhina were also noted.24  Bateman explains that words of Kongo-
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Angolan origin comprise “40% of the African derived lexical items in Gullah,” of which 
the Black Seminole language, Afro-Seminole Creole is derived.  The Black Seminole 
name Dindy was an African-derived word in the Gullah language meaning “small child” 
and used to express endearment between boys and girls.  The word dindi is also listed by 
Phillip Morgan as meaning “child” in the Gullah language.25   
 The Afro-Seminole Creole language is an English-related Creole.  It is a 
descendant or derivative of the Gullah language.  Due primarily to the isolation of the 
Black Seminoles, the Afro-Seminole Creole language (ASC, hereafter) has, according to 
linguist Ian Hancock, “preserved far more of its original character than has Gullah.”  In 
the linguistic terms, creolization is a process in which a new language develops from the 
fusion of communicators that do not have a language in common.  In the case of the 
Black Seminoles, ASC earliest formations included a creolization of English and a 
mixture of West African languages.26
 The ASC is considered to be “almost identical to the conservative Gullah of a 
century ago . . . but it does not have the non-English sounds which Gullah has.”  The 
African influence on the Gullah language is reflected in the incorporation of Sierra Leone 
Krio and Mende terms.  However, the Mende did not have a strong presence in Sierra 
Leone until after 1800, therefore, Mende words are not found in the ASC.  The ASC 
language formed prior to 1800.  From Hancock’s research, both the similarities as well as 
the differences between the two languages can be identified.  Examples are: 
 1. Gullah: e nuh shum or e ain’ shum 
  ASC:  e nuh shem 
  English: he did not see her 
 
 2. Gullah: e ain’ gwine shum 
  ASC:  e nen shem or e nuh gwen shem 
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  English: he won’t see her27
 In example one, both the Gullah and ASC languages utilize “e” as the pronoun  
he, she, or it as well as the word “nuh” meaning not or doesn’t in English.  In the Gullah 
translation, there are two sentences demonstrating the change in the language and 
adoption of the word “aint” (spelled as ain’).  It has been shown that creolization of the 
Gullah language resulted from the infusion of more derivatives from the English 
language.  Example two further demonstrates the adaption of the ain’ word in Gullah 
while the ASC language maintains a closer African cultural connection with an African 
based dialect.  For example: 
English:  Where did those women hear that you didn’t want to go to John’s house 
with us? 
 
ASC:  duh wisseh de ooman-dem bin yeddy she humuh nuh oin wan’ fuh go tuh 
John house wit we? 
 
Krio:  nuh usie de ooman – dem bin yerry she una no bin wan’ foh go nuh John 
ho’se wit we? 
 
In this translation of modern ASC language the word “modern” is pertinent here because 
the translation in ASC is derived from studies of Black Seminoles in twentieth century 
Texas.  Thus, this further demonstrates the continuing trend of the language to utilize 
African words.28
 By examining the ASC research, one is afforded the ability to trace Black 
Seminole migratory patterns.  Based upon Hancock’s extensive research on the ASC 
language, the following map outlines Black Seminole migrations up to approximately 20 
years before their departure from Florida. 
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Ian Hancock, The Texas Seminoles and their Language, (Austin:  African and African 
American Studies and Research Center, 1980): page 8. 
 
1. South Carolina/Georgia:  From 1670 to 1749 both states relied heavily upon West 
African slaves; it is in this area that the Gullah language is formed in North 
America. 
 
2. Saint Augustine: The ASC is noted among the runaway slaves in Saint Augustine 
in 1699. 
 
3. Andros Island:  From 1812 to the mid-nineteenth century Black Seminoles began 
to take residence on Andros Island.  Today, Black Seminoles live there at Red 
Bay. 
 
4. Negro Fort:  In 1816, Black Seminoles are recorded living in the northwest area 
of Florida.  The Negro Fort will be discussed later in the study. 
 
5. Guanabacoa, Cuba:  Around 1820, Black Seminoles are reported to have began 
arriving and settling near Havana in Guanabacoa.29  
 
It is important to note that these areas are not the sole locations for Black Seminoles in 
Florida, but areas where they were highly concentrated and where the ASC language was 
highly visible. 
 In 1739, Governor Manuel de Montiano officially established the town of Gracia 
Real de St. Teresa de Mose (Fort Mose, hereafter) approximately two miles north of St. 
Augustine.  Although the Spanish recorded little information regarding its structure, 
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British reports describe Fort Mose as “four square with a flanker at each corner, banked 
with earth, having a ditch without on all sides lined round with prickly royal and . . . a 
well and a house within, and a look-out.”  Fort Mose was located at the head of Mose 
Creek, a tributary of North River, which provided an abundance of shellfish and saltwater 
fish.  Freedmen planted in the fields nearby while smaller maroon communities 
developed in the vicinity.30
 By the time Fort Mose became an official town, St. Augustine had already earned 
the reputation of being a safe haven for runaway slaves.  Thus in August of 1739, word 
from Indian allies in the nearby areas reached Montiano confirming that the British had 
attempted to erect a fort in the Apalachee region (northwest of St. Augustine), but the 
Blacks revolted, murdered all the whites, and escaped.  These runaways, days later, 
would seek directions to the Spanish from Native Americans they met in the wooded 
areas of Florida.  Fort Mose quickly became known as a center of black freedom for 
runaways and a village of new converts as all residents received some type of Catholic 
instruction.31
 In the following year, Georgia Governor James Ogelthorpe invaded Florida, 
wreaking havoc on Spanish communities in the territory.  Although Governor 
Ogelthorpe’s invasion was unsuccessful, many Spanish forts and settlements were 
destroyed, including Fort Mose.  For the next twelve years, inhabitants of Fort Mose 
lived among the Spanish in St. Augustine.  The small maroon communities that existed in 
the wooded areas surrounding Fort Mose were forced to flee further into the woods and 
joined other maroon societies or Indian settlements.  Research has shown that during this 
time Florida black culture was infused with Spanish values, including Catholicism.32
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 For those Blacks who relocated in Saint Augustine, a bond formed between the 
important members of both communities.  Due to the fact that there were always a lower 
number of female runaways, black males looked to Indian women or free and slave 
women in Saint Augustine for companionship.  According to Landers, interracial 
relationships were common, whether cohibitation or formal marriages.  As an example, 
Landers provides the story of Thomas Chrisostomo.33
 Thomas Chrisostomo and his first wife were Congo slaves belonging to different 
people.  In 1745, they wed in St. Augustine.  Pedro Groxales and his free wife, Maria, 
were the godparents at the wedding.  By 1759, Thomas was a free widower.  In the 
following year he married a widow by the name of Maria Francisca.  Thomas’ godfather 
had also gained his freedom by this time; however, his wife and at least four of their 
children were still slaves in Saint Augustine.  The line between slave and free was altered 
and crossed in marriage seldom without difficulties.  According to Landers, “Spaniards 
also viewed society as an extension of family structures…the institution of extended 
kinship which included blood relatives, fictive kin, and sometimes servants or slaves.”  
Mutual obligations were understood and honored by both groups.  Many of the Blacks in 
and around St. Augustine also had extensive contact with English culture as well as  
Yamasee Indian culture.  Therefore, what research discovers is that due to the frequent 
interaction of members of Fort Mose with St. Augustine residents, those particular Blacks 
were exposed to outside cultures much more broadly and as a result, incorporated more 
cultural diversity into their African-centered culture.  Also, once Blacks gained their 
freedom, they closely associated themselves with the remnants of seven different Indian 
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nations, thus engaging a variety of Native American cultures.34  The association of 
Blacks and Indians will also be discussed further in the following chapter. 
 There were objections to Blacks living in St. Augustine.  Poor Spaniards viewed 
the relocated Blacks as competing wage laborers.  There is little doubt that racial 
prejudice also became a factor.  In 1749, the new governor Melchor de Navarrete, 
decided to rebuild Fort Mose.  In 1752, Governor Fulgencio Garcia de Solis attempted to 
remove Blacks to Fort Mose.  He faced stern opposition.  Governor Garcia de Solis 
reported to the crown that black opposition to their return to Fort Mose was not founded 
in fear of attacks but their “desire to live in complete liberty.”  This raises questions as to 
the validity of historical descriptions depicting Fort Mose as a free black town.35
 Ogunleye contends that those Blacks at Fort Mose were in fact re-enslaved.  She 
goes on further to state that, “these Africans were treated like children and constantly 
reminded of the inferior status their African blood supposedly produced.”  Also, she adds, 
“they surrendered one European name and identity [English] for another [Spanish] and 
were forced to convert to Catholicism.”  Landers also agrees with the supposition that 
Blacks were forced to convert.  According to Ogunleye, many never gained their freedom 
and for those who did it certainly did not guarantee freedom for their families.  Their 
living conditions were shabby at best.36
 Regardless of the exact status of the Blacks at Fort Mose, Blacks in and around 
Fort Mose were involved in a cultural adaptation process that mixed African, English, 
Spanish, and a number of Indian cultures.  Kathleen Deagan’s archaeological research 
uncovered artifacts of material culture that demonstrate the cultural adaptation process.  
For example, a hand-made pewter medal was found.  On one side St. Christopher was 
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depicted while the other side had a pattern resembling the Kongo star.37  Thus, much like 
their Black counterparts in the wilderness, Blacks who remained in close and constant 
contact maintained African cultural ties, particularly with the Kongo.  Regardless of the 
contact with larger outside cultures, Blacks continued to develop and maintain their own 
cultural identity. 
 In 1763, Florida was occupied and controlled by the British for the first time in  
approximately twenty years.  During this time, the majority of Blacks associated with 
Saint Augustine and Fort Mose relocated to Cuba.  All of the inhabitants of Fort Mose 
were relocated.  In 1784 when the British returned, Blacks also returned.  However, how 
many Blacks returned who were occupants of Fort Mose is not known.  Fort Mose was 
never re-established.  Thus, the Black community of Fort Mose remained scattered.  
Although the Spanish returned and established control in Florida again, Blacks had begun 
to establish a close relationship with the Native Americans in the region who had by now 
began a new Indian nation known as the Seminole.  Black maroon settlements were 
established in close proximity to Seminole settlements, villages, and towns.  In time, they 
became known as the Black Seminoles.  Black Seminoles would eventually come in 
contact with the Fort Mose descendants through trade, thus exposing Black Seminoles in 
Florida to various aspects of Carribbean culture, particularly material culture.38
 From their initial arrival in the sixteenth century, Blacks began to abscond from 
European authorities and establish maroon societies in the Florida wilderness.  As the 
Spanish began to establish settlements and control of Florida, Blacks began to increase in 
number.  In the seventeenth century, Spanish control in the region was threatened with 
the establishment of English colonies in South Carolina.  In 1687, Spanish officials 
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reported the first runaways from the nearby English settlements.  The Spanish crown, 
interested in maintaining control in the southeast, began to encourage runaways from 
English settlements and colonies.  As a result, two distinct black communities evolved.   
 Those runaway slaves who remained in the Florida wilderness established 
communities and relationships with both nearby Native Americans and Spanish 
authorities.  They developed an African-based culture which incorporated Native 
American and Spanish cultures.  Although they lived in close proximity to Native 
Americans, they maintained a closer identity to West Africa.  This culture included 
material objects such as pottery and object scripts as well as a language. 
 As early as 1739, fugitive slaves were settling at Fort Mose, located just outside 
of present day St. Augustine.  Blacks agreed to help defend St. Augustine from outside 
European invasion in exchange for certain liberties.  The protection served three primary 
functions:  to maintain a social and strategic relationship with the Spanish, to maintain 
the Spanish foothold in St. Augustine, and to advance Blacks within Spanish society.  
The Spanish provided food until the first crops were harvested, a priest for religious 
instruction, and established a military unit.39  Arguably, Fort Mose was the first free 
black settlement in what would become the United States of America.  At Fort Mose, 
Blacks would also create a culture that wove together African, Native American, and 
Spanish elements.  However, this particular community was transported to Cuba. 
 Over time, runaway slaves  began to prosper and increase in numbers.  Blacks 
either lived in separate communities near Seminole Indians or joined them by 
cohabitating or intermarriage (this relationship will also be examined further in the next 
chapter).  Thus, they became known as the Black Seminoles, a nation within a nation.  
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Black Seminoles would continue to exist with an African-inspired culture that included a 
mixture of Spanish, English and Native American components. 
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Chapter 2 
Black and Seminole Indian Alliance 
 
 
       In the English colonies, there is no clear evidence of a mutual understanding between 
Blacks and Indians.  Relationships between Blacks and Indians were defined by  
necessity.  Collaborations were confined to specific geographic locations and 
circumstances rather than involving a massive collective effort throughout the English 
colonies.  The Spanish colonies offer a different story.  From its earliest beginnings in 
1503 (a mere decade after Columbus), Governor Nicolas Ovando of Hispanola “solicited 
that no Negro slaves should be sent to Hispanola, for they fled amongst the Indians and 
taught them bad customs, and never could be captured.”1  Florida’s landscape, like other 
Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and South America, resembled the tropical homeland 
from which many African slaves had come.  For African American slaves, it represented 
refuge from plantation society.  Black cohabitation with Seminole Indians is believed to 
have begun shortly after Seminole Indians settled in the territory.  By the early nineteenth 
century, Blacks were a noted part of their community. 
 The intent of this chapter is to examine the origins and history of the Seminole 
Indians as they relate to the Black Seminoles.  By utilizing a chronological approach, this 
chapter defines the character of their relationship while interpretating the nature of their 
alliance against both plantation society as well as the United States government. 
 The ancestors of the Seminole Indians migrated into Florida during the eighteenth 
century.  Seminole Indian migration would continue gradually over the next seventy 
years.  They began as a mixture of people from the Hitchiti, Yuchi, Yamassee, and 
Apalachee tribes.  In time, the Creek or Muskhogean would migrate into the territory and 
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cohabitate with the aforementioned groups.  Horatio Dexter, a trader in the territory, 
described Seminoles in 1823, stating, “They are by some represented as outlaws or 
runaways from the Creek Nation . . . but appear to have been rather a colony tempted to 
emigrate by the superior advantages for hunting and pasturage.”2
 The word Seminole first appears in a 1765 English document referring to a band 
of Indians in the Alachua region.  It originates from the Spanish word cimarrones.  
Indians adopted it as Simaloni.  It evolved into Semanoli and finally into Seminole.  
According to Cline, “seemingly the term embodies the concept of people who remove 
from populous towns and live by themselves …. Particularly those who establish new 
homes distant from the nation and who fail to heed its councils.”  By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, this breakaway faction of migrating Indians had assumed the term 
Seminole for identification.  British authorities and citizens alike broadened the scope to 
include other Indians in Florida.3  Cultural differences developed between Seminoles and 
Creeks.  This was due primarily to the adaptations to environmental changes intrinsic in 
the migratory process.  The distance between the two expanded, thus allowing the 
Seminoles to create an autonomy instrumental in developing their own communities.  For 
example, their villages and towns were smaller and were developed in a less formal 
arrangement.  Also by the nineteenth century, they no longer relied on the Creeks for 
direction.  The assuming of the name Seminole for identification was indeed also a 
symbol of the creation of a new tribe.4
 During Florida’s first period as a British colony (1763-83), an increasing number 
of Blacks began to inhabit the region.  James Grant, governor of British East Florida, 
believed that the economic development and overall prosperity of the colony relied upon 
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the institution of slavery.  He began to offer new settlers one hundred acres per head of 
household and an additional fifty acres for every white and black person in the family, 
causing slave importation to increase tremendously.  Florida produced a two-to-one ratio 
of slaves to Whites.  During this period, the average plantation had between seventy and 
two hundred slaves.5
 As a result, Blacks were either purchased by Seminoles or given as presents.  The 
going rate was forty head of cattle.  The quality of cattle corresponded with the quality of 
the slave, taking into consideration such factors as age, sex, weight, and condition.  
British officials would strengthen alliances with Seminole chiefs by presenting them with 
slaves as gifts.6  During primarily to the influx of runaway slaves which in turn increased 
cohabitation, the relationship between runaways and Seminoles was also strengthening; 
therefore, the Seminoles welcomed runaways as well.  In time, when Florida became a 
Spanish colony once again, Seminoles began to forcefully take Blacks in the North 
Florida region.7
 Seminole slaves consisted of both Blacks and captured Indians; however, their 
institution of slavery was vastly different from both the English and Spanish societies.  
The slaves lived by themselves in their own villages with little or no supervision.  
Kenneth Porter describes the relationship as such: 
 A system of relationship between the Seminole Indians and their Blacks 
developed which was the admiration or horror of all beholders.  The Blacks lived in 
separate villages of well built houses, raised crops of corn, sweet potatoes, other 
vegetables and even cotton, and possess herds of livestock; their masters, or rather 
protectors, never presumed to meddle with any of this property as long as they received a 
reasonable “tribute” [generally believed to be one third of their produce].  [They were] in 
no case treated as chattels.8
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 As Porter indicates, as long as they paid their “tributes” they were generally left to 
themselves to create both a community and culture of their own.  These “tributes” could 
easily be equated with taxes that any British or Spanish citizen would pay.  Colonel G. 
Humphreys, a Seminole agent, described the relationship as such:  “The Blacks of the 
Seminole Indians are wholly independent…. And are slaves in name, they work only 
when it suits their inclination.”9  Seminole Indians were fully aware of the importance of 
slaves and slavery to Whites.  Thus, the term slave became an intrinsic part of 
negotiations throughout conflicts with Whites (including the war) as well as a useful 
means for Seminoles to highlight their strength through sheer numbers. 
 Gradually, Blacks coalesced into two groups within Seminole society.  The first 
group was the maroons.  This group of Blacks were in the company of Seminole Indians 
the longest.  The second group was new arrivals that resulted from the influx of slaves 
into Florida.  This group was primarily composed of runaways.  During the earliest 
periods of the formation of the two groupings, the fugitive slaves were was ostracized to 
a certain degree until they had proven themselves to be both loyal and productive 
members of the community.  Gradual acceptance was achieved primarily through 
marriage and the longevity of existence within the community.10
 The exact number of families produced from miscegenation or marriage may 
forever remain a mystery.  Evidence does, however, indicate that marriages between 
Blacks and Indians were less common than noted by earlier studies.  The practice of 
intermarriage seems to apply more so to the leadership circles of the two groups and less 
between the commoners among Blacks and Indians.  This would suggest that  alliances 
were predicated upon strategic marriages.  There are several examples of intermarriage 
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and miscegenation within the leaderships of both sides.  Black Seminole leader John 
Cavallo was born to a Seminole chief and African or African American mother.  Chief 
Micanopy had two wives, one of whom was one was a “half-breed Negro woman.”  
Seminole Chief King Philip was the father of a Black Seminole, John Philip.  The most 
noted Black Seminole leader in Florida, Abraham, wed the widow of a former Indian 
chief.”11
 Black Seminoles and Seminole Indians alike shared common practices and 
principles concerning marriage.  For Seminole Indians, before a union between a man 
and woman could take place, both clan elders had to approve.  In Black Seminole society 
parental consent was needed.  Both cultures practiced polygyny up to the twentieth 
century.  Men in both societies needed the permission of the first wife to marry again.  He 
could have as many wives as he could materially support.  In Seminole Indian society, 
polygyny occurred more often within a clan.  This was primarily due to the matrilineal 
aspect of clan kinship.  Wives from different clans lived in separate houses; two women 
living together from different clans was considered intolerable.  Wives in the Black 
Seminole society lived separately.  Two women with the same husband would not 
tolerate living in the same house.  Marriage within their respective societies was more 
commonly preferred by both groups; however, marriages between Indian and Blacks 
were generally accepted.12  It is important to understand that marriage or miscegenation 
between the two did not necessarily represent a direct union between Blacks and Indians 
within the community. 
 The most important aspect of social grouping among Seminole Indians was the 
matrilineal clan, which traced its bloodline to a common ancestor.  The clan was the basis 
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of determining kinship, marriage and participation in ritual ceremonial functions.  It was 
the clan’s responsibility to defend its members when necessary.  Each clan selected either 
a natural phenomenon or an animal as its symbol.  This is not to say that they indulged in 
a belief in animal ancestry.  The usage of an animal as their symbol was a classification 
device.13
 Marriage did not secure entry into a clan.  However, because the clan was 
predicated upon the matrilineal line, a child born of a Seminole Indian woman was 
considered a member of the clan.  Therefore, if a Black Seminole man married a 
Seminole Indian woman, he was not a member of her clan, but their children were.  If a 
Black Seminole woman had children with a Seminole man, then her children did not 
belong to the clan.  For the most part, Black Seminoles were not included in the clan 
system except when needed for classification purposes.14
 The exclusionary rules and principles governing the clan kinship system indirectly 
demonstrate the autonomy of the Black Seminole society.  No matter how intimate a 
relationship may be between a Black Seminole and their Seminole Indian counterpart, the 
former was generally not considered a full-fledged Seminole Indian.  For most Blacks, 
regardless of the living arrangement or cultural contact, the omission of clan identity 
presented a clear separation of identity.  The principles of clan identity undoubtedly 
played an integral part in the decisions to have Black Seminoles live in separate villages.  
In fact, Seminole Indians fostered the creation of Black Seminole autonomy by 
encouraging self-sufficiency.  This in turn allowed Seminole Indians to sustain their clan 
identities.15
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 The nature of the Seminole and Black Seminole relationship evolved into a state 
of co-dependency.  On one hand, the Seminoles existed primarily on hunting and the 
herding of livestock.  The Black Seminoles’ agricultural lifestyle provided a level of 
agrarian production that Seminoles came to depend upon for the sustainability of their 
communities.  On the other hand, Black Seminoles were vulnerable to the threats of 
slavery by an ever-expanding white plantation society.  Seminole Indians provided both 
refuge and protection to the Black Seminole.  The co-dependent nature of their 
relationship is one of the primary elements of the alliance forged between the two. 
 By the early nineteenth century, the alliance between the two had strengthened to 
the extent that it emerged as a recognizable feature of the territory.  As early as 1808,  
groups of Seminole and Black Seminoles were seen trading in the St. Johns River region.  
The Spaniards utilized the alliance to their own advantage by hiring Blacks to trade with 
the Seminoles on their behalf.16  However, the most outward display of cooperation 
evidenced itself through conflict with Whites in the territory.   
 Despite the fact that Seminoles were “consciously moving away from contact 
with Whites into the remoter parts of Florida,” they had come to the realization that 
plantation society represented a force that could not be completely avoided. 17   It became 
necessary to understand as much as they could about Whites in order to negotiate a 
peaceful coexistence in Florida.  Black Seminoles became a vital instrument in dealing 
with Whites.  They began to heavily rely on their Black Seminole counterparts for 
understanding and bridging the gap of communication between them and Whites.  As a 
result, leaders in the Black Seminole communities became an integral part of the 
leadership in the Seminole Indian community. 
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 Seminole communities relied on herding, hunting, fishing, and agriculture for 
their existence.  They utilized the products from hunting and herding to trade for 
European manufactured goods.  Cattle, hogs, and the skins of bears, deer, and panthers 
were exchanged for rifles, knives, tools, powder, clothes, liquor, and slaves.  Hunting 
proved to be more useful for trade than consumption.  Leary of too much interaction with 
nearby Whites, they primarily utilized the markets in Cuba, the Bahamas, and small 
settlements on islands of the Gulf Coast.  The Gulf Coast islands were often populated 
with ex-slaves which allowed for collaboration beyond just commerce. 
 The Black Seminole communities complemented Indian communities by hunting 
with them.  Both communities would plant in common and form a separate “Indian field” 
in which they worked together.  This “Indian field” was designated as tribute to the chief 
of the neighboring town with which the Black Seminole town or village was affiliated.18  
Once Florida became a United States possession in 1821, Whites were infuriated by the 
Black-Indian relationship.  Thus, from 1821-1835 relations between Seminoles and 
Whites steadily deteriorated.   
 The alliance between Blacks and Seminoles was becoming more mutual through 
day to day contact.  Klos described, their relationship during this period best by stating 
“Indians may have had the upper hand in the relationship but never used it against the 
blacks.”  Instead, they were beginning to develop a more cohesive strategy against the 
encroachment of Whites.  For example, Whites were allowed to come into Seminole 
Territory, search for escaped slaves, and claim them.  However, Blacks claimed by 
Whites reserved the choice to return to plantation society or remain in Seminole 
Territory.19    
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When the United States gained control of Florida through a treaty with Spain in 
1821, it held dominion over Florida and subsequently the Seminole Nation.  The Black 
Seminoles had lost their ally in the British with the end of the War of 1812, while the 
Seminoles’ ability to manipulate trade and rivalries between the United States and Spain 
was all but stymied.  Indian displacement became a top priority of the administration of 
President Andrew Jackson.  In Florida, Indian removal represented the acquisition of land 
and the retrieval of slaves. 
 According to the Niles’ Weekly Register, the region between the Suwannee and 
St. John’s Rivers was “the finest agricultural district within the limits of the United 
States”, … It also stressed the advantages of a mild and healthy climate, a rich soil, and 
convenient navigation.20  Secretary of War John Calhoun was informed by the territorial 
governor, William P. DuVal, that “it will be a serious misfortune to this territory if the 
Indians are permitted to occupy this tract of country.”  DuVal went on to recommend the 
removal of Seminoles and their placement under Creek authority, “to whom they 
properly belong,” or their emigration west of the Mississippi River.21  Calhoun was far 
ahead of DuVal.  Almost a year to date earlier, he instructed Indian agent John R. Bell to 
convince the Seminoles to either join the Creeks or “to concentrate ... in one place and 
become peaceable and industrious farmers.”22  Seminoles responded to Calhoun by 
enlightening him to the fact that “An hundred summers have seen the Seminole warrior 
reposing undisturbed under the shade of his live oak, and the suns of an hundred winters 
have risen on his ardent pursuit of the buck and the bear, with none to question his 
bounds, or dispute his range.”23  From the Seminole response and DuVal’s letter to 
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Calhoun approximately one year later, obviously Calhoun’s orders to Bell had not 
resulted in success. 
 In September 1823, Seminole Indians began to negotiate terms to the effect that 
Calhoun’s orders would finally come into fruition.  Governor DuVal, along with his 
entourage, met with Indian representatives at Moultrie Creek (just south of St. Augustine) 
to agree upon the establishment of boundaries that would cede North Florida to the 
United States.  According to the treaty, the Seminoles were entitled to a region from the 
Big Swamp along the Withlacoochee River south to the main branch of the Peace or 
Charlotte River.  The United States strategically set the boundaries approximately fifteen 
to twenty miles inland denying Seminoles coastland that would allow them to make 
foreign contacts thus keeping them under United States’ control.  The agreement was 
made; North Florida was subsequently ceded to the United States.  Governmental 
representatives present at the negotiations and treaty signing quickly advised Calhoun to 
establish military posts around the borders “to embody such a population within 
prescribed limits, and to conquer their erratic habits … [and] further induce an early 
settlement of the country now open to the enterprise of [white] emigrants.”24    The 
United States acquired the fertile soil of North Florida without any major complications; 
the retrieval of slaves would be a different matter altogether. 
 The objective to retrieve Blacks lost to the Seminoles was created simultaneously 
with the order to remove them from North Florida.  In fact, Calhoun’s first instruction to 
Agent Bell informed him that “The government expects that the Slaves who have run 
away and been plundered from our Citizens or from Indian tribes within our limits 
[particularly Creeks] will be given up peaceably by the Seminole Indians when 
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demanded.”  The disputes over the possession of Blacks between Seminoles and Whites 
became the most prominent aspect of the Indian removal debate in Florida. 25   
 Negotiations often failed.  This was mainly due to the personal vested interests of 
Indian agents, who themselves were often slave owners, and the influence of Black 
Seminole interpreters and advisors consistently present at formal negotiations.  Seminole 
Indians became willing to negotiate terms for land distribution, but maintained an 
uncompromising position on the relinquishing of Black Seminoles.  For example, during 
the treaty negotiations that resulted in the ceding of North Florida to the U.S., the 
Seminoles Indians were required to list the Seminole communities including the number 
of residents.  The Seminoles listed thirty-seven towns including 4,883 residents, but as 
James Gadsden, a United States representative noted, “Objected to stating the number of 
Negroes in the nation.”26  Furthermore, Article Seven of the treaty required the Seminole 
Indians to be “active and vigilant in the preventing the retreating to, or passing through, 
of district assigned them, of any absconding slaves, or fugitives from justice” and return 
the aforementioned to an Indian agent for compensation of related expenses.27  Further 
evidence will demonstrate that the Seminole Indians had no intentions of honoring 
Article Seven.  A complete examination of this treaty will be discussed later in this study. 
 By mid-1820s, Alachua County slave owners were estimating that approximately 
one hundred slaves were still absconding to reside among the Seminoles.  Accusations 
towards the Black Seminoles were made such as “ [they] aided such slaves to select new 
and more secure places of refuge.”  One slave owner ventured to neighboring Black 
Seminole villages in search of runaways.  He determined that an exact number of 
runaways residing with Seminoles could not be determined due to the fact that “from the 
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Circumstances [sic] of their being protected by the Indian Negroes …these Indian 
Negroes are so awful that it is impossible to gain any information relating to such 
property from them.”28  Governor Duval issued a letter to the Seminole Indians advising 
them to uphold the treaty.  At the end of the letter, he issued a warning that refusing to 
give up runaways would result in the military seizure of them by force “and in the 
confusion, many of you may lose your own slaves.”29  The principal spokesman, Tuckose 
Emathla replied, “We do not like the story that our people hide the runaway Negroes 
from their masters.  It is not a true talk…. We have never prevented the whites from 
coming into our country and taking their slaves whenever they could find them and we 
will not hereafter oppose their doing so….”30
 Throughout this same time period, legal measures were developed in order to 
settle “ownership” disputes.  As a result Seminole Indians did return a few runaway 
slaves.  For the most part they refused to surrender slaves.  The principal problem with 
this law was not the content thereof, but its enforcement by Whites when Black 
Seminoles were illegally taken from Seminoles.  Governor DuVal informed the 
superintendent of Indians affairs, “I have felt ashamed while urging the Indians to 
surrender the property they hold, that I had not power to obtain for them their own rights 
and held by our citizens.”31  A second fundamental problem existed in that the Seminole 
Indians began to feel as though they had no rights in the white man’s court.  “The Indian, 
conscious of his rights, and knowing that he paid the money, though incapable of 
showing the letters executed under forms of law, as he had received none, and relying 
upon the honesty of the white man, protested most earnestly against these demands, and 
resolutely expressed a determination to resist all attempts thus to rest from his rightfully 
 46
acquired property….”32  The law itself existed in an unbiased nature enacted to secure the 
rights of personal property.  The enforcement of the law secured Whites an outlet in 
circumventing the law itself. 
 The legal measure for settling the ownership disputes ultimately failed.  In 1825, 
Alfred Beckley, a lieutenant stationed in Florida, reported that Whites utilized any 
opportunity including force against Seminoles “so that the whites might possess 
themselves of many valuable Negroes.”33  By 1828, it was reported that “so many claims 
are now made on them, that they begin to believe that it is the determination of the United 
States to take them all.  This idea is strengthened by the conversations of many of the 
Whites, and which they have heard.”34  It became obvious that Whites were going to 
utilize any measure to increase their slave ownership.  The Seminole Indians understood 
the importance of slave power in plantation society and now had come face to face with 
the length of measures in which Whites were willing to acquire it. 
 The close relationship between Seminole Indians and the Black Seminoles 
implicitly developed into a relationship between Seminoles and all Blacks in the territory.  
The Black Seminoles extended both a welcome and a comradeship to Blacks in the 
territory.  Black Seminoles often would cross the territorial boundaries and establish 
relationships with slaves on the nearby plantations.  Black Seminoles were also partially 
responsible for the demise of negotiations over runaway claims.  The mere fact that the 
interpreters in the negotiations were sometimes former slaves themselves presented a 
problem.  Governor DuVal asserted that black interpreters appeared “much more hostile 
to the white people than their masters” and they were “constantly counteracting” his 
advisement to the Seminole Indians.  He later reported instances where Seminole Chiefs 
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agreed to certain demands but would later balk on compliance after conferring with their 
black advisors.  Humphreys believed that “the Negroes of the Seminole Indians are 
wholly independent, or at least regardless of the authority of their masters; and are slaves 
but in name.”  He felt that Indians saw Blacks “rather as fellow sufferers and companions 
in misery than as inferiors” and that “[the] great influence of the Slaves posses over their 
masters [allowed them to] artfully represent whites as hostiles.”35
 Governor DuVal would eventually go on to become a primary instigator in the 
greatest test of the alliance between Indians and Blacks.  As early as 1826, Seminole 
Indian removal became a serious solution posed by Whites instead of a mere suggestion.  
DuVal would go even further to advise Indian Superintendent McKinney, “The 
Government ought not to admit Negroes to go with them … I am convinced the sooner 
they dispose of them the better.”36   
 By the end of the decade, white southerners began to view Indians as potential 
allies of foreign powers and the presence of runaway slaves among them a threat to the 
security of plantation society.  Throughout the South, state laws were being enacted to 
lessen the independence of Indians as well as make emigration more attractive to them.  
President Jackson shared the interest of white southerners and began to urge Congress to 
adopt a federal policy of Indian removal.  In 1830, Congress adopted such a policy and 
appropriated $500,000 for negotiation of removal treaties.  Strategies were devised to 
weaken the strength of tribes while pushing them westward at the same time.  For 
example, the policy officially recognized Indian fathers as the owners of land and the 
heads of a family.  The measure essentially weakened the clan and its position in Indian 
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society.  This measure indicated the intent of Whites to force cultural changes within 
Indian society. 
 For white Floridians, their primary reason for the removal of Seminoles remained 
the same throughout the years.  To them, Seminole presence was “a most weighty 
objection … [due to the fact] that absconding slaves find ready security among the 
Indians and such aid is amply Sufficient to enable them successfully to elude the best 
efforts by their masters to recover them.”37  By 1827, the territorial government had 
begun adopting the aforementioned measure to entice emigration and formally began 
requesting Indian removal throughout the territory. 
 In January 1832, instructions were given by Secretary of War Lewis Cass to draft 
a treaty and arrange the removal of the Seminoles west to live within the Creek Nation.  
As always, Black Seminole leaders were present during negotiations.  Whites would 
continue to claim as many runaways as possible, while Seminoles were still reluctant to 
relinquish any to their authority.  A division among the Seminole Nation was also 
developing in terms of provisions within the possible treaty.  As far as the United States 
was concerned, the Seminoles belonged to the Creek Confederacy.  Neither Black 
Seminoles or their Indian counterparts wished to reside within the Creek Confederacy. 
 The Seminoles had been gradually asserting their autonomy for many years, but 
the Creeks refused to acknowledge their separate identity.  By utilizing their clan identity 
ties, Creeks often included Seminoles in their treaties with the United States regardless of 
Seminole opinion or the presence of Seminole leaders during negotiations.  For Black 
Seminoles, a reunification with Creeks in the west would only guarantee re-enslavement. 
 49
 By asserting the inclusion of Seminoles within the Creek Confederacy, the latter 
would go further to assert claims on Black Seminoles during negotiations.  Demands 
were then made by the Creeks concerning Black Seminoles, thus complicating matters 
for all involved.  Agent Thompson advised Governor DuVal, “As it would be difficult, 
not to say impossible, to prove that the negroes claimed by the Creeks, now in the 
possession of the Seminole Indians, are the identical negroes, or their descendants … I 
cannot conceive that the Creeks can be supposed to have a fair claim to them …” 
Nevertheless, Washington authorities would continue combining the Creeks and 
Seminoles together during their Indian removal activities in Florida.38
 In regard to Black Seminoles, it became quite clear that U.S. policy was only 
interested in their enslavement.  Due to the conditions of the treaties of emigration (which 
will be further examined later), Blacks would begin to assert objections different from 
those of the Indians.  Failed treaties and ever increasing hostilities would result in the 
most costly, deadly war between Whites and Indians known as the Second Seminole 
War.39
 In essence, what we find in examining the relationship between Blacks and 
Seminole Indians is cohesiveness unlike any other relationship between Blacks and 
Indians of the Southeast.  All other members of the Five Civilized Tribes included slave 
codes in their constitution.  Creek law frowned upon intermarriage between the two “as it 
is a disgrace to our Nation for our people to marry a Negro.”  In 1827, the Cherokees 
excluded Blacks from political involvement and discouraged joint emigration.  The 
Choctaws imitated white society in the laws affecting Blacks after emigration.40
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 The alliance between Blacks and Indians within the Seminole Nation began with a 
basic empathy for one another.  Seminole Indians understood the urge of Blacks to attain 
as well as maintain their own freedom.  This basic empathy developed into a co-
dependent relationship.  The intermarriage and cultural exchange that occurred between 
the groups strengthened their ties.  Much of the collaboration between Blacks and Indians 
was motivated by the presence of a common white foe.  The Seminole Nation grew as a 
response to increased oppression by Whites.  Their codependency became the key to their 
survival.  They found a way to coexist while at the same time maintaining their own 
cultural identity.  Here again, because Whites often treated them differently, they were 
able to retain cultural traits through their own distinct experiences. 
 Black Seminoles were incorporated into Seminole life in different ways.  
However, because they were allowed their own living arrangements and encouraged to be 
self-sufficient, they maintained a separate identity.  Black Seminoles gained their 
Seminole Indian counterparts’ respect by becoming trusted interpreters, advisors, wives, 
husbands, hunters, warriors, and field hands.  For them, any status among Seminole 
Indians was better than chattel slavery with Whites. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Black Seminole Early Resistance and Involvement During the Second Seminole War 
 
 As with any major historical event, the Second Seminole War was the result of 
culminating developments.  It would prove inadequate to say the least to examine just the 
war without discussing the arising tensions, conflicts, and political climate which existed 
prior to the war.  Accordingly, this chapter will also examine the war with a focus on the 
involvement of the Black Seminoles.  Time periods previously examined are included in 
this chapter with emphasis solely on the Black Seminoles.  In doing so, it is the objective 
of this chapter to demonstrate the contributions of the Black Seminoles. 
 According to Jane Landers, “Free blacks had been organizing themselves into 
militia units under their own leaders in Florida since the seventeenth century . . .”  They 
began to provide military service to Spanish authorities which in turn garnered them 
recognition from the Spanish crown.1  Once their service was formally recognized by the 
Edict of 1693, they were incorporated into the military.  Like other military organizations 
serving the crown, black militias had regular officers, systematic training, and state-
supplied  pay, equipment, arms and uniforms.2
 During the eighteenth century, tensions began to increase between Britain and 
Spain, and both sides began to seek ways to destabilize the other in the Americas.  Spain, 
in order to challenge the British, allied themselves with slaves in the English colonies.  
Thus, Florida became a safe haven for black runaways.  The origins of the development 
of this policy may be traced back to the latter part of the seventeenth century.  It is not 
known whether the policy of accepting runaways was initiated solely by the Spanish 
(without the influence of runaways themselves) or simply a result of the recognition of 
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the influx of runaways and the political and military advantages they seemed to offer.  
However, the Edict of 1693 appears to set the precedence.  King Charles II wrote to 
Governor Quiroga in response to the question of allowing runaways to convert to 
Catholicism, stating: 
To the Governor and Captain General of the city of St. Augustine…..  It has been 
notified in different letters, dated 1688, 1689, and 1690, that eight black males 
and two black females, who had run away from the city of San Jorge, arrived to 
that presidio asking for the holy water of baptism, which they received after being 
instructed in Christian doctrine.  Later on, the chief sergeant of San Jorge visited 
the city with the intention to clam the runaways, but it was not proper to do so, 
because they had already become Christians.  As a prize for having adopted the 
Catholic doctrine and become Catholicized, as soon as you get the letter, set them 
all free and give them anything they need, and favor them as much as possible.  I 
hope them to be an example, together with my generosity of what others should 
do.  I want to be notified of the following of my instruction as soon as possible.3
 
 The King’s letter indicates that religious convictions seem to have influenced the 
decision to use Blacks for military and political advantages over the British.  However, 
when examining the Edict of 1693 in the geopolitical context of North America, the use 
of Catholicism appears to become a vehicle in which Spain was able to justify the 
strategic acceptance of runaway slaves.  Charles II waited five years before he responded 
to the letter.  He received the first letter in 1688, as indicated in his 1693 response letter.  
In that time he was able to assess the importance of Blacks as a tool against the British.  
During this same period, Carolina citizens (under British colonial rule) made several 
complaints to Spanish authorities concerning the return of runaway slaves.  In response, 
Spanish authorities promised to compensate them for their slaves but not to return the 
slaves.  This promise was never fulfilled.  It would seem that if religious exhortations 
were the key element to keeping the slaves then compensation in some manner would 
have been a safer and more amicable diplomatic gesture.  The king was informed that the 
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British subjects preferred their slaves.  The question then becomes why did it take the 
five years to issue the letter when tensions where steadily rising?  During the five years, 
Charles II realized that the loss of slaves would seriously weaken the Carolina colony, 
and in turn, weaken the British strongholds in North America.  By issuing the Edict of 
1693 he was able to accomplish two goals in the struggle with England.  He was able to 
weaken  British power in the area while also procuring manpower for the defense of 
Florida.  The guarantee of freedom and safety established Blacks as a key element in his 
defense of Florida for Spain. 
 The Yamasee War, 1714-1716, demonstrated the impact and future implications 
of the Edict of 1693.  It also demonstrated the strength of a united Black and Indian 
military force.  The Yamasee and Creek Indians had been allied with the British.  The 
Yamasee assisted the British in capturing Apalachee Indians for the purpose of Indian 
slave trading.  Throughout their relationship with the British, the Yamasee were involved 
in trading with British subjects.  In time, the Yamasee created a debt with British traders 
which in turn caused the latter to seize Yamasees as slaves for repayment of debt.  In 
doing so, they began a war in which Yamasees, Creeks, and Apalachees attacked the 
South Carolina colony.  Many slaves joined the war against the British.  By 1716, the 
British along with those Indians still loyal to them defeated the Yamasee and their allies.  
The defeated (along with their allies) left South Carolina and headed to St. Augustine 
where they would not only be safe, but would be afforded the chance to ally themselves 
with a stronger force against the British.  Although there was a “constant flow of Africans 
into St. Augustine even before the Yamasee War,” the war represented an open alliance 
between the Spanish and black slaves in British colonial North America.  During the war 
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the Spanish supported the hit-and-run tactics of the united front against the British in 
order to destroy them in the Southeast.  Though the effort was thwarted, the Yamasee 
War strengthened the political goals of the Edict of 1693 for the Spanish while helping to 
create the dynamics of the Seminole and Black Seminole alliance.  The Stono Rebellion 
caused an influx of Blacks into Florida.  Furthermore, they  established the military bond 
between Indians and Blacks in resistance to slavery.4
 From 1717 to 1740 Blacks established themselves in Spanish Florida through 
military service to the crown.  Despite the Edict of 1693, many Blacks found themselves 
in either slavery or indentured servitude in Spanish Florida.  Consequently, it is during 
this period that the first primary black leader emerged.  It is important to note that at this 
particular time these groups were not known or recognized as Black Seminoles, however, 
they did represent the basis for black freedom in Florida. 
 Francisco Menendez was a Mandingo runaway in South Carolina who had fought 
in the Yamasee War and fled to Florida.  In Florida, Menendez was re-enthralled in a 
condition similar to indentured servitude.  He went on to become the leader of the black 
militia in St. Augustine.  He established himself by helping to defeat the British in a 1728 
attack.  In 1737, his petition, “The Runaway Negroes from English Plantations to the 
Crown,” was accepted by Spanish authorities.  In this petition, Menendez urged the 
authorities to adhere to the Edict of 1693 and grant Blacks full freedom and appoint 
Menendez as the governor of Fort Mose.5  For Blacks, it would demonstrate that military 
service was the key to securing their freedom.  This concept would prove effective 
throughout the Seminole Wars. 
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 In 1739, South Carolina leaders received a declaration of war from England 
against Spain.  Tensions between England and Spain had mounted to the point where 
negotiations and treaties had become null and void.  The British cited the Edicts of 1693 
and 1738 as policies directly aimed at destroying the colony of South Carolina.  The 
following year, the British launched their largest assault on the Spanish in North America 
with St. Augustine being the primary point of assault.  During the assault, the black 
militia was relocated to St. Augustine in defense of the city.  The British occupied the 
abandoned Ft. Mose and utilized it as a point of attack on St. Augustine.  On June 15, 
1740, the black militia along with a group of Indians under the command of Menendez 
attacked the British at Fort Mose.  In less than one month, the British forces evacuated 
the fort.  From this particular point onward, the Spanish would be largely dependant on 
auxiliary forces for protection in Florida.  Menendez utilized his position and the 
dependence of Spain on the black militia to his advantage.  By 1752, Fort Mose was 
completely rebuilt and re-occupied by Blacks.6
 For the next decade, the black militia would continue to provide service to the 
Spanish crown defending St. Augustine in exchange for freedom and land for Blacks in 
and around Ft. Mose.  Runaways from South Carolina would continue to increase the 
black population in the region.  During this time, members of the Yamasee, Creeks, 
Apalachee, Yuchi, and Hitchiti tribes of Indians were beginning to create the Seminole 
Indian Nation.  The geopolitical and military struggles among the British, Spanish, and 
French were beginning to reshape North America.  By 1763, the Treaty of Paris had 
ended the conflict between the British and Spanish in Florida.  Florida was ceded to the 
British.7  The lives of Blacks and Indians alike would be to transformed forever.  The 
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loss of a powerful ally in Spain would cause them to begin to forge a bond that became 
the essence of their survival.   
 British dominion over the Florida Territory lasted for twenty years.  During this 
time military service was all but nonexistent.  With the relocation of the majority of the 
black militia from Ft. Mose to Cuba, those Blacks who remained began to cohabitate with 
other Blacks in the wilderness, including runaway slaves who were still absconding from 
South Carolina and newly colonized Georgia, along with Indians.  The Seminoles were 
now spreading out across Central and North Florida.  They were no longer concentrated 
around St. Augustine.  Large bands created a society in the Alachua and Pensacola 
regions.  This was primarily due to their cohabitation with a large number of Creeks who 
became disenchanted with the Creek Nation and sought independence.  It is during this 
period that many Blacks, primarily runaways, began to create villages in close proximity 
to Seminoles.  In 1783, the geopolitical climate would again change. The Treaty of Paris, 
which ended the American Revolution, ceded Florida back to Spain.8  Although Spain 
sought to restore Spanish Florida to its previous state, Spaniards found themselves a 
minority in the territory.  A number of South Carolinian and Georgia planters had created 
a plantation society in East Florida surrounding St. Augustine.  Those Blacks and Indians 
who remained in East Florida had now created a society that included traits of Spanish 
culture.  According to Landers, “There is no evidence that any of the Florida Indians 
[who relocated with the Spanish in 1763] ever returned … nor is there any clear evidence 
that any of the free Blacks of Mose returned to Florida.”9  Black militias resurfaced with 
the Seminoles as their primary ally.  From this particular point onward, black military 
leadership evolved into Black Seminole leadership. 
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 As with the British, Americans viewed the Edicts of 1693 and 1783 as a direct 
threat to plantation society.  Although the edicts were repealed, Spanish authorities made 
no efforts to return runaway slaves.  Secretary of State for the Continental Congress, John 
Jay, informed Thomas Jefferson that Seminoles were wreaking havoc on the State of 
Georgia and that something had to be done.10  The Spanish position in Florida was weak 
at best.  Alachua Seminoles represented a buffer between the United States and Spanish 
Florida, therefore Spanish authorities supported the Seminoles by granting them land and 
money to prosper in the region.  All inhabitants profited through trade.  For Spaniards, to 
adhere to any sanction against the Seminoles was to inevitably lose a valued ally, thus 
making the territory quite vulnerable to seizure.  To return any runaway slaves would 
ultimately have the same consequences.  Therefore, what we find at the advent of the 
nineteenth century is the resurfacing of the same tensions between plantation society in 
Georgia and South Carolina and Spanish Florida. 
 Once again tensions mounted such that in 1811 the United States President James 
Madison was given authorization by Congress to use military force to seize Florida. 
President Madison at this point was in a very delicate situation to say the least.  Tensions 
between the United States and England had also mounted to the degree that war was 
imminent.  Madison was careful not to spark violent conflicts with both Spain and 
England simultaneously.  He outwardly admonished Georgia Governor David B. Mitchell 
for any open attacks against Florida while allowing Secretary of State James Monroe to 
place Mitchell in command of East Florida.  Mitchell was allowed to keep troops in 
Florida while creating his own state militia.11
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 In 1812, Mitchell mobilized a detachment of his state militia in an attack against 
Florida and initiated the Florida Patriot War.  In response, Spanish authorities again 
utilized black military service to protect themselves.  The garrison at St. Augustine 
consisted of four hundred Whites and five hundred Blacks.12  It is important to note the 
fact that not all of the runaways joined the Seminoles or Black Seminoles.  There were 
those who placed themselves under Spanish rule.  Black Seminoles, however, were in the 
more favorable position as they lived in more strategic locations and were better trained 
in arms.  The Spanish authorities looked to them as their most reliable allies in Florida. 
 In July of the same year, Mitchell voiced his complaints concerning the arming of 
Blacks by Spanish authorities as well as the arrival of black troops from Cuba.  He was 
convinced that these measures would entice American slaves to revolt.  In a letter to 
Spanish authorities Mitchell states, “Your certain knowledge of the peculiar situation 
[slavery] of the Southern section of the union ... [should] have induced you [to] abstain 
from introducing those [Blacks] into the province…”13
 In late July, a black man traveling throughout Florida warned both Seminole and 
Black Seminole villages that an attack was underway and that Whites planned to take 
their land and subdue them.  On July 25, two hundred Indian warriors and forty Blacks 
from the Alachua region attacked the plantations along the St. Johns River, causing panic 
and desertion among the Georgia militia.14  By month’s end, Mitchell’s assumptions had 
proven correct.  Slaves deserted plantations throughout the region as well as in Georgia 
and South Carolina to join the Indian and Black warriors.  On July 30, U.S. Colonel 
Thomas A. Smith reported “several hundred fugitive slaves from the Carolinas & 
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Georgia [are] at present in their [Seminole] Towns & unless they are checked soon they 
will be so strengthened by [other] desertions from Georgia & Florida.”15
 In order to prevent the influx of black troops and supplies into St. Augustine, the 
United States instituted a blockade on the upper peninsula of East Florida.  Their aim was 
to destroy St. Augustine by first reducing the strength of the garrison by cutting off the 
supply line, followed by an assault on the garrison, thus rendering the city defeated.  
Those plans were thwarted on September 12 by a group of approximately fifty Blacks 
and a small number Indians led by a free Black named Prince Witen.  In an ambush 
directed at U.S. supply wagons, Witen and his men shot and scalped a sergeant in front of 
the troops.  The rest of the troops were fired upon at point blank range.  Those who 
survived scattered, leaving the supply wagons behind.  As a result, the American supply 
line was cut.16   
 Blacks continued to fight throughout Florida, whether on their own initiative or 
under the command of the Seminole or Spanish.  For example, in Alachua, Blacks 
participated in the retaliatory battle against the United States for the ambush.  The United 
States aimed its efforts at destroying both Seminole and Black Seminole villages alike.17  
Heavy black participation throughout the colony only increased the fear of a massive 
slave revolt.  Thus, in its effort, the United States focused their attention not only on 
destroying Black Seminole villages but, according to Brigadier General Thomas 
Flournoy, “every Negro found in arms be put to death without mercy.”18  Many Black 
and Indian Seminoles were forced to flee their villages and reside in the swamps.  They 
were cut off from supply lines and dispersed, leaving the Alachua region open to 
American settlers. 
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 A year later, they would emerge from the swamps and migrate westward toward 
the Suwannee River.  Although the Patriot War had subsided, primarily due to the 
withdrawal of United States troops and the lack of continued support from the 
government, a sharp division within the Creek Nation caused tensions in the territory 
once again.  The United States had become less occupied with the situation in Florida.  
This was due to the fact that during the Patriot War, the United States declared War on 
England, and the War of 1812 had commenced.19
 The Creeks were divided into two factions:  the Upper Creeks, who were 
concentrated primarily in present-day Alabama, and the Lower Creeks, who were 
primarily living along the Chattahoochee River on the Georgia-Florida border.  A civil 
war erupted in which the militant Creeks, known as the Red Sticks, were in conflict with 
those Creeks who were more amenable to negotiations with the United States.  The 
Upper Creeks had been less exposed to white influence than the lower; therefore, the 
growth of plantation society was not as readily accepted by them.  Utilizing ammunition 
from Spanish authorities in Pensacola, approximately 180 Mississippi territorial militia, 
their Seminole allies, and the Red Sticks attacked U.S. forces about eighty miles north of 
Pensacola on July 27, 1813.  In August, the Red Sticks struck yet another blow at Fort 
Mims just north of Mobile.  There they massacred almost all occupants of the fort.    
Blacks quickly began to occupy the same positions among the Upper Creeks (Red Sticks) 
as they had among the Seminoles and participated in joint war activities.  As a symbol of 
this unity, most of the slaves were spared by Indian warriors.20
 The massacre at Fort Mims enraged the United States.  By the fall of 1813, 
General Andrew Jackson had entered the region with 3,500 Tennessee volunteers and 
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approximately one thousand Georgia volunteers.  In November, the Red Sticks 
encountered the Americans.  Blacks fear of re-enslavement caused them to fight again 
alongside the Red Sticks.  Recent runaways also accompanied the Red Sticks as they 
fought through December.  On December 23, a battle ensued just outside of present day 
Montgomery in which twenty-one Creeks and thirteen Blacks lost their lives.  On March 
27, 1814, Jackson crushed the Red Stick opposition at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.  The 
majority of the Creek warriors fled south into Florida.  The Creek War was steadily 
headed towards the Seminoles.21
 In 1814, the British commissioned Lieutenant George Woodbine to recruit as 
many Creeks and Blacks as he could for service to the British Crown.  Woodbine entered 
Florida in May and set up his operations in Prospect Bluff located fifteen miles from the 
mouth of the Apalachicola River.  Approximately one month later, Woodbine arrived in 
Pensacola to organize the Red Sticks, provide them with food and ammunition, and 
recruit more runaways for service.  By late August, Brevet Major Edward Nicolls of the 
Royal Marines had joined Woodbine in Pensacola.  As a symbol of a unified front, 
Nicolls hoisted the Spanish flag alongside the British flag and declared himself 
commander of the city.  Nicolls was welcomed by the downtrodden Spanish who had 
long since become exasperated in the war with Americans.  In November, Jackson 
clashed with Nicolls and Woodbine in a furious fight over Pensacola.  In five days, 
Jackson captured Pensacola, forcing Nicolls and Woodbine to evacuate.  The Blacks who 
participated with the English fled with them, given that they were promised their freedom 
and land in the British West Indies in return for their military service.  These Blacks 
included over one hundred fugitive slaves from the region alone.  The British sailed 
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approximately 150 miles east of Pensacola along the Apalachicola River and set up a fort 
at Prospect Bluff.  Here they utilized the fort for negotiations with the Seminoles, 
remnants of the Red Stick Creeks, and the region’s runaway slaves.22
 The War of 1812 officially ended on December 24, 1814 with the Treaty of 
Ghent.23  Nicolls remained at the fort for another six months.  In that time he continued to 
train approximately three thousand Indians and three hundred Blacks.  Nicolls’ 
relationship with Blacks formed before he entered present day Florida.  Blacks were 
identified with him in Mobile.  Apparently, a close bond was formed.  In the summer of 
1815 he arranged a meeting in London in order to garner an agreement that made the 
Creek and Seminole Indians military partners.  The agreement was never made.  The 
remaining Creeks and Blacks stayed at Prospect Bluff after the British left with those 
agreeing to relocate in the West Indies.  The British left behind artillery that included vast 
amounts of ammunition.  In time, the majority of the Indians left the fort to create their 
own villages in the area.  The Blacks remained at the fort under the leadership of a Black 
named Garcon.  The fort became known as the Negro Fort.24
 The Negro Fort prospered under the leadership of Garcon.  Garcon himself was a 
runaway slave and a thirty-year-old carpenter.  Blacks built a village behind the fort 
which included fields reaching out into the countryside.  It encouraged  perhaps another 
one thousand Blacks to settle in the surrounding area.25
 The fact that former slaves and free Blacks lived and prospered nearby unsettled 
the American planters in the region.  Protests were made by Jackson, who by this time 
had been appointed southern division commander to Spanish authorities.  In April 1816, 
Jackson issued the following as an ultimatum to the Governor of Spanish Florida: 
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I am charged by my Government to make known to you that a Negro fort, erected 
during our late war with Britain… is now occupied by upwards of  two hundred 
and fifty Negroes, many of whom have been enticed from the service of their 
masters, citizens of the United States; all of whom are well clothed and 
disciplined.  Secret practices to inveigle Negroes from citizens of Georgia, as well 
as from the Cherokee and Creek nations of Indians, are still continued by this 
banditti and hostile Creeks.  This…may endanger the peace of the nation and 
interrupt the good understanding which so happily exists between our 
governments …. The principles of good faith which always insure good 
neighborhood between nations, require the immediate and prompt interference of 
the Spanish authority to destroy or remove from our frontier this banditti, put an 
end to an evil of so serious a nature, and return to our citizens and friendly Indians 
inhabiting our territory those Negroes now in said fort …. I reflect that the 
conduct of this banditti is such as will not be tolerated by our government, and if 
not put down by Spanish authority, will compel us, in self-defense, to destroy 
them.26   
 
 In response, Spanish authorities expressed a willingness to suppress the Blacks 
but informed Jackson that they could not do the job.  Florida Governor Zuniga sent the 
following reply: 
“It gives me pleasure to understand that, their king as your excellency thinks with 
respect to the necessity of destroying the Negroes, the fort at Apalachicola 
occupied by them was not constructed by the orders of the Spanish government; 
and that the Negroes, although in part belonging to inhabitants of this province, 
and as rational beings, may be subjects of the king, my master, are deemed by me 
insurgents or rebels against the authority, not only of his Catholic Majesty, but 
also of the proprietors for whose service they have withdrawn themselves; some 
seduced by the English Colonel Nicholls, Major Woodbine, and their agents, and 
others from their inclination to run off.”27
 
This evidently was true to a certain extent.  The Americans were not the only ones 
interested in returning runaway slaves.  According to Landers, “Pensacola’s governor, 
Mauricio de Zuniga agreed to solicit specific orders from Spain, but he was in no position 
to actually send troops against the fort.”  Landers goes further to state, “instead, he sent 
Captain Vicente Sebastian Pintado to investigate the matter and to retrieve any runaway 
slaves belonging to Spanish owners in East and West Florida.”  With the assistance of the 
British, Pintado entered the Negro Fort with a list of 136 runaways including Garcon 
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himself.  However, British authorities would not allow Pintado to seize any Blacks by 
force.  British and Spanish authorities could not agree on the conditions of freedom for 
the Blacks at the fort.  Nicholls responded that the Blacks at the fort had already obtained 
their freedom as they were in the company of Indians Pintado interviewed 128 runaways 
of which “only twenty-eight agreed to return with him.”28
 Frustrated by the reply of the Governor and thoroughly convinced that this “black 
insurrection” was bolstered by the Spanish, Jackson ordered the destruction of the Negro 
Fort in 1816.  General Edmund P. Gaines was given the order to destroy the fort and 
return the Blacks to their owners.  Gaines began by erecting Fort Scott just inside the 
Georgia border but clearly close enough to initiate responses by the Negro Fort.  He 
commissioned two gunboats to carry supplies to the fort along the outskirts of the 
Apalachicola.  Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Clinch was in command and given the orders 
not to enter the Apalachicola but to travel in plain view along the junction of the Flint and 
Chattahoochee Rivers.  It was Gaines’ hope that the Negro Fort would act upon them and 
give him a reason to attack. 
 On July 17, the Negro Fort’s defenders gave Gaines his wish when a gunboat was 
sent out to retrieve water.  Blacks ambushed and killed almost the entire crew except for 
two survivors of whom one was captured.  This was the opportunity that Gaines waited 
for.  He immediately dispatched Clinch’s command down the river toward the fort.  
Along the way, Clinch encountered a party of Lower Creeks on a slave-hunting mission.  
He immediately commissioned the Lower Creeks, supplying them with powder, guns, 
and a promise of clothes from the fort.  He also guaranteed them a payment of fifty 
dollars for each American slave captured.  Clinch’s fortunes continued to increase as they 
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got closer to the fort.  The Lower Creeks intercepted a messenger from the fort carrying a 
white man’s scalp on his belt.  The messenger had been sent to the Seminoles for help.  
Now Clinch swiftly advanced toward the Negro Fort knowing that reinforcements were 
not on the way. 
 As the United States force and its Lower Creeks allies approached the fort, Blacks 
immediately fired their cannons.  Clinch ordered the Blacks to surrender to which the 
Blacks only cheered after the second volley of cannons.  Clinch ordered the gunboats up 
to the fort which immediately caused the Blacks living outside of the fort to abandon 
their villages and disperse into the forest. 
 On the tenth day of the expedition, the American forces came within range of the 
Negro Fort.  Cannon volley was exchanged.  The shells of the American force were 
unable to penetrate the walls as the inexperience of the Blacks sent shells hurling 
overhead doing more damage to the banks of the river than anything else.  During the 
ninth round of volley from the gunboats the United States was able to strike a blow that 
would immediately destroy the fort.  A shell that was heated red-hot landed in the main 
ammunition supply area of the fort causing a terrible explosion; out of the 374 Blacks in 
the fort, 270 were killed instantly.  In the end there were only approximately fifty 
survivors.  Garcon and his Choctaw Indian counterpart were captured.  The Choctaw was 
scalped and stabbed to death while Garcon was shot.  The remaining survivors were 
taken into custody and returned to slavery.  Those Blacks who were dispersed into the 
forest fled toward the Black and Seminole villages.29
 The destruction of the Negro Fort stunned blacks living in the region as well as 
the Florida Territory.  The Blacks who lived in close proximity to the fort and were 
 69
affiliated with it began to reorganize themselves close to Seminole villages.  In essence, 
the destruction of the fort resulted in the increase of the Black Seminole population.  
These particular Blacks began to cohabitate with Black Seminoles and establish stronger 
bonds with Seminole Indians.  Their villages now extended down the eastern coast as far 
as Tampa Bay.  They also chose Bowlegs as their king and were placed under the Black 
Seminole leadership of Nero, Bowleg’s principal or chief slave.  Under Nero’s command, 
the Black Seminoles began organizing themselves in preparation for retaliation.  They 
swore revenge and were “in complete fix for fighting.”30
 Nero is the most prominent Black Seminole leader during the First Seminole War.  
Territorial conflicts and the unquenchable thirst of Americans for slaves kept East Florida 
on alert for attacks by either side.  The expansion of the plantation system southward 
would continue to exacerbate the tensions between Seminoles and Whites.  For Nero, 
there was no way to avoid a conflict as his village and other Black Seminole villages 
under his command were geographically situated in the path of the plantation system’s 
southward movement. 
 In the Fall of 1817, General Gaines erected a United States fort directly across the 
Flint River from a Seminole village then known as Fowl Town.  Gaines ordered his men 
to cross the river in search of timber.  Chief Neamathla of Fowl Town informed Gaines 
that his men had come onto Seminole land to cut timber and that it was a trespass that 
was not to be tolerated.  Gaines informed Chief Neamathla that the land in question was 
part of the American soil granted in a treaty with the Creek Nation.  Furthermore, 
Neamathla was now subject to U.S. laws. Chief Neamathla replied that the Creeks had no 
right to cede any Seminole land to them and that the treaty did not mean anything to 
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them.  Earlier, he had warned Major David Twiggs “not to cross or cut a stick of wood on 
the east side of Flint River.”31  When Gaines called for Neamathla to attend a meeting, 
the latter declined due to lingering distrust.  Gaines ordered Twiggs along with 250 
soldiers to bring Neamathla to the fort for a meeting.  The Seminoles resisted by firing 
upon the troops.  The United States returned fire causing the Seminoles to flee.  A larger 
contingent of soldiers returned two days later under Lieutenant Mathew Arbuckle. 
Neamathla did not adhered to the demand for a meeting.  The two forces exchanged 
gunfire yet again.  This time, when the Seminoles fled the village, the United States 
troops, unable to capture Neamathla, burned the village to the ground.  According to 
Florida historian Joe Knetsch, the Seminoles viewed the attack as an act of war.32
 The Seminoles wasted little time before they responded to the attack.  Less than 
two weeks later they ambushed a United States military boat traveling up the 
Apalachicola River killing nearly all of those aboard.  A few days later they trapped a 
fleet of five U.S. vessels for four days.  Two officers were killed and thirteen were 
wounded.  Troops from the nearby Fort Scott rescued the fleet.33  Black Seminoles 
participated in both attacks. 
 For Nero, his leadership would soon be tested and proved in both diplomacy and 
battle.  In December, warriors from Fowl Town captured two white agents of a British 
trading firm and tried them for their alleged participation in the Negro Fort destruction.  
Nero intervened on the whites men’s behalf and sent them into protective custody under 
the Spanish command.  His intervention demonstrated the Black Seminoles authority and 
respect among the Seminoles.34
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 Nero was unaware of the furious offense that Americans had taken over the 
massacre of the first military boat.  Andrew Jackson returned to the region as the new 
commander in Florida replacing General Gaines.  He entered East Florida with a zeal for 
revenge.  There were women and children aboard the ship who had died, and America 
was outraged.  He quickly moved up the Apalachicola River sacking Seminole villages 
along the way.  Nero was warned that Jackson was headed toward Chief Bowleg’s town 
and the Black Seminole villages on the Suwannee.  According to Alexander Arbuthnot, a 
Scottish trader and ally to Bowlegs, “the main drift of the Americans . . . is to destroy the 
black population of Swany.”35  Nero prepared for the attack by removing their women, 
children, and cattle to the opposite side of river where they would be safe.  He quickly 
organized all the Black Seminole men from the villages in the area.  Black Seminoles 
voiced their readiness to avenge the destruction of the Negro Fort, stating they would 
give the troops “something more to do than they had at Apalachicola.”36  The Black 
Seminoles had underestimated the size of Jackson’s regiment.  They were trapped on one 
side of the Suwannee while Bowlegs and the larger contingent of Seminole warriors were 
on the other.  Despite a valiant effort, the Black Seminoles, being greatly outnumbered, 
were forced to flee the area.  It can be deduced that Nero was killed as there is no further 
mention of him in any of the records.  While some historians view the Battle of the 
Suwannee as a defeat for the Black Seminoles, the Black Seminoles were quite successful 
at holding off the military forces long enough to allow their families to escape.   
 Shortly thereafter, Jackson crossed the Suwannee River and attacked Bowleg’s 
village.  The Seminoles along with the Black Seminole survivors were defeated.  They 
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were forced to retreat into the nearby forest and swamps as Jackson burned the Seminole 
villages.  The defeat of Bowlegs marked the end of the First Seminole War. 
 The destruction of the Negro Fort may also be viewed as the first act of the First 
Seminole War.  Giddings asserted this idea by stating: 
This commencement of the First Seminole War was unknown to the people of the 
United States.  It was undertaken for the purposes stated in General Jackson’s 
order to “blow up the fort, and return the Negroes to their rightful owners.”  
Historians have failed to expose the cause of hostilities, or the barbarous foray 
which plunged the nation into that bloody contest which cost the people millions 
of treasure and the sacrifice of hundreds of human lives.37
 
The question then becomes, what makes the destruction of Fowl Town the first act of the 
war and not the destruction of the Negro Fort in the perspective of some historians?  
Evidence from previous battles indicates that had the messenger reached the Seminoles, 
they would in all likelihood have been involved in the battle.  From the United States 
perspective, the issue of slavery, particularly the return of black runaways, was one of the 
primary factors motivating the hostilities between the United States and the Seminoles.  
Jackson’s military operations during the war indicate that both Seminole Blacks and 
Indians were considered a common foe.  In a letter, he referred to the First Seminole War 
as a “savage and Negro war.”38  Also, years later John Prince, a black resident in the 
Suwannee region under Nero’s leadership, testified that Indians said “they would not 
have been attacked at the Suwannee, if they had not these Negroes—among them; that 
the [U.S.] hope of getting possession of them invited the attack and proved the 
destruction of the town.”39  Thus, the destruction of the Negro Fort was indeed the first 
act in the First Seminole War as expressed by Joshua Giddlings in his 1858 account.  
Furthermore, when historians assert that the attack on Fowl Town was the first act of the 
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war, they are relegating the Black Seminoles simply to the role of  Blacks in the company 
of Seminoles or Seminole slaves in the historiography of the Seminole Wars. 
 Andrew Jackson continued his military campaign into 1819 attacking Spanish 
forts and executing two of the remaining British occupants in Florida.  By February, the 
Spanish were no longer able to maintain control over Florida.  Thus, the Adams-Onis 
Treaty was signed between Spain and the United States ceding Florida to the United 
States for a price of five million dollars and the release of American claims to Texas.  
The formal transfer would not take place for another two years.  In 1821, the Florida 
Territory formally became a United States possession.  Although his tenure only lasted a 
few months, Andrew Jackson became the Provisional Governor.40  In July, Indian 
subagent Jean Penieres provided Jackson with a territorial review of the land and its 
inhabitants, including the following concerning Black Seminoles: 
“We must add to this enumeration…fifty or sixty Negroes, or mulattos, who are 
maroons, or half slaves to the Indians.  These Negroes appeared to me far more 
intelligent than those who are in absolute slavery; and they have great influence 
over the minds of the Indians.  It will be difficult to form a prudent determination 
with respect to the maroon Negroes who live among the Indians on the other side 
of the little mountains of latchiove.  Their number is said to be upward of three 
hundred.  They fear again being made slaves under the American government and 
will omit nothing to increase or keep alive mistrust among the Indians, whom they 
in fact govern.  If is should become necessary to use force with them, it is to be 
feared that the Indians will take their part.  It will, however, be necessary to 
remove from Florida this lawless group of free boaters, among whom runaway 
Negroes will always find refuge.  It would perhaps be possible to have them 
received at St. Domingo, or furnish them the means of withdrawing themselves 
from the United States.”41
 
Penieres’ review reveals two very pertinent aspects of the future relationship between the 
United States and the Seminoles.  The first is the recognition of the intricate relationship 
between Blacks and their Indian counterparts.  The second is the introduction of the 
concept of Seminole removal from the territory.   
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 For Black Seminoles, Florida’s cession to the United States meant that they were 
down to their last and most trusted ally.  They understand that their plight and fate was 
intricately tied to that of the Seminoles.  Black Seminoles would begin to migrate in 
patterns directly parallel to their Seminole counterparts, constructing villages in close 
proximity and placing themselves under the protection of Seminole Chiefs.  Leadership 
changes among both groups witnessed a lateral shift for Black Seminoles within the 
Seminole Nation as a whole.  Contact with whites occurred more often as negotiations 
between Seminoles and the United States increased.  Thus, Black and Indian co-
dependency upon each other now extended even more into the area of diplomacy. 
 As stated earlier, Black Seminoles were afforded the autonomy to create their 
own communities outside of Seminole Indian villages.  Within those communities, a 
hierarchal structure existed reflecting the one in Seminole Indian culture.  There existed a 
Black Seminole Chief, who in most cases had established family ties or a close bond with 
Seminole Indian teachers in the adjoining village.  Below the Chiefs were sub-chiefs, 
who directly assisted the chief in the management of the village and in his absence 
performed the duties thereof.  Black Seminole leaders were held responsible for the 
upkeep and maintenance of the village.  They were the final arbiters in all matters 
concerning the community.  They were subject to the counseling of the elders in the 
community, especially when settling disputes.42
 Due to their familiarity with Whites and plantation society, Black Seminole 
leaders often served the Seminole nation as advisors and interpreters between Indians and 
the U.S.  Initially, Black Seminole leaders were considered sub-chiefs within the nation.  
However, as negotiations and interactions between Whites increased, they began to be 
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recognized as chiefs.43  The recognition of the Black Seminole leaders as chiefs seems to  
indicate that the Seminole Indians recognized the autonomy of the Black Seminoles in 
general.  The change in attitudes in essence reflects the existence of the Black Seminoles 
as a nation within a nation.  The mere fact that it would be years later before the United 
States officially recognized the Seminoles as a nation is irrelevant.   
 In 1821, the United States government immediately sought the solidification of 
their control over the Florida Territory.  An early effort in this regard involved the 
signing of the 1826 Indian Springs Treaty.  This treaty was basically an agreement on the 
terms of all claims, debts, and properties in question between the United States and the 
Creek Nation.  The properties in question included land but particularly the ownership of 
runaway slaves.  This treaty was signed under the influence of the same ideals that led to 
the attack on Fowl Town.  Both Creeks and Americans still viewed the Seminoles as a 
part of the Creek Nation.  Thus, any agreement with the Creeks was equivalent to one 
with the Seminoles.  However, for Creeks, it also further signified the division within the 
Creek Nation due to the fact that only the Lower Creeks (Andrew Jackson’s allies) signed 
the treaty.  For America, it provided the ability to remove the Black Seminole threat to 
plantation society as well as return slaves to plantation slavery.  “As to Negroes now 
remaining among the Seminole belonging to white people” the treaty asserted, “we 
consider those people a part of the Creek nation….”44
 The Indian Springs Treaty essentially eliminated virtually all claims of the 
Seminoles on the Black Seminoles, and made the Black Seminoles susceptible to slave- 
catching expeditions.  Black Seminoles were now unilaterally placed under the control of 
America.  Now, there was no question as to how the United States would deal with 
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runaway slaves; it became a question as to exactly which Black Seminoles were in fact 
runaways. 
 In 1823, the disheartened Seminoles chose not to resist the Americans as they 
seized the last vestiges of Seminole land in the Alachua region.  On September 18th, 
Seminole leaders signed the Treaty of Moultrie Creek which ceded all claims in Florida 
except for a reservation located miles away and cut off from the sea.  Included in this 
treaty was a promise by the Indians to allow Americans to apprehend runaway slaves.  
According to Article 7 of the treaty: 
The Chiefs and warriors aforesaid… stipulate to be active and vigilant in the 
preventing the retreating to, or passing through, the district of country assigned 
them, of any absconding slaves, or fugitives from justice; and deliver the same to 
agent, who shall receive orders to compensate them agreeably to the trouble and 
expense incurred. 
 
Evidence reveals that Seminoles had no intentions of completely honoring this portion of 
the treaty as several groups of Black Seminoles were not listed, including the primary 
Black Seminole community, Pelikalaha.45
 The Moultrie Creek Treaty was flawed and destined to fail from its inception.  
The land designated for the reservation was difficult for Seminole Indians and Black 
Seminoles because of the presence of poor soil.  Two years later Florida Governor 
William DuVal would declare:  “The best of the Indian lands are worth but little… [and] 
is by far the poorest and most miserable region.  I ever beheld.”46  In South Florida, the 
Seminoles would also suffer a drought.  In December 1825, Lieutenant Colonel George 
Brooke reported, “The major part of their nation is…suffering…unless the government 
assists them, many of them must starve.”47
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 Other problems existed in that some Seminoles would adhere to relocation at their 
own pace.  Both Black and Indian Seminoles were slow to leave the prosperous land of 
the Alachua region and remained on the land until Whites began to inhabit the area.  
Also, for those who adhered to relocation there existed a problem with the economic 
compensation to be provided the Seminoles.  The government was slow to distribute the 
provisions guaranteed to the Seminoles.  It became a device for giving Whites the upper 
hand in their relationship with Indians.  For the Black Seminoles, it meant that their 
Seminole Indian counterparts were forced to return runaway slaves as a result of the 
threat of withholding provisions. 
 It would seem as though this would have caused a major division between Blacks 
and Indians.  In fact, by 1826 it was reported that so many runaway slaves were returned 
that an estimate of less than fifty were still at large.  This estimate did not include the 
approximately eight hundred Seminole slaves reported in 1822.48  However, it is 
important to remember that within the Black-Indian relationship, Seminoles would allow 
the return of runaways, but if those slaves absconded again, would allow the return of 
Black Seminoles.  As a result, Blacks were becoming more and more self-reliant as their 
leadership began to understand that they would ultimately always have a different 
relationship with the government different from that of their Indian counterparts. 
 Black Seminole chiefs such as Abraham (who became the principle leader) began 
to understand that the survival of their people rested upon their ability to negotiate better 
terms for themselves.  It could no longer be left up to their Indian counterparts as they 
themselves were forced into a struggle for their own survival.  In order to achieve these 
better terms, Black Seminole leaders undertook the task of convincing their Indian 
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counterparts that a unified front during negotiations must still be sought whenever 
possible.  They also became more intricately involved in matters within the Seminole 
Nation.  What occurred during the 1820’s was the further development of both Black 
Seminole leadership as well as the Black Seminoles as a nation within the Seminole 
Nation.  The Black Seminoles had established themselves through cultural exchange, 
agricultural contributions, military involvement, and now in the political process, both 
internally as well as externally. 
 The relationship between the Black Seminoles and Whites continually 
deteriorated throughout this period.  Much of the blame for the continued flow of 
runaways to the Seminoles was directed towards them.  In DuVal’s 1826 letter to the 
Seminoles (mentioned in Chapter two), he warns the Seminoles that Blacks, especially 
the runaways, were a detriment to their society.  He counseled them as such: 
You are not to mind what the Negroes say; they will lie, and lead you astray, in 
the hope to escape from their white owners, and that you will give them refuge 
and hide them.  Do your duty and give them up.  They care nothing for you, 
further than to make use of you, to keep out of the hands of their Masters.49
 
DuVal’s letter was apparently part of a ploy of Whites to separate the Seminole Nation.  
For example, in this letter DuVal’s goes on further to state: 
Thus far the negroes have made you their tools, and gained protection, contrary to 
both justice and the treaty, and at the same time, laugh at your for being deceived 
by them.  You conduct in this matter is cause of loud, constant, and just complaint 
on the part of the white people.  Deliver them up, rid your nation of a serious pest, 
and do what, as honest men, you should do; then your white brothers will say you 
have done them justice, like honest, good men.50
 
 It therefore became imperative for Black Seminole leaders to maintain not only a 
unified front, but also an authoritative position within the Seminole Nation in order to 
maintain a political climate that would suit the needs of their people.  Their authority was 
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most recognizable in their counseling and interpretations during negotiations with 
Whites, particularly during those negotiations concerning runaways.  Governor DuVal 
noted that Blacks were “much more hostile to the white people than their Masters.”  He 
went on to claim that they were “constantly counteracting” his counsel to Indians and that 
there were instances where the Indians had agreed initially but reneged after talking with 
Black Seminole leaders. 
Authors John and Mary Lou Missell, in their study entitled The Seminole Wars, 
attribute this “counteracting” to the fact that Black Seminole interpreters “were illiterate 
Blacks who spoke that dialect of the plantation . . . . [They] would have been unfamiliar 
with the formal language used in legal documents.”  They go on further to state, “What 
they heard and what they understood may have been completely different.  How they 
related that understanding to their chiefs may have been something different again.”51
It is important to remember that the vast majority of the information utilized by 
historians is garnered from the United States military and government records.  Thus, 
historians have relied upon these invaluable documents and source materials to interpret 
the Black Seminole involvement during the war.  It is the interpretation of the relevant 
information that makes this study unlike the existing historiography concerning Black 
Seminoles and the Second Seminole War. 
 The Seminole Removal Policy, which officially began in 1830, represented 
irreparable damage to the Seminole Nation.  For the Seminole Indians it would destroy 
the clan and kinship structure of their society.  The father would own land and become 
head of the family.  The matrilineal distinctions of kinship ties would become far less 
significant.  The clan would be weakened through the loss of its basic economic and 
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political functions.  For Black Seminoles, the marginalization of Creek and Seminole 
Indians out west would place them in an unacceptable position of slavery among the 
Creeks, provided they emigrated along with the Seminole Indians.52
 In 1832, Colonel James Gadsden, under the instruction of Secretary of War Lewis 
Cass, met with Seminole leaders at Payne’s Landing on the Ocklawaha River to obtain an 
emigration agreement.  Those instructions included a promise of annuities to be paid 
through the Creeks.  This indicates that as late as 1832  the Seminoles were still not 
recognized as a nation but instead still part of the Creek Confederacy.53  Once again, the 
government, looking for the upper hand, utilized the devastating effect of the previous 
year’s drought on the Seminole harvest as an advantage.  Gadsden offered food as an 
incentive for removal.  Black Seminole leaders Abraham and Cudjo were present.54
 Cudjo was present as an agent for the U.S. military.  By 1834, he would be 
referred to as a “regular interpreter at the Seminole agency.”55  Although he was a Black 
Seminole leader of a Black Seminole town in the Big Swamp area or, as the military 
describes him one of the “principle characters” as late as 1822, Cudjo was the first leader 
to side with the government.56  John Bembrose, a Seminole agent at the time, provides us 
with a hint of his physical description:  “Little, limping figure of Cudjoe…his cunning, 
squinting eyes.”  According to Porter, “his physical deficiency of partial paralysis 
predisposed him toward association with those who could give him the medical attention 
and comforts which his condition called for and which would have been inaccessible 
among the hostile Indians and Negroes.”57  It is not known exactly when he became an 
interpreter for the United States.  He was, however, by the time of the Payne’s Landing 
Treaty drawing both a salary and rations. 
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 The most arduous task for Gadsden in the negotiations were convincing the  
Seminole Indians to combine with the Creeks and settling the claims of slaves within the 
Seminole Nation.  When dealing with the issue of claims, Gadsden remarked that “Many 
claims are for Negroes….The Indians allege that the depredations were mutual, that they 
suffered in the same degree, and that most of the property [slaves] claimed was taken as 
reprisal for property of equal value lost by them.”58
 On May 9, 1832, the Treaty of Payne’s Landing was signed.  It gave the Seminole 
approximately five million acres of land in the Arkansas Territory.  It also provided the 
Seminoles with a settlement of $3,000 a year for fifteen years in addition to a one time 
payment of $15,400 for Florida lands improved by the Seminoles.  The Seminoles agreed 
to pay $7,000 to the United States for compensation of claims made against those Black 
Seminole members considered runaways.  It is important to remember that Whites made 
a distinction between Seminole slaves or Black Seminoles and runaway slaves.  For 
Black Seminoles, the $7,000 payment suggested that their families as well as their 
communities would be kept intact.  The treaty was still contingent upon the satisfaction 
of the Seminoles with the land in the Arkansas Territory.  The Secretary of War informed 
the President that the treaty was “not obligatory on part …and until the tribe, upon their 
report, shall have signified their desire …. [W]hen they return, the determination of the 
tribe will be made known to the government”.59
 In the winter of 1832-1833, a delegation that consisted of seven Seminole Indians, 
Indian agent John Phagan, Abraham, and Cudjo traveled to the Arkansas Territory to 
inspect the land.  At Fort Gibson on the Arkansas River, the second part to the Payne’s 
Landing Treaty was signed.  The Treaty of Fort Gibson basically stated that the 
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Seminoles were satisfied with the land granted to them in the Arkansas Territory, and that 
they had agreed to live within the Creek Nation but would live in a separate area 
nevertheless becoming a part of the Creek Nation.60
 Immediately upon the delegation’s return to Florida the Seminole Nation abruptly 
refused to accept the treaty.  There were several problems with the Fort Gibson Treaty.  
The first issue the Seminoles raised was the fact that the delegation had no authority to 
sign the Fort Gibson Treaty.  Chief Micanopy told Indian agent Wiley Thompson that 
after their council with the Seminole delegation they decided to decline the offer.  There 
is a version of events that states that Phagan forced the delegation to sign by threatening 
to refuse to guide them home.  Four of the seven Indians later stated that they never 
signed the treaty.  Thompson replied to Micanopy that the delegation had signed; 
therefore, he was to prepare his people for emigration.  Abraham returned to Thompson 
with this reply:  “The old man says today the same he said yesterday, the nation decided 
in council to decline the offer.”61
 The treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson ultimately proved to be a serious 
threat to the Black Seminoles’ freedom.  Although the Seminoles were to pay $7,000 for 
Blacks, the placing of the Seminole Indians within the Creek Nation ultimately would 
leave them unprotected by their Seminole Indian counterparts.  The threat of the loss of 
protection was continuously bolstered by the persistent acts of kidnapping by the Creeks.  
Military authorities as well as government officials continued to separate Blacks and 
Indians in both political terms as well as physically.  Therefore, Black Seminoles began 
to view the Creek-United States alliance as a major threat once again.  The physical 
separation allowed Creek kidnappers greater opportunities.  Thus, in the view of the 
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Black Seminoles, emigration to the west under the Fort Gibson Treaty guaranteed their 
enslavement.62  According to Potter, the Creeks’ initiative to incorporate Seminoles into 
their nation was “evidently with a view to dispossess the Seminoles, in the easiest 
manner, of their large Negro property.”63  The Creeks’ persistent pursuit of ownership 
and control of the Black Seminoles further complicated Seminole removal for all 
involved.  For the Seminole Indians, it represented two concerns that caused even the 
Seminole Indians who initially favored emigration to now object to a removal that would 
unite them with Creeks.  The primary concern was the issue of the loss of Black 
Seminoles.   
The second major concern was a fear that Creeks would extend no justice to them 
once they were outside of the United States jurisdiction.  Without a separate Indian agent 
to address their concerns, Seminoles feared being engulfed by the larger Creek Nation 
and exterminated as a culture.  Their loss would not stop at the Black Seminoles.  
Seminoles argued that the Payne’s Landing Treaty which guaranteed their property 
(particularly Seminole “slaves”) could not be guaranteed once they were in the West.  
Indian agent Thompson, when dealing with the property rights of Seminole slaves, 
agreed, reporting, “As it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to prove that negroes 
claimed by the Creeks, now in the possession of the Seminole Indians, are the identical 
Negroes, or their descendants…I cannot conceive that the Creeks can be supposed to 
have a fair claim to them.”64  The loss of the Black Seminoles to the Seminole Indians 
would represent the beginning of their extermination. 
 The Creek – United States agreement, through various treaties, began with Creek 
claims on the Black Seminoles.  The essence of the Creeks’ position with the United 
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States in relation to the Black Seminoles was that they had been kidnapping their own 
property.  The annuities for slave property had been covered in pre-existing treaties for 
removal.  Therefore, the Creek Nation began to demand the return of what they saw as 
their slaves.  For the United States this would ultimately mean that white lives, time, 
money, and effort would have been wasted if they were to honor the Creek agreement 
and turn the Black Seminoles over to the Creeks for an emigration trip westward.  The 
United States, which further evidence will demonstrate, had no intention of allowing 
runaways to leave Florida.  It would serve no purpose to separate them from their Indian 
counterparts, wherever this counterpart might go.65  It is important to understand that the 
government continuously maintained a respect for property rights.  Therefore, the 
government made the distinction between runaway slaves and Seminole slaves within the 
Black Seminole population.  This was, however, not the case with Whites in Florida.  The 
constant pressure from Whites on the government to garner as many Blacks as possible 
for their plantation regime would dictate the policies concerning the Seminole Nation. 
 In 1834, Thompson would conditionally try to convince the Seminoles to 
emigrate peacefully.  His constant offers of assurance that the Seminoles’ property would 
be protected from the Creeks would fall mostly on deaf ears.  As far as Micanopy was 
concerned, the Moultrie Creek Treaty did not expire for another nine years.  This was the 
only treaty that concerned the Seminoles.  The Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson Treaties 
to Micanopy were non-existent.  The mood of the Seminoles was changing.  Complete 
distrust of Whites became the primary sentiment as younger leadership began to arise 
among the Seminole Indians.  Of these new leaders, one in particular would go on to 
become the government’s most formidable foe.  During a meeting on October 23, 1834 
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between Thompson and various Seminoles, the young leader named Osceola disrupted 
the conference by plunging his knife through a document on Thompson’s table and 
declaring, “The only treaty I will ever execute will be this!”66
 Osceola’s life began in the Creek Nation of Alabama.  His mother at the time of 
his birth was married to a white man named Powell.  There is no evidence that Powell 
was his biological father, yet he became commonly referred to by Whites as Powell.  It is 
known that his heritage included the white race; a Scotsman and Red Stick leader known 
as Peter McQueen has been proven to be his uncle.  He was never accepted by Whites; in 
fact, he was belittled and reviled by Whites as a youth until he was driven out of 
Alabama.  During the First Seminole War, he was captured but ultimately either escaped 
or was released.  He shortly settled among the Tallahassee Tustenuggees and became 
known as such.67
 He is described as having piercing eyes and chiseled lips.  Thompson recalled him 
to be bold and dashing.  As an observer of one meeting recorded, “a continuous smile 
played over his face, particularly when shaking hands with the officers.”  Its seem as 
though Osceola was generally a mannerable man, but was easily irritated during 
negotiations and unapologetic for the change in his mannerisms.68  In time, Osceola 
would rise in rank to a war leader, becoming a serious concern for Whites.  As he 
ascended within the Seminole Indian community, his relationship with Black Seminole 
leaders would strengthen.  He would ultimately become one of the Black Seminoles most 
trusted ally during the Second Seminole War.69
 In April 1835, Thompson would make his last attempt at negotiating with the 
Seminoles.  Here again, Osceola would end any successful agreement by declaring “I will 
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make the white man red with blood; and then blacken him in the sun and rain, where the 
wolf shall smell his bones and buzzards liven upon his flesh.”  Conflict was now 
inevitable.  Shortly thereafter, Thompson would arrest Osceola for his repeated insults 
and threats.  After six days of confinement, Osceola agreed to emigration.  Thompson, in 
either his naivete or overconfidence in the authority of Whites, presented Osceola with a 
rifle for his cooperation and believed that Osceola was no longer a threat to Seminole 
removal.70
 The government then declared that on January 8, 1836, all Seminoles must be in 
Tampa Bay and begin their emigration westward.  In this declaration they also issued a 
warning that if not, the United States Army would hunt them down.  Black Seminoles 
were now face to face with the harsh reality of re-enslavement.  The persistent conflict 
over slave ownership between Indians and Whites meant that any common Black 
Seminole could be either kidnapped or claimed by Whites and placed in slavery.  
Skirmishes between the Seminole nation and the U.S. government during the summer of 
1835 were preludes to  war.  Black Seminole warriors from Minatti under the leadership 
of (Black Seminole) Harry were heavily involved.  Around that time, Osceola issued a 
warning to any Seminole chief that conceded to emigration. 
 In November, Chief Charlie Emathla was executed by Osceola, Holata Mico, and 
Abraham for compliance with emigration.  Emathla had sold his cattle and become an 
agent for the military, convincing other chiefs to do the same.  Abraham protested the 
murder but Osceola scattered the gold over the Chief’s body stating emphatically, “See It 
is the price of your blood.”  Other chiefs who had also agreed to emigrate quickly rushed 
to Tampa Bay after Osceola’s warning.  One chief in particular, Chief Econohatomico 
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(also known as Red Ground Chief) reached Tampa Bay on November 14.  Only days 
after, white slavers raided his settlement, seized a number of Black Seminoles, and 
reduced them to slavery in Georgia.  The chief’s black granddaughter was among the 
captives.  To the rest of the Seminoles (both Indian and Black), this was the proof they 
needed to confirm the treachery of the Whites.71
 In December, the skirmishes would escalate to planned attacks on plantations in 
the Alachua and St. John’s River regions.  On December 17, Black and Indian Seminoles  
raided plantations in the Alachua region.  Ten days later, raids were executed in the St. 
John’s River region.  These raids would continue throughout January.  The plantation 
raids were carried out with two objectives in mind.  The first was to strike a blow at 
plantation society in order to have Whites suffer the hardships of losing their homes and 
property much like the Seminoles endured during the destruction of their villages.  The 
second goal was to garner supplies and entice slaves to join their cause.  The second 
objective heavily involved the Black Seminoles.  Abraham was responsible for the 
strategic planning.  As a result, two more Black Seminole leaders, John Caesar and John 
Cavallo, would attract the attention of the military as well as Whites in Florida’s 
plantation society.  Like Abraham, both men will be examined further in this study.  The 
success of the plantation raids is implied by the fact that a majority of white settlers 
panicked and moved to either St. Augustine or Jacksonville for safety, leaving the 
frontier open once again for the Seminole Nation.72
 During the last week of December, Major Frances L. Dade and over one hundred 
troops set out from Fort Brooke (at Tampa Bay) to Fort King (near present-day Ocala).  
At Fort King, they were to assemble with other units and execute Thompson’s threat to 
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hunt Seminoles down and round them up.  The troops were being guided by a mulatto 
named Luis Pacheco, who was hired by the army for twenty-five dollars a month for 
access to his knowledge of the area and Indian languages.73
 At the time, Louis Pacheco was a slave of a Spanish trader in the region.  He was 
born on a plantation of Francis P. Fatio in the St. John’s River region.  He was 
approximately thirty-five years old in 1835, which places his birth during the height of 
Seminole trading activity in the region.  Between the frequent contact with traders and 
older siblings (a brother and sister) living with Indians, he was able to learn the Indian 
language.  In 1824, be absconded from his abusive master and began living with Indians.  
As fate would have it, he was taken into custody and returned to servitude under Colonel 
Brooke.  He was transferred to other officers over a period of time until he was sold to 
Antonio Pacheco.74
 On December 28, 1835, Pacheco led Dade along with his soldiers through a piney 
area full of tall grass and palmettos approximately three miles from the Withlocoochee 
River and roughly approximately one mile south of the turn off that led to Peliklakaha.  
One hundred and eighty warriors, both Indian and Black, arose from the tall grass and 
opened fire on the troops.  Major Dade was killed instantly.  Pacheco, who was right next 
to Dade, fell from his horse.  Later, Pacheco would recall, “I immediately threw down my 
gun and lay down behind a tree, very much frightened….As I could speak the Seminole 
language, I begged each one for my life as they leveled their guns at me.”  As the fight 
ensued, Pacheco found himself in the middle of fire.  Pacheco contends that his life was 
spared on the orders of Sub-chief Jumper.  He was then taken to a Black Seminole village 
where “the negroes made me feel quite at home,” while the Indians “told me often that I 
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would not live long if I misbehaved.”  By the end of the attack, there were only two 
soldiers still alive.75   
 Pacheco’s account of the attack, which has become known as the Dade Massacre, 
has been challenged and has become a point of controversy regarding the Second 
Seminole War.  Pacheco continuously maintained throughout his life that he knew 
nothing of the attack.  He would later state that because of his luck, Indians believed that 
he used magic to make himself invisible.  However, Whites believed that he led Dade 
purposely into an ambush.  Coe, in Red Patriots, asserts that Pacheco “secretly planned to 
inform the Indians and maroons of the intended march through their country.”  Pacheco’s 
short stint among the Seminoles did establish a relationship with the Seminole Nation.  
His siblings living within the Seminole Nation could certainly have fostered feelings of 
empathy and connectedness.  Pacheco would also admit later in life that he was resentful 
of Dade for sending him out in the swamps and wilderness by himself looking for signs 
of hostilities.  These three facts certainly bolster Coe’s assertion.  Pacheco may have met 
with Seminoles and confided in them.  Whether Pacheco was being truthful may not ever 
be known.  What is known is that in 1838 he emigrated west with other Black 
Seminoles.76   
Blacks had open lines of communication in the region with Seminoles.  
According to Major F.S. Belton’s account, “a Negro [Black Seminole leader]…named 
Harry, controls the Pea Creek band of about a hundred warriors, forty miles southeast of 
[Fort Brooke], who keeps this post constantly observed, and communicate with the Mick-
asukians at Withlacoochee.”77  Black Seminoles were also highly active participants 
during the Dade Massacre.  According to one of the two survivors, Private Ransom 
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Clarke, the Black Seminoles were “more savage than the Seminoles.”  Clarke himself 
was shot in the shoulder by a Black Seminole “who, when he fired, cried out, There damn 
you!”  Ransom would also go on to state that he heard Blacks boasting and 
congratulating themselves for killing Whites or leaving them to die slowly.78  Seminole 
Chief Alligator later recalled, “When I got inside the log pen, there were three white men 
alive, whom the Negroes put to death after a conversation in English.79  Although what 
was said in this particular conversation is not known, Blacks were recalled as making 
frequent rants to dying soldiers of “What have you got to sell?”, which was a common 
question to Black Seminoles by soldiers when they visited the military posts.80
 Three days later, Osceola and Alligator led a band of approximately 250 warriors 
into battle against United States forces under the command of General Duncan L. Clinch.  
The exact number of warriors in the Seminole band is not known.  According to Porter, at 
most one-fourth of the warriors were Black.  It was later reported that “Abram [Abraham] 
was …at Withlacoochee but made off on the first fire.”  The Seminoles attacked the 
unsuspecting troops, who were unaware of the Dade Massacre, on the Withlacoochee 
River as they were attempting to cross.  The battle became known as the First Battle of 
the Withlacoochee River or Clinch’s Battle.  During the battle, Osceola was shot in the 
arm.  The wound, however, did not discourage him or his troops. By the end of the battle 
four U.S. soldiers died while fifty nine were wounded.  The U.S. troops were forced to 
retreat to Fort Drane. The Seminoles suffered three deaths, of which two were Black 
Seminoles, and five wounded.  One month later, Osceola would write to Clinch, stating  
“You have guns and so have we…you have powder and lead, and so have we…your men 
will fight and so will ours, till the last drop of the Seminole’s blood has moistened the 
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dust of his hunting ground.”  An officer recalled, “Firing was heavy, and the bushes 
literally cut up around us, how it was that more were not shot I cannot tell.”  The 
Seminoles would go on to gain control of the Withlacoochee region.  The Second 
Seminole War had officially begun.81   
 On February 29, a combination of both Black and Indian warriors crossed the 
Withlacoochee River in advancement towards Camp Izard.  At Camp Izard, General 
Gaines was in the process of building a post that would be a central point of departure for 
expeditions.  Realizing that both their numbers and ammunitions were too low for an 
assault, the warriors concealed themselves in the hammocks of the rear side of the camp 
and waited for an opportune moment.  The Seminoles knew that it would be virtually 
impossible to duplicate another Dade massacre.  Their goals were to inflict enough 
damage to cause a withdrawal before reinforcements from Fort Drane (approximately 
thirty miles away) could arrive. 
 The bugle sounded reveille and for the soldiers the day would begin as normal.  
As the men proceeded from breakfast to their post, the warriors watched in silence.  
Approximately one-third of the men remained on duty at the half-completed post, while 
the rest worked on the riverbank chopping logs.  There were only a few soldiers utilized 
as lookouts on the shoreline.  They were totally unaware that the Seminoles had already 
crossed the river and were positioned on their flanks and to the rear.  The warriors 
patiently waited until mid-morning before the slightest advancement was made.82
 Without the slightest hint of forewarning, Seminole battle cries accompanied a 
rifle assault.  Unlike the panicked response of the soldiers during the Dade massacre, 
soldiers dropped their axes and immediately reached for their rifles.  General Gaines 
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himself was shot as warriors rushed in behind a wall of smoke.  He was struck in the 
lower lip resulting in the loss of two teeth.  Seemingly unshaken by the attack or being 
shot he was reported as saying, “It is mean of the redskins to knock out my teeth when I 
have so few!”83  The battle lasted for two hours.  The Seminoles, satisfied with their 
attack, quickly retreated back into the hammocks.  The warriors suffered but one 
casualty, while the soldiers suffered the same in death and thirty-three wounded.  Gaines 
regrouped his soldiers immediately, ordered the completion of the camp, and sent a 
runner to Fort Drane for immediate reinforcements and provisions.84
The following afternoon, the warriors attacked Camp Izard again.  This time, 
instead of a close-quarter assault, the warriors shot every soldier visible from the 
hammocks who was either by the riverbanks or exposed in the camp.  This assault would 
last for three days and would result in much loss of life for the soldiers, and would be 
quite successful in lowering their morale and increasing their isolation.  By early March, 
supplies for the camp were such that horses and dogs were eaten for meat.  According to 
Lt. Prince, “A quarter of dog meat sold for $5.”85  Gaines expedition to hunt Seminoles 
was quickly turning into a complete disaster. 
 Two days later, Black Seminole leader John Caesar went to Camp Izard and 
called for a parley.  Captain E.A. Hitchcock met with the Seminole delegation which was 
lead by Osceola.  Seminole Chiefs Jumper, Alligator, and Holatta Mico made up the 
delegation for the Seminoles while Abraham and John Caesar interpreted.  Chief Jumper 
acted as the spokesman while Abraham interpreted.  The Seminoles called for a truce that 
would include the United States soldiers retreating from the Withlacoochee region and 
leaving them to live in peace.  General Gaines responded three days later, asserting that if 
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the warriors withdrew from the region and participated in treaty negotiations, the United 
States military would cease attacking them.  The Seminoles agreed that the 
Withlacoochee would mark the boundary between them.  However, before the 
negotiations could be completed, General Clinch’s reinforcements from Fort Drane 
arrived.  Upon immediate sight of the warriors, the soldiers fired upon the Seminoles, 
sending them retreating into the hammocks.  The soldiers were unaware of the parley and 
disturbed what might have been negotiations to end the war.  On March 10, the famished 
soldiers, whom one observer called “living skeletons,” returned to Fort Drane.  General 
Gaines would leave Florida shortly afterwards, claiming the Seminoles were “met, 
beaten, and, forced to sue for peace.”  The truth of the matter was that although the 
Seminoles’ siege on Camp Izard was lifted, they still held the region. 
 General Winfield Scott, who was appointed in January to lead the Florida 
campaign, ordered three divisions to move on the Seminoles from the north from Tampa 
Bay under Colonel William Lindsay, south then west from the St. John’s River region 
under Major Reynold M. Kirby, and from the southwest under General Clinch.  Scott’s 
plan was to surround the Seminoles in the Withlacoochee region and advance a 
coordinated attack, hopefully crushing the Seminole opposition.  Their movements would 
be coordinated by firing signal guns daily.  Once they arrived at their designated 
positions, a cannon would be fired.  The total number of United States troops involved 
was approximately 4,800 men.86
 During this operation, the military was engaged in several battles with Seminole 
warriors as they passed through various regions in route to Withlacoochee.  For example, 
on March 17, U.S. soldiers were ambushed on the east bank of the St. John’s River.  
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Warriors “crept…within 25 yards of the sentinel before being preceded” and fired at 
close range.  On March 30, approximately fifty warriors attacked troops in the Alachua 
region near Peliklakaha.  The next day troops entered the abandoned Peliklakaha and 
burned it down.  Unable to actively engage the Seminoles, Scott was replaced by 
Governor Call in May.  For the next five months these examples would be characteristic 
of the war, until direct confrontation was no longer avoidable in October.87
 On October 1, warriors informed the Seminoles that troops were rapidly 
advancing upon them.  Knowing that they were greatly outnumbered, the Seminoles were 
left with no choice but to take refuge in the Cove of the Withlacoochee.  On October 12, 
five downtrodden warriors entered the new Seminole camp and informed them they had 
been attacked by troops and that prisoners had been taken.  A Black Seminole woman 
who had been captured, under pressure from the troops, divulged information as to the 
whereabouts of both Black and Indian villages in the region.  This was the breakthrough 
that the troops were waiting for.  Up until this point, they were unable to openly engage 
the Seminoles and were primarily victims of various ambushes.  As the troops advanced, 
Black and Indian warriors openly attacked troops in various places in the region.  These 
engagements continued for the rest of the month.  The engagement on October 12 
became known as the Second Battle of Withlacoochee or Call’s Battle.  During the battle, 
the Blacks and Indians developed a plan that involved strategic maneuvers from bands 
that were separated by the villages.  The respect for each other as warriors as well as a 
joint nation were displayed often throughout the month.  For example, when warriors 
attacked the troops who had captured the prisoners, they spared the life of the Black 
Seminole woman believing that she had been forced to reveal their villages, but they 
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immediately shot an Indian guide named Billy for willfully betraying his people.  Once 
again, United States troops were repelled from the Withlacoochee region back to Fort 
Drane; however, they would not go back to accept defeat.  They would only go back in 
order to regroup.88
 In November, Governor Call returned to the Withlacoochee region with troops, 
Tennessee volunteers, and approximately 750 Creek volunteers.  Their numbers 
represented approximately one half of the amount originally sent by Scott earlier that 
year.  Many of the volunteers from Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee had grown weary 
of the expedition and had returned home.  The Creeks wore white turbans to identify 
themselves and were there “to receive…such plunder [Blacks] as they may take from the 
Seminoles.”89  The Seminole nation was well aware of the Creeks’ intentions during their 
participation.  One Seminole Chief later stated that he “understood the Creeks had come 
for Negroes.”90
 On November 13, Call’s troops crossed the Withlacoochee River and torched 
three large Seminole villages.  According to Porter, “Because of their [dwellings’] 
superior workmanship, the burned villages most likely belonged to Black Seminoles, who 
were known to be better builders than the Indians.”  An elderly Black Seminole was 
taken prisoner as he was the only person encountered.  This would bolster Porter’s 
assertion to a certain degree.  He informed the troops that the rest of the Seminoles had 
relocated to the Wahoo Swamp.91
 Call proceeded to the Wahoo Swamp with the Tennessee volunteers principally 
making up the right wing and the Creeks principally the left.  On November 17 and 18, 
the Seminoles would continue their tactic of ambush by assaulting the right wing.  The 
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engagement lasted for approximately one hour and ended with a dispersal of Seminoles, 
who were routed.  For political reasons, the Seminoles chose to attack the right wing, 
preferring to fight the Whites instead of the Creeks.92   
 The second engagement in the Wahoo Swamp was a major battle.  The Seminoles 
suffered heavy losses.  The United States troops estimated that at minimum fifty warriors 
were killed.  The Seminoles were forced to retreat deeper into the swamp.  The troops 
pressed the attack, despite low provisions.93  On November 21, the Seminoles engaged 
the Tennessee militia again and quickly retreated further into the swamps.  The militia 
pursued them into the swamps regardless of the fact that they were “above their waists in 
mud and water” at times.  The Seminoles were at their last stronghold.  Their force 
totaled 620 men of which approximately 200 were Black.  It was reported that “one of the 
most distinguished leaders [during the battle] …[was] the property of a Florida planter.”  
As the Seminoles prepared for the final assault, the Creeks boldly dashed in through a 
shallow portion of the river.  Before the Creek leader could inform his warriors that the 
water was indeed shallow he was shot down.   
The Creek warriors returned fire without further advancement.  The Seminoles 
were engaged with the Creeks for approximately one hour as the Tennessee militia tried 
to maneuver through the swamp.  The troops arrived shortly after the volunteers finally 
made their way through, and it was they who noticed the shallow part of the river and 
commanded the militia to proceed with a bayonet charge.  Unable to see the portion of 
the river that the commanding officer of the troops had informed them to pass through, 
the militia refused.  This allowed the Seminoles time to hold off their pursuers.  As night 
began to fall, the soldiers began to withdraw.  Once again, the United States forces were 
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unable to openly engage the Seminoles and defeat them.  Governor Call had now failed 
twice to crush the Seminoles.  As a result, he would be replaced in December by General 
Thomas S. Jesup.94
 Thomas Sidney Jesup began his leadership career in the military in 1808 as a 
commissioned Second Lieutenant of the Seventh Infantry.  He first distinguished himself 
in the War of 1812.  Afterward, he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a Brigadier-
General and quartermaster General of the Army by 1818.  Ten years later, he was 
promoted to Major-General.  His first command against Indians would not be against the 
Seminoles.  In May 1836, he was assigned to command U.S. and Georgia troops in the 
Creek War.95
 On December 8, 1836, Jesup replaced Governor Call as commander of the Army 
in Florida.  His strategy against the Seminoles was to utilize those tactics that were both 
orderly and most practical in routing the Seminoles and accomplishing the goal of 
submission as quickly as possible.  He was not careful to try not to make the mistake of 
underestimating of the Seminoles and having a lack of extensive knowledge of the 
Florida terrain as his predecessors did.  Before he enacted any campaign he wanted to 
determine the exact location and numbers of Seminoles in their strongest positions.96
 From Jesup’s entrance into the Second Seminole War, he immediately recognized 
and understood both the military and political importance of the Black Seminoles.  It 
therefore became a pertinent strategy to identify those strongholds that held a large 
number of black warriors.  Once Jesup determined that the Seminole strongholds were in 
close proximity, he decided to attack each separately in hopes of isolating them.  Instead 
of utilizing the approach of his predecessors, Jesup adopted the Seminoles’ guerilla  
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tactics.  This strategy of utilizing the guerilla-style tactics was based on the premise that 
the military advantage of the Seminoles was their advanced knowledge of the Florida 
terrain which included their ability to find food and shelter concurrent with their military 
movements.  Therefore, he developed a strategy that would utilize small groups of men to 
attack the Seminole villages.  If he were able destroy their food and shelter and dictate 
their movements to some degree, he felt that the Seminoles would be too concerned with 
survival to continue to hold off the troops.  He went on further to create a regiment of 
Creek scouts to track Seminoles in order to gain a better understanding of their patterns 
of movement as well as the strength of their warriors.  He promised the Creeks the 
Seminole possessions, particularly their “slaves.”  However, he would later rescind this 
promise.97
 Politically, the Black Seminoles were a delicate matter in negotiations with the 
Seminole Indians as well as in the United States public arena.  Both anti-slavery and pro-
slavery activists alike kept a watchful eye on the war.  Both sides used the Black 
Seminole cause as an argument for their stand on slavery.  The longer the war lasted, the 
more the Black Seminoles became a central focus.98
 Jesup decided that if the Black Seminoles repudiated their opposition to 
emigration, then the Seminoles would comply with the terms of the Payne’s Landing and 
Fort Gibson Treaties.  In all likelihood, this decision was based on the military’s position 
that although in 1834 the Seminoles informed Indian agent W. Thompson that they 
wished to be near their ancestor’s graves, both Thompson and Secretary of War Lewis 
Cass believed that the fear of losing Blacks was their real reason for refusal to emigrate.  
Furthermore, it was believed that the Seminoles’ refusal to emigrate was indeed the idea 
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of Blacks.  However, the basic problem, which was the cornerstone of the conflicts 
leading up to and during the war, was determining which Blacks belonged to the 
Seminole Indians and which belonged to the white slave owners.  Ultimately, the 
decisions that Jesup made in dealing with this issue dissatisfied both of the 
aforementioned causing Jesup to fail in his efforts to end the war quickly.99
 Jesup’s first decision was to locate Osceola.  It was believed that he was still in 
the Wahoo Swamp region or had gone further south into the Everglades with Micanopy, 
Jumper, and Abraham.  In late December or early January, it was discovered that Osceola 
was still in the Withlacoochee region.  He apparently was ill and took residence in a 
Black Seminole village in the Panosufkee Swamp.  On January 10, 1837, United States 
troops along with a few Creeks surprised the Black Seminole village and captured sixteen 
Blacks.  Two days later thirty-six more Blacks were captured, three belonging to 
Osceola’s band.100
 Primus, a former slave, was one of the Blacks captured.  United States troops 
were familiar with him as they had used him earlier as a messenger on at least two 
occasions.  Primus was married to a Black Seminole, thus, the last time he left the 
company of Whites he never returned.  After being threatened with hanging, Primus told 
troops that Osceola was in the swampy wilderness and that Chief Echo Emathla was still 
on the Withlacooche River.101
 The army immediately marched down the river on both sides in search of both 
Osceola and Echo Emathla.  On this expedition, they determined that the remaining 
Seminoles had fled the region, heading south through the swamps “with no other means 
of subsistence than roots, palmetto cabbage and occasionally indifferent beef.”102  To the 
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military, this meant that Jesup’s plans were to some extent yielding immediate results.  
Lieutenant Colonel Foster was dispatched to scout for a camp of Seminoles just south of 
the mouth of the river.  There Foster’s band encountered a group of Indian and Black 
Seminoles.  It was reported that the Georgia volunteers killed two Indians “after (it was 
said) they had thrown down their arms.”  The troops then took six Black Seminole men 
along with twelve women and children into custody.  Although Jesup was unable to find 
Osceola, he was content in the fact that the Withlacoochee region was for the most part 
free of Seminoles.  He then continued to move south in search of Micanopy, Jumper, and 
Alligator.103
 On January 22, 1837, the primary contingent of troops made its way south to the 
Oklawaha River.  There a Black Seminole man was captured and most likely forced to 
reveal the whereabouts of the camp of Chief Osuchee (also known as Cooper), 
Micanopy’s brother-in-law.  Osuchee was noted for leading black warriors at the Battle 
of Wahoo Swamp.  In that battle, he had been shot and was now in the southern portion 
of Apopka Lake recuperating with a medicine man and others wounded, along with their 
families.  The next day, the Creeks charged Osuchee’s Camp without orders and killed 
him.  Cooper’s wife and children, along with others, were captured, including two black 
warriors and their families.104
 The captured prisoners informed troops that the majority of Seminoles were 
headed in a southeast direction.  Colonel Archibold Henderson led a contingent of 
Alabama volunteers, United States mounted marines, and Creek scouts after them.  On 
January 27, they spotted Seminole herds of livestock grazing after spotting their trail.   A 
band was immediately dispatched to locate the Seminoles.  While collecting the cattle, 
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the troops seized a Black Seminole who was in charge of guarding the cattle.  He 
informed the troops that a large number of Black Seminoles, along with approximately 
forty to fifty Indians, under the command of Abraham was nearby.  Lieutenant James 
Chambers, who was in charge of another band dispatched to locate Seminoles, discovered 
the Seminoles baggage train.  He captured five Indians, two women and three children, 
approximately twenty Blacks (mostly women and children), and one hundred ponies, of 
which half carried “a large quantity of plunder.”105
 The remainder of the Seminoles around the baggage train escaped to the main 
body of Seminoles nearby.  Major Morris, along with the Creek band, followed them 
immediately.  In the Big Cypress Swamp, along the approximately twenty-yard-wide 
Hatcheelustee Creek, Black and Seminole Indians warriors prepared for battle.  They 
strategically placed themselves on the opposite side of their families to protect them 
while creating a cover for their escape.  Just after noon, the warriors opened fire on the 
advancing troops.  Henderson’s troops counterattacked forcing the Seminoles to retreat 
further into the swamps and assume another defense.106
 Black Seminoles’ families quickly dispersed deeper into the swamps.  The 
warrior’s position provided them with ample time and space to escape.  However, one 
Black Seminole named Ben was captured along with his wife, Jane, and infant son, 
Robert.  Apparently, the family fell behind the other Blacks and subsequently stopped 
running as the troops commanded them to halt.  Ben did not offer the troops any valuable 
military information,  but instead stated that he had never been owned by a white man 
and that he belonged to Micanopy.  The troops were unmoved by his plea and 
immediately took him and his family into custody.107
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 Despite the fact that many Seminoles, particularly Black Seminoles, escaped the 
capture of their baggage train, Jesup claimed that the Battle of Hatcheelustee Creek was a 
tremendous victory.  Jesup believed that the Seminoles would be prepared to discuss 
emigration again now that they had suffered such a great loss of equipment, supplies, and 
livestock.  Jesup, however, was disappointed that “not a single first-rate warrior has been 
captured, and only two Indian men have surrendered.  The warriors have fought as long 
as they had life, and such seems to me to be the determination of those who influence 
their councils.  I mean the leading Negroes.”108
 As it would turn out, Jesup was premature in his statements concerning the lack of 
“first-rate warriors” among his prisoners.  Jesup soon discovered afterwards that Ben was 
“one of the most important and influential characters [or Black Seminole leaders] among 
the Indian Negroes.”  Jesup looked upon Ben as an interpreter whose former position of 
leadership would favorably impress the Seminoles.  The fact that his family was also held 
prisoner assured Jesup that Ben could be trusted to relay his messages and return.  On 
January 28, Ben left to locate Chief Jumper and tell him that Jesup wanted to negotiate.  
The general anxiously awaited his return.109
 When Ben arrived at the Seminole camp, he spoke with not Jumper, but with 
Abraham, his leader.  He notified Abraham of the general’s wishes to negotiate and gave 
him gifts from Jesup.  In Porter’s account of this meeting in The Black Seminoles, he 
states, “It is unclear why Ben decided to go directly to Abraham.  Perhaps he knew him 
better than Jumper or he could not locate the chief.”110  Ben went directly to Abraham 
because Abraham was his chief.  Furthermore, by going directly to Abraham, Ben’s 
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actions bolstered the case that the Black Seminoles in Florida were a nation within the 
Seminole Nation. 
 On January 31, Ben returned to Jesup with Abraham.  Ben entered the camp first 
to advise them that Micanopy’s leading Black Seminole or “the terror of the white 
people, for the last year” was ready to meet.  As Abraham entered the camp, soldiers 
muttered amongst themselves about the arrival of “the Niger who was going to hang.”  
The exact content of their conversations is not known.  However, it can be surmised that 
both parties agreed to listen to the others wishes as Abraham agreed to bring in Jumper 
and Alligator for negotiations.  Jesup now fully understood that in order for emigration to 
occur, he had to gain the assistance of the Black Seminoles.  This assistance would not be 
acquired without extending considerations to them in the matter.111
 After some persuasion, Abraham convinced Jumper and Alligator to meet with 
Jesup.  On February 3, the men agreed on a truce with other principal chiefs who could 
be gathered together for negotiations.  All agreed to meet Jesup at Fort Dade, located 
approximately fifty miles northeast of Tampa, on February 18.  It is important to note that 
the negotiations for the Seminoles must have included other principal chiefs in the nation.  
Also, this truce did not include the entire Seminole Nation, as the Seminoles in the St. 
John’s River region continued their plantation raids throughout 1836 and into 1837.  
Black Seminole leader John Caesar would be the Principal War Chief until January 1837.  
He was simply unwilling “to do nothing” while the Seminoles in the Withlacoochee were 
being subdued.112
 Jesup appears to have been doubtful about the success of the upcoming 
negotiations.  Although he looked forward to the treaty negotiations, he wrote, “I have 
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required…immediate emigration; there would be no difficulty in making peace … were if 
not for that condition ….  The Negroes are all averse to removing to so cold a climate.”  
Jesup readily acknowledged the importance of establishing a satisfactory agreement with 
the Black Seminoles.  He also believed that an agreement with the Blacks could be 
separate from an agreement with Indians.  Jesup fully understood that he was not dealing 
with Blacks in the company of Seminoles or Seminole slaves, but a distinct group of 
people with power, influence, and interests in the Seminole Nation.  Thus, on March 4 
when negotiations actually began, distinct proposals for Black Seminoles and Seminole 
Indians were discussed with each groups’ leaders.113
 The Seminoles would not begin to assemble at Fort Dade until February 19.  Only 
Abraham arrived on the day before to assure Jesup that the negotiations would take place.  
Approximately ten Black Seminoles were present during the negotiations.  Black 
Seminoles were represented by Abraham; later during the negotiations, John Cavallo 
supposedly made his appearance.  Negotiations began on February 24.  However, when 
discussions came to a standstill, Seminoles decided that they could no longer talk due to 
the fact that Micanopy was not present and talks had gone beyond their instructions.  
Micanopy wanted to remain in the swamps while Jesup insisted upon emigration.  
Representatives could not continue negotiations without Micanopy, therefore both sides 
agreed to continue negotiations on March 6.  This would give Micanopy time to come.  
To ensure his arrival Jesup kept twelve hostages including a nephew of Micanopy.114
 On March 4, negotiations started again.  Micanopy, for an undetermined reason, 
did not show, nor did Alligator.  Both chiefs did, however, send men and authorized them 
to negotiate on their behalf.  John Cavallo was one of the two men sent by Alligator to 
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represent him.  Two days later, an agreement entitled “Capitulation of the Seminole 
nation of Indians and their allies, by Jumper, Holatoochee or Davy, and Yaholoochee, 
representing the principal, chief Micanopy” was signed.  The “Articles of Capitulation,” 
as it become commonly known, agreed that hostilities would cease immediately and 
permanently.  Seminoles agreed to assemble no later than April 10 for emigration.115
 For the Black Seminoles, Article V was the most important of the eleven articles 
that made up the capitulation agreement.  It guaranteed the safe passage of Seminole 
Indians and their  “allies and their Negroes” westward.  Article V enraged the plantation 
owners.  Pressure from this group would cause Jesup to rescind Article V by secretly 
negotiating an April 8 agreement with selective chiefs to return runaway slaves.  In an 
effort to conceal this agreement, he ordered the separation of runaway slaves, which by 
this time, numbered more than seven hundred Blacks.  In an effort to seize them without 
alarm, attempts to claim Blacks by white slave owners caused panic among the Black 
Seminoles who had assembled at various forts in expectation of emigration.  Once the 
news spread, the Seminole Nation as a whole was then enraged.  When Coa Hadjo 
announced in council that he had agreed to return fugitive slaves, Osceola furiously 
declared that as long as he was alive that would never happen.  It was reported that the 
Seminole Indians stated “they had not taken them [Blacks] and they [Blacks] would not 
give up.”  Osceola wholeheartedly agreed with the Black Seminoles.  As Black 
Seminoles began to flee from the forts, Seminole Indians began to refuse to assemble for 
emigration.  Jesup ordered the capture of all Black Seminole leaders, but it was too late.  
In September, fighting began once again and the Second Seminole War was renewed.116
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 By December 1837, the Seminole Nation was largely concentrated in South 
Florida in the Lake Okeechobee region.  Black Seminoles were now reliant upon John 
Cavallo as their principal leader.  Abraham had been held under strict supervision since 
his agreement to emigrate.  Seminole Indians experienced a rift due to Coa Hadjo’s secret 
agreement to return runaways.  Osceola, the Seminole Indian chief whom they knew they 
could trust, had been captured.  Their future was now in the balance.  Some Black 
Seminoles grew weary of battle and began to turn themselves in to troops.  Colonel 
Zachary Taylor, upon his recent arrival in Florida, proceeded southeast from Tampa Bay 
searching for Seminoles.  There he reported, “Charles, John, & August three Negroes of 
Micanopy’s people surrendered.”  Even Black Seminole leaders were willing to 
surrender, since most likely the “August” referred to in Taylor’s report was one of the 
two-sub-chiefs at Peliklakaha.117
 On Christmas day, the troops reached a swamp in the Okeechobee region “three-
fourths a mile in breath…totally impossible for horses; and nearly so for foot, covered 
with a thick growth of saw-grass, five feet high, and about knee-deep in mud and water, 
which extended to the left as far as the eye could reach, and to the right to a part of the 
swamp and hammock we had just crossed through, which ran a deep crack.”118  There in 
a hammock just beyond this point they would engage the Seminoles in battle.  A full 
examination of this battle, which became known as the Battle of Lake Okeechobee, will 
be presented in a later chapter.119
 In February 1838, a committee of Jesup’s senior officers, headed by Brigadier 
General Abraham Eustis, implored Jesup to end the war by allowing the Seminoles to 
stay in South Florida.  Jesup agreed and wrote to the president:  “In regard to the 
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Seminoles we have committed the error of attempting to remove them when their lands 
were not required for agricultural purposes; when they were not in the way of the white 
inhabitants….  My decided opinion is, that, unless immediate emigration is abandoned, 
the war will continue for years to come, and at constantly accumulating expenses.”  By 
March 7, “more than three hundred Indians, and one hundred and fifty Seminole negroes, 
had come in.”  A military surgeon described the Black Seminoles as “the most diabolical 
looking wretches I ever saw; their style of dress contributing much to render them 
ferocious and oriental in aspect.”120
 Jesup was now thoroughly convinced that the key to ending the war was to settle 
the issue concerning Black Seminoles once and for all.  Therefore, he issued an order 
stating “that all the Negroes [who were] the property of the Seminole…  Indians in 
Florida… who separated themselves from the Indians and delivered themselves up to the 
commanding officer of the Troops, should be free…. They should be sent to the west as a 
part of the Seminole Nation, and be settled in a separate village, under the protection of 
the United States.”121  The declaration would appear to have accomplished the Black 
Seminole’s goals.  However, the protection guaranteed by the troops seemed to only 
apply to those “Negroes the property of the Seminole.”  Therefore, the question of “slave 
ownership” was not completely answered.  This would only increase the mistrust of 
Black Seminoles toward Whites.  As a result, Jesup would spend the next two years 
convincing Black Seminoles of their safe departure out west.  In an effort to do so, he 
would utilize Black Seminole leaders who had agreed to emigrate.  In time, the principal 
Black Seminole Chief John Cavallo would become one of those leaders. 
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 To Jesup’s dismay, his plan to allow the Seminoles to remain in Florida without 
their black allies was rejected by the Secretary of War.  Furthermore, he was ordered to 
continue with removal regardless of the present conditions.  Jesup was now in a major 
dilemma.  Hundreds of Seminole Indians who had come in now believed that they were 
permitted to stay.  He was now facing 513 Indians and 161 Blacks of which 150 were 
warriors assembled near Fort Jupiter.  On March 21, he ordered their capture.   
 For Jesup, his order left him with feelings of dishonor.  As far as the government 
was concerned, the capture was a great success in that almost as many Seminoles (both 
Indian and Black) were seized as had either surrendered or been captured during the 
previous fifteen months.  Five principal Seminole Indian chiefs remained at large:  
Coacoochee (Wild Cat), Alligator, Sam Jones, Aalleck Tustenuggee, and Tiger Tail.  
Black Seminole leader John Cavallo was also still at large.122
 Jesup utilized persuasion to bring in Wild Cat, Alligator, and John Cavallo.  In 
March, Chief Holatoochee and Black Seminole leader Abraham accompanied General 
Taylor to negotiate with Alligator.  A pleased Taylor informed Jesup of Alligator, 
Cavallo, and Cocoochee’s pending surrender.  He went on to report that “Alligator will 
send for Coacoochee [Wild Cat].”  Jesup responded to the news:  “If these three chiefs 
can be detached from the hostiles the war may yet be closed this summer.”123  John 
Cavallo surrendered in mid-April.  On April 25, Abraham wrote Jesup, stating.  “All the 
black people are contented I hope….  John Cavallo is in and contended.”124  Although 
this was deemed as another major success, the war was still not over.  In May, Jesup was 
replaced as commander by General Taylor.125
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 To Jesup’s credit, Black Seminole leaders had surrendered and prepared for 
emigration.  Jesup had successfully created a division between the Black and Indian 
Seminoles.  The fact that Black Seminole leaders agreed to emigration demonstrates that 
although they were allies with the Indians, they maintained a separate goal during the 
war.  This act by the Black Seminole leadership challenges the historiography that 
completely submerges the Black Seminole experience within that of Seminole Indians. 
 For the remainder of the war, small numbers of Black Seminoles would continue 
to fight under the remaining Seminole Indian chiefs in Florida.  They would no longer 
play significant roles in battle.  They would participate in negotiations on the behalf of 
the Seminoles in the capacity of interpreter only.  Black Seminole leaders, including 
principal chief John Cavallo and July (the second sub-chief of Peliklakaha), would 
continue to work with the government and convince Seminoles to emigrate until the 
war’s end in 1842.  For Black Seminoles, the last party of emigrants arrived in the west 
by 1841.  Small numbers would remain in Florida for the most part concealed in the dark 
hammocks and swamps below Lake Okechobee.  They would sporadically be involved in 
attacks on farms and plantations.  These attacks would be instituted primarily as a means 
to steal supplies.  In 1857, an attack was reported on soldiers at Palm Grove which was 
“led by a Negro … dressed in the full costume of a chief.”126
 The struggle for freedom would play as an important role in the cultural 
development of Black Seminole society.  The significance of their military service would 
allow them to increase their numbers, sustain their way of life, and forge alliances with 
not only the Seminole Indians but with foreign powers as well.  In time, their military 
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experience would define Black Seminole society in a way that distinguished them from 
their Seminole Indian counterparts. 
 In the years following the Second Seminole War, Seminole Indians would begin 
to serve as slave catchers.  There were two primary reasons for this.  First, portions of the 
remaining Seminoles in Florida became somewhat subservient to the United States, 
causing them to cooperate whenever possible.  More importantly, there were those 
Seminole Indians who became resentful towards their black allies for utilizing their 
position between them and Whites for their own advantage.  The fact that Black 
Seminole leaders eventually traded positions and supported the United States military left 
these particular Seminole Indians with a strong feeling of betrayal.127
 The primary goals of this chapter were to discuss the black military experience in 
Florida as it relates to the development of Black Seminole society and examine the 
Second Seminole War from the Black Seminole perspective.  Scholars must begin to re-
examine the historiography concerning the Second Seminole War and question the 
importance placed on the Black Seminoles.  The estimated numbers of participants 
reflects neither their importance in nor impact on the Second Seminole War.  To 
continuously perpetuate the idea of docile  Blacks in the company of dominating Indians 
is above all a misrepresentation of history.  Black Seminoles developed a different 
objective from Seminole Indians during the war and for the most part accomplished it.  
As Seminole Indians fought to remain in Florida from 1838 to 1842, the majority of the 
Black Seminoles were securing their freedom by emigrating westward. 
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Chapter 4 
Black Seminole Leadership 
 Black Seminole leaders utilized their trusted positions as interpreters and counsel 
to Seminole Indians to the advantage of their own community.  While entrusted with 
positions of authority they gained the ability to negotiate their own terms.  By examining 
the lives of the three most prominent Black Seminole leaders during the Second Seminole 
War, Abraham, John Ceasar, and John Cavallo, this chapter seeks to further examine the 
involvement of Black Seminoles by shedding light upon their lives.  In doing so, this 
chapter will provide a fuller understanding of the Black Seminoles position at various 
stages of the war while interpretating their experiences.  This chapter will revisit portions 
of the conflict between Seminoles and the United States government with a microscopic 
view from these leaders’ perspective.  A fuller understanding of the autonomy of the 
Black Seminole community will be rendered, including how that autonomy was derived 
particularly from their leaders’ perspective. 
Abraham 
The most outstanding personality among the Black Seminoles was an illiterate 
runaway slave who, like many runaways in Florida, found solace among the Seminoles.  
However, unlike most Black Seminoles, this man’s intelligence and influence was 
recognized by all.  Abraham, referred to by Seminoles as Yobly,1 was given the title 
“Prophet” by fellow Black Seminoles and "Sense bearer" by his Seminole comrades.2   
Both his leadership and contributions to the Black Seminole’s quest for freedom in 
Florida rank Abraham with other great abolitionists, such as Samuel R. Ward, Henry 
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Bibb, and Mary A. Shadd-Cary.  There is no doubt that his accomplishments equal theirs; 
however, the difference between them is his lack of universal notoriety. 
Generally, Abraham is believed to have been born between 1787 and 1791.  One 
account places his birth in possibly Georgia or another southeastern English-speaking 
state, while another account depicts him as born of slave parents (who were fugitives 
from Georgia) in Pensacola among the Seminoles.  Given the known facts, it would seem 
most likely that parts of both accounts are accurate.  Contradictory evidence makes it 
impossible to determine with absolute certainty whether he had any knowledge of the 
Spanish language.  This raises questions to the length of time spent in Pensacola.  Also, 
as a young boy he was the slave of Dr. Sierra, a physician in Pensacola.  This raises 
questions regarding the tale of a birth among Seminoles.  It can be deduced that he was 
born of slave parents from Georgia (not necessarily runaways) and raised as a slave of 
Dr. Sierra in Pensacola.  All accounts of his years as a young boy in Pensacola do 
coincide.  Abraham grew up within the city of Pensacola, suggesting that he perhaps 
served as a domestic servant.3
Descriptions of both Abraham’s physique and mannerisms were often 
contradictory.  The only consistency in these descriptions referred to the cast that 
appeared over his right eye.  Based on the fact that these impressions were primarily 
those of American officers, it becomes obvious how the descriptions varied so wildly.  
For example, one officer describes Abraham as “a person erect and active, and in statute 
over six feet.”4  Yet another describes him as “of ordinary statute, rather thin, with a 
slight inclination forward.”5  The descriptions of his mannerisms and character were 
equally inconsistent.  “Abraham is a non-committal man…with a countenance which no 
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one can read is one description that may best define him when negotiating with 
officers.”6  It seems that his demeanor was directly related to the ulterior motives 
underlying negotiations and circumstances surrounding any given meeting.  “He always 
smiles and his words flow like oil,” one person noted.  “His conversation is soft and low, 
but very distinct, with a most genteel emphasis.”7   He was also described as “plausible, 
pliant, and deceitful.”8  
As a young boy, Abraham escaped a life of bondage with Dr. Sierra and fled to 
the Seminoles.  In time he became a slave to Micanopy who later became a Principal 
Chief of the Seminoles. Abraham became a member of a Seminole community where he 
was afforded opportunities to develop as a leader.  He would go on to gain the titles of 
interpreter, spokesman, sense bearer, and chief counselor to Micanopy.  He would also 
marry the widow of a former Chief Seminole (as previously stated) and become the Chief 
of Pilaklikaha.9
According to Weik, Pilaklikaha (also known as “Abraham’s Old Town”) primary 
period of occupancy was from1813 to 1836.10   During this period, Black Seminoles 
cultivated various foods such as beans, melons, pumpkins, corn, rice, and other 
vegetables.   Their livestock included horses, fowl, and cattle.  Pilaklikaha, like all other 
Black Seminole towns, was a place of safety for its inhabitants.  Black Seminoles 
maintained a peaceful coexistence with the Seminole Indians; however, they likely 
understood their chances of survival as being predicated upon their strength of numbers 
and geographic contiguity.  Their evolving sense of community fashioned a certain 
cultural autonomy, which helped distinguish the group from their Indian neighbors.  By 
1826, there were over one hundred Blacks residing in Pilaklikaha.11  In 1836, Pilaklikaha 
 122
became a casualty of the Second Seminole War when the United States military dispersed 
the inhabitants by forcing them to flee and burned the town down leaving Pilaklikaha in 
ruins.        
Neither Abraham’s military training or conflicts with American soldiers began 
with the Second Seminole War.  It is believed that in July 1814, Abraham was one of  the 
Black slaves fighting alongside the British during the War of 1812, motivated by the 
promise of freedom and land in the British West Indies.  The British force was in search 
of a base of support for an assault on New Orleans and recruited refugees from the Red 
Stick Creeks and runaway slaves from Pensacola.  In November of that year, General 
Andrew Jackson stormed Pensacola forcing the British along with their Indian and Black 
allies (including Abraham) to flee the city.  Abraham was then discovered at the Negro 
Fort (or Fort Negro).  Exactly how he escaped the ill fate suffered by most Blacks when 
the fort was destroyed in 1816 is not known.  It, however, can be deduced that it was 
during this period in his life that he became directly affiliated with the Seminoles.  Those 
Blacks who fought with the British aligned themselves with Chief Bowlegs on the 
Suwannee River.  Chief Bowlegs was Micanopy’s uncle.  At that time, Abraham became 
somewhat of a protégé of Bowlegs and Micanopy and resumed fighting against Andrew 
Jackson in 1818.  In the battle of the Suwannee, Abraham gained both the recognition 
and trust typically reserved for Seminole warriors.  As a result, he placed himself directly 
under the protection of Micanopy, who had now become principal Chief of the 
Alachua.12   
Chief Micanopy was a direct descendant of one of the members of the original 
band of Alachua Seminoles.  His authority was expanded when factions of the band 
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settled in different areas of the region.  Although the extent of his authority is not clear, it 
was understood that when he spoke all adhered.  General Clinch of the United States 
military described him as “a man of but little talent or energy of character, but from his 
age and wealth has much influence in the nation.”13  He is physically described as 
approximately five feet, six inches, weighing approximately two hundred and fifty 
pounds with a “fat, dull face set on a short neck”.14
Chief Micanopy was inclined to indulge himself on the privileges bestowed upon 
a man in his position.  During the conflicts with Whites in the area which resulted in war, 
Micanopy was involved in the negotiations much more than in the actual fighting.  This is 
not to say that he did not participate; however, Chief Alligator was considered the war 
chief from the Alachua region while Micanopy was considered non-aggressive.  His 
position as head chief was considered more or less ceremonial.  He was intelligent 
enough to surround himself with sensible and reliable counselors, who assisted him in 
delegating authority in some instances while manipulating him in others.  Micanopy 
participated in all of the major negotiations until his capture and eventual emigration. 
In reference to the Black Seminoles, Porter noted that Micanopy was “notably 
kind” to the Black Seminoles attached to him in his region.  Likewise, he was treated 
quite well by the Black Seminoles in the Alachua region.  At Peliklakaha, he was made to 
feel so comfortable that he made reference to it as his official residence.15            
By the early 1820’s Abraham was Micanopy’s interpreter.  His first important 
role came as an interpreter for Micanopy during negotiations in Washington D.C. in 
1826.  Micanopy headed this delegation of Seminole chiefs to Washington per request  of 
the government.  Upon their return, in gratitude for his service, the chiefs presented 
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Abraham with a young wife Hagar, the widow of Chief Bowlegs.  Micanopy himself 
granted Abraham his emancipation.  Although his emancipation was not formally 
recorded until 1835, from this point in life Abraham would consider himself free.16  
During this period, the question of Seminole removal and immigration to the West would 
begin to take precedence in both the dialog and relationships between the Seminoles and 
the government.  As previously stated, by the 1830’s the United States government was 
clear on its  intent to remove the Seminoles from Florida.   
In 1832, when both sides agreed to meet at Payne’s Landing on the Oklawaha 
River located in Central Florida, Abraham was again present as interpreter and counselor 
to Chief Micanopy.  Due to the fact that there were no minutes taken at this meeting, the 
actual substance of this meeting has yet to be agreed upon by historians.  As far as 
Abraham was concerned, the United States military insisted that it had bribed him with 
two hundred dollars to misinterpret the negotiations for removal.17  Initially it would 
seem as if Abraham had betrayed the Seminole Indians as well as his own people.  
However, if Abraham knew that the chiefs who signed the treaty had no authority to bind 
the entire Seminole nation and/or the fact that the majority of the chiefs had agreed with 
the prior treaty which guaranteed them twenty years of retributive payments, then what 
we actually discover was a cunning move of deception.  When viewing the terms of the 
Payne’s Landing Treaty, Abraham was fully aware of the fact that there were no 
provisions for the Black Seminoles.  The fate of the Black Seminoles would therefore rest 
in the hands of the governments and the slave society whose interests they clearly 
represented.  To support such a treaty would mean that Abraham would have agreed to 
return to slavery.  Not only did Abraham consistently interpret and counsel with the 
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Black Seminole interests in mind, but also in 1833 when he accompanied the delegation 
of chiefs to inspect the land planned for Seminole relocation, he began to devise a plan in 
which the Black Seminoles would obtain land and continue to live free. 
Abraham, like many other members of the Black Seminoles, was once before in 
bondage to Whites.  At this point he had risen in a society that allowed his abilities to 
flourish to the point where he had obtained both status and respectability.  He was a 
proven leader, demonstrating his forthrightness and loyalty to a community that had 
entrusted him with their lives.  He was well aware of the consequences that would result 
in the Black Seminoles’ return to slavery.  A lifetime of achievements would render 
nothing under the plantation system.  His family unit, which consisted of a wife and 
children, would no longer be guaranteed.  Therefore, it would be quite unwise to allow 
the Payne Treaty to take effect.  The acceptance of the Payne Treaty would result in 
separation from Seminole Indians.  Once separated, the Black Seminoles would be 
vulnerable.  Abraham understood that although the Black Seminoles and the Seminole 
Indians shared a common foe, the Black Seminoles had a much larger stake in the issue.    
From that point on, he deceived the United States military into thinking he was favoring  
peace while he began to make preparations for a war with a different objective than his 
Indian counterparts.  
Abraham also understood the strength of the United States military.  By the 
1830’s he had experienced fifteen years of combat against them.  He arrived at the 
conclusion  that a concentrated effort of secret operations could offset the disparity in 
strength and numbers.  Consequently, in his initial war preparation, he began to recruit 
runaways from nearby plantations.  In 1835 and 1836 he began to build an arsenal of 
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ammunition through trade contacts with Spanish fishermen.18  The preparations led by 
Abraham were in no way a solitary act by the Black Seminoles.  Almost simultaneously, 
the Seminole Indians were also preparing for war.  In 1834, when the government paid 
them their last annuity, most of the money was spent purchasing ammunition.  Abraham 
was successful in demonstrating that the Black Seminoles’ plight was related to that of 
the Indians, thus resulting in an inseparable bond.  By late 1834, Osceola successfully 
convinced the Seminole Indians that a united stand must be maintained.  Elder members 
unanimously viewed migration as the demise of the Seminole Nation as a whole.  The 
government became fully aware of both the overall preparations for war by the unified 
front, as well as their implications for the removal negotiations.  The government now 
understood that unless they directly addressed the issue of Black Seminole emigration, 
the emigration of the Seminole Nation would be null and void.19
During the months prior to the outbreak of the Second Seminole War, Abraham 
sought a way to further strengthen the unified front against emigration.  He also 
continued his efforts in preparation for war.  As a tactic to accomplish both goals, 
Abraham began to forge stronger alliances with younger more aggressive leaders among 
the Indians.  Abraham’s diplomatic strategies, however, were not accepted.  This was due 
to his mild-mannered and good-natured demeanor.  For example, it was not hard to 
convince Osceola of the common bond between them and the importance of unification.   
However, on November 26, 1835, he was unable to convince Osceola to spare the life of 
Chief Charley Emathla.20  Abraham’s hopes were that they could put up such a fight that 
the Seminole Indians and Black Seminoles could remain in Florida on reservations.  Still, 
he also reconciled himself to the possibility of migration.  He was uneasy about the 
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present terms concerning migration.  He knew that once they migrated westward near 
Creek reservations the Creeks would attempt to subjugate the Seminole Indians and 
enslave the Black Seminoles, reducing them to a condition comparable to that of slavery 
with Whites.  Therefore, the stipulations in the emigration agreement would have to 
ensure not only Black Seminole inclusion but also guarantee their safety upon arrival.  
Abraham never lost his loyalty to the Seminoles,  however, he placed Black Seminole 
interests as his first priority. 
Abraham was involved in the Second Seminole War from the very beginning.  
For the first two years of the war, he was heavily involved in fighting, strategic war 
planning, and negotiations.  Abraham “The Prophet” occasionally stirred up the 
enthusiasm of Seminoles and Black Seminoles alike by utilizing religious exhortations.  
He prophesized the death of General Wiley Thompson by stating, “he would be killed by 
Indians while walking about his place.”  Ironically enough, Thompson was killed at the 
beginning of the war by Osceola while strolling and smoking a cigar after his dinner.21
Once the Second Seminole War began in December 1835, Abraham was, for over 
a one year period, one of the leading war-spirits.  Eighty warriors were under his personal 
command.22  It was stated that “no action was complete unless Abraham was reported to 
be in it, with his big gun.”23  He would go on to garner the respect of the United States 
military.  Its overall opinion was that Abraham was “a good soldier and intrepid leader,” 
and  “an enemy by no means to be despised.”24  Holding true to his beliefs in secret 
operations, Abraham developed a hit-and-run strategy designed “to fly before the army 
and avoid a battle,” taking refuge “in the dense swamps and hammocks of the 
Everglades.”25   During the first year of the war, his strategy proved successful.  He was 
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an active participant in the ambush known as the Dade Massacre and both the First and 
Second Battles of the Withlacoochee.  In January 1837, his tactic of avoidance would not 
prove successful in the Battle of Big Cypress Swamp (the smaller of the two swamps 
with that name).  
On January 27, 1837, Abraham, along with approximately fifty Seminole and 
Black Seminoles under his command, were in the Big Cypress Swamp maneuvering to 
the rear side of a United States military detachment under the command of Colonel 
Henderson.  His plan was to merge with a larger detachment of Black Seminole warriors 
already “in advance.”  In the ensuing confrontation, they (the Seminoles and Black 
Seminoles) suffered a heavy loss.  Their loss was not so much due to mortal wounds, but 
in persons captured and the loss of provisions.  The military captured their “baggage-
train,” which contained both provisions and munitions.  Also, a large number of women 
and children, mostly Black, were captured.  Later on, Abraham revealed that he had lost 
most of his personal property.  He was quoted as stating, “at the Cypress… I lose most 
everything – all my powder and blankets, a hundred dollars in silver, pots, kettles, 
everything.”  One of the most prized possessions of Abraham’s lost in battle was his 
paper of manumission.26  As a result, “Abraham made his appearance bearing a white 
flag on a small stick which he had cut in the woods, and walked up to the tent of General 
Jesup with perfect dignity and composure.  He stuck the staff of his flag in the ground, 
made a salute or bow with his hand, without bending his body, and then waited for the 
advance of the General with the most complete self-possession.  He…since stated that he 
expected to be hung, but concluded to die, if he must, like a man, but that he would make 
one more effort to save his people.”  In that effort, Abraham on February 3 and 18 of 
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1837 successfully brought in Jumper and Alligator, along with other Seminole and Black 
Seminole chiefs for negotiations of peace.27  From this point on, Abraham would be more 
involved in negotiations than fighting.  
Abraham’s involvement in the many treaty and truce negotiations throughout the 
years allowed him the ability to not only demonstrate his importance to the Black 
Seminole cause, but also his skill at negotiating on their behalf.  Having long since 
earned the trust of the Indians, Abraham was able to maneuver his way between the two 
sides, creating a niche for his people.  Although he stood firmly as a faithful comrade to 
the Seminole Indians, Abraham was never naïve enough to believe that they could defeat 
the United States government.  However, what he did believe is that they could put forth 
enough resistance in order to negotiate better terms.  When Abraham accompanied the 
delegation to view the land set aside for the Seminoles in 1833, he viewed the land in 
good favor.  He would have preferred to stay in Florida on a reservation there, but the 
land west of the Mississippi was not a disappointment, to say the least.  He consciously 
made a decision that Black Seminoles would also partake in this land and live free. In this 
instance and others, Abraham demonstrated that the leadership of the Black Seminoles 
had a distinct and different motive for war, compared to the leadership of the Seminoles.  
In March 1836, Abraham played a pivotal role in negotiating a truce with General 
Gaines at Camp Izard.   Abraham’s intent was to negotiate either a permanent 
arrangement or formal treaty between the United States government and Seminole 
Indians that was agreeable to both sides, which stipulated that Black Seminoles would 
share the fate of their Seminole counterparts.  Unfortunately, these negotiations, as 
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previously discussed, ended abruptly due to a miscommunication between members of 
the United States military.28
One year later, during negotiations in the Spring, “largely through the 
negotiations of the Negro Abraham,” on March 6, 1837 at Camp Dade, a treaty was 
concluded between General Jesup and the Seminole chiefs Jumper and Holatoochee 
(claiming to represent Micanopy).  By the terms of this treaty, the Indians agreed to 
“cease their hostilities, come to Tampa Bay by April 10, and board the transports for the 
West.”  Furthermore, Abraham was able to negotiate the inclusion of Article V allowing 
Black Seminoles to emigrate.29  According to official military correspondence as 
reported in the Army and Navy Chronicle, “Major General Jesup, in behalf of the United 
States, agrees that the Seminole and their allies, who come in and emigrate to the west, 
shall be secure in their lives and property; that their Negroes their bona fide property, 
shall accompany them west.”30  For Abraham, the terms “allies” and “Negroes their bona 
fide property” would be given the broadest of interpretations.  In his mind the struggle for 
the Black Seminoles’ security and freedom was over.  Abraham was successful in his 
efforts to maneuver between Seminoles and the government.  The negotiations that led up 
to Article 5 were full of cunning and deceit.  However, it cannot be said that his 
negotiations and efforts in implementing Article 5 did not save Black Seminole lives or 
ensure a continued liberty. 
In 1838, Abraham would work closely with General Jesup in convincing the 
Seminoles and Black Seminoles that emigration would secure them freedom and land.  
For Jesup, working closely with Abraham also represented a way to keep a close eye on 
him, allowing direct supervision.  In March 1838, Abraham, who was now considered an 
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agent of the United States military, was successful in convincing Chief Alligator, along 
with his large following, to make peace.31  This venture was deemed a major success due 
to the events of April and May of 1837.  Although Jesup agreed to both Article 5 and to 
protect the Black Seminoles (as long as they cooperated with emigration), pressure from 
the slave holders caused him to rescind parts of Article 5.  In April 1837, Jesup issued 
Field Order #70 which demanded that the Seminoles yield their most recently acquired 
Blacks, including those who joined them during the war.  Immediately, slave owners 
began to appear at military posts claiming Blacks as runaways and their property.  Black 
Seminoles and Seminoles began to abscond from the post with the intent of continuing 
the war.32   
General Jesup was now in the worst situation.  By May, Jesup rescinded Field 
Order #70 with justification as well as what he thought was a peaceful solution for both 
sides.  He reported to the War Department that the arrival and appearance of slave owners 
at emigration sites causes Black Seminoles to flee.  He went on further to state “Negroes 
rule them,” therefore Seminoles fled too.  Thus, the actions of the slave owners were the 
cause of the war’s renewal.33  Jesup’s solution was to allow thirty-five slaves to be 
returned to slavery, implement the original Article 5, and purchase the claims of all other 
slave owners.34  Pressure was now exerted on Abraham to first regain the trust of his 
comrades, then convince them that their safety was reassured.  Persuading Chief Alligator 
was a major accomplishment.  However, Abraham would fail to convince the majority, 
and the Second Seminole War renewed.  This served as a crushing blow to both General 
Jesup and Abraham.  In July 1838, General Jesup retired from the Florida campaign.  As 
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he prepared for retirement, he was successful in initiating the relocation of Abraham, his 
family, and 90 other Black Seminoles to Arkansas. 
Abraham remained loyal to his people throughout his time in Florida.  Before he 
left Florida by way of Tampa Bay on February 25, 1839, he had the following letter sent 
to General Jesup with his X. 
I have the honor to present my best respects to you.  Tony Barnet and myself have 
done everything promised by us, and expect the General will do by us as he said 
at the beginning of this campaign….  We wish to get in writing from the General 
the agreement made with us.  We will go with the Indians to our new home, and 
wish to know how we are to be protected, and who is to have the care of us on the 
road.  We do not live for ourselves only, but for our wives and children who are 
dear to us as those of any other men….I have charge of all the Red people coming 
on to Pease Creek, and all are satisfied to go to Arkansas… Whoever is to be 
Chief Interpreter we would wish to know.   I cannot do anymore than I have.  I 
have done all I can, my heart has been true since I came in….All  Seminole 
Brethren are coming in… all the Black people are contented I hope.  Your servant 
Abraham.35
 
Although Abraham appears to have been one of the most loyal members of the Black 
Seminoles, unfortunately, through his negotiations with Whites (both military and 
otherwise), he earned many enemies. “The Miccosucos threaten me and you and others;  
Abraham says his conduct in Florida in favour of the whites, has procured him many 
enemies, and that he leads an uncertain and unhappy life.”36 There are several ways to 
examine the animosities that may have arisen throughout the years.  Conceivably, there 
were Black Seminoles, especially those who chose to dwell with their Indian 
counterparts, who believed that emigration was wrong and that they would rather die 
fighting than move.  There were also those Black Seminoles who for generations had 
toiled and cultivated the land that they felt  was theirs and believed that to negotiate any 
type of relocation was unthinkable.   
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These sentiments of attachment to the land that had been cultivated for years 
would later manifest themselves in a wider geographical context. Schwalm’s work, 
entitled Hard Fight for We, examines these same sentiments among Black freed-women 
in South Carolina after the Civil War.  The newly emancipated expressed aspirations to 
own the land that they and their forefathers had toiled for generations. 37  From this 
perspective, one can perhaps understand some of their disposition towards Abraham.  
Perhaps Micanopy’s influence had encouraged Abraham to be too inclined to negotiate 
for peace at times.  The fact still remains that Abraham understood that a complete 
victory in combat was not a realistic goal.  His objective was to ensure that his people, 
Black Seminoles, were not forced into slavery.  Therefore, when Abraham placed himself 
under Jesup’s authority and became an agent for emigration, the question became 
betrayal or sacrifice.  It may never be known whether  all the Black Seminoles were 
aware of the insurmountable odds they were up against.  It would seem that members of 
the Black Seminole community could not fully understand the complexities of 
negotiations during war.  There may have been those within the community who simply 
refused to accept the mere truth, that uncompromised goals were very rarely achieved in 
negotiations.   
      Members of the Seminole Indian nation may have legitimately harbored feelings of 
betrayal.  It is clear that from the earliest of negotiations, even before war broke out, that 
Abraham was reconciled to the notion of either living on reservations in Florida or 
emigrating west. However, given the unassertive character of Micanopy, it is also 
understandable how Abraham perhaps felt comfortable prioritizing the cause of the Black 
Seminoles, whether his approach coincided with the Seminole cause or not.  Abraham 
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very well may have manipulated Micanopy as others did for his own agenda.  Many 
historians would agree with the assertion that Abraham utilized the fondness and trust of 
Micanopy as a license to negotiate on the behalf of his people.  Micanopy’s fondness for 
the Black Seminoles may have given Abraham the authority to negotiate as he did 
without the consent of other chiefs.  Therefore, it is safe to say that as an interpreter and 
negotiator he did not fully serve all the interests of the Seminole Indians at all times.  
Still, the crux of the matter is whether the Indians fared better by emigrating as opposed 
to facing near annihilation through continued armed resistance.  One could argue that the 
Seminoles would have emigrated eventually  whether it was in 1832 with the Payne’s 
Landing Treaty, or with the ending of the war. However, the provisions and dignity with 
which they emigrated in that year could not have been offered in 1832. 
     If there were any flaws in Abraham’s thinking or actions during his time spent in 
Florida and especially during the Second Seminole War, it was his naïve trust that 
General Jesup’s decisions were supreme and were not subject to rejection by a higher 
authority.   While in Washington, had not Abraham observed and understood the 
hierarchical structure of the government?  Did he not recognize the authority of those he 
met there?   Was he led to believe that General Jesup had the full cooperation of the 
government?  I contend that Abraham was led to believe that the decisions made by 
General Jesup would be accepted and guaranteed by those in Washington.  Not until after 
Field Order #70 did Abraham completely understand that General Jesup’s authority was 
not absolute.  Furthermore, this was the basis upon which his relationship with General 
Jesup developed.  The relationship in itself was still an adversarial one.  Nevertheless his 
trust in General Jesup relied upon his authority in the war. 
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      The first few years of Abraham’s life after his emigration are not clear.  
However, it is known that conflicts between the Creeks and the Seminoles increased the 
suffering of Black Seminoles.  As suspected by Abraham years prior to emigration, Creek 
Indians would begin to lay claims on Black Seminoles as runaway slaves.  In 1845, 
Abraham was a witness to a treaty that sought to rectify the bad relations between Creeks 
and Seminoles.  The sudden death of Micanopy in 1848 worsened the position of the 
Black Seminoles.  Micanopy’s successor, Jim Jumper, sought peaceful coexistence with 
the Creeks through appeasement. 
       After 1845, Abraham’s life seems to have fallen into obscurity.  Joshua Giddings’ 
account seems to be the most credible, although it is very speculative.  As Porter writes,  
“Giddings…admittedly bases his narrative partly on hearsay, partly on newspaper 
accounts.”38  Nevertheless, according to Giddings, Abraham was among the Black 
Seminoles who migrated in September 1850 across Texas into Mexico with Seminole 
comrades.  In 1852, men who were guarding the United States commissioners while 
establishing the Mexican border were taken by Seminoles to their village where 
“Abraham was yet living [and]…regarded as a ruling prince by his people.”39
Abraham’s life signifies a life of charisma, leadership, and struggle.  From his 
youth, Abraham sought freedom.  Freedom from slavery would become a lifelong 
endeavor in which he sought liberty not only for himself but for all Black Seminoles.   
Whether one agrees with the decisions that he made throughout the various conflicts, one 
cannot question his dedication to his people.  His intent was clear from his earliest 
beginnings as in interpreter and sense bearer.   There is no doubt that he was a devout 
abolitionist in his own right.   
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John Caesar 
The majority of John Caesar’s life is quite obscure.  In fact, the known 
information about John Caesar covers a period of just over a year (December 1835–
January 1837).   This is primarily due to the limited contact between John Caesar and 
Whites (whether they be military or otherwise) in the territory.  This obeservation, 
however, by no means diminishes his importance, contributions, or leadership during the 
Second Seminole War.   
 John Caesar was physically described as short and stocky with a broad face.  He 
was generally believed to have been an elderly man at the advent of the war, probably in 
his late fifties or sixties.  Caesar was one of the Black Seminoles who for the better part 
of his life lived directly in the company of Seminoles. His mastery of the English 
language suggests either an early childhood in plantation society or rearing by slave 
parents.  Walton asserts that his parents were runaway slaves.  Whatever the case, he 
became a “slave” of Chief Emathla (or King Philip as Whites called him), the principal 
chief of the St. John’s River Seminoles.  In time, Caesar became Emathla’s counselor, 
interpreter, and commander of the Black Seminoles under his protection a relationship 
identical to Abraham’s relationship with Micanopy.40     
 Chief Emathla, according to Sprague, was a “ good natured, sensible Indian… he 
was inclined to peace, but opposed to the execution of the treaty [Payne’s Landing 
Treaty], and expressed a determination to die upon the soil.” 41 42  Chief Emathla was 
more inclined to negotiations and peaceful co-existence with Whites in the territory.  
However, if the government was adamant about forcing his removal, the chief was 
willing to fight to the death.     
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 Chief Emathla’s policy of conflict avoidance is most likely the reason why so 
little information is known about Caesar.  In all likelihood, Caesar adhered to this policy 
whenever possible.  Therefore, most of John Caesar’s life will continue to be embedded 
in mystery and clouded by rumors and speculation.  As for Chief Emathla, he would go 
on to discover that the government would not entertain any ideas of avoidance or 
peaceful co-existence with the Seminoles in the Florida Territory.  In the fall of 1837, for 
reasons unknown, four runaways returned to the custody of the Whites.  They brought 
with them John Philip, who under pressure from his wife had grown weary of the 
hardships of war.  John Philip agreed to guide the military to a Seminole encampment.  In 
September, General Joseph M. Hernandez was led to an encampment just south of St. 
Augustine on the Tomoka River.  In a surprise attack, Emathla was found by the river 
bathing.  He was captured and taken into the custody of General Thomas S. Jesup.  An 
elderly man who wished to live the rest of his life in peace, the chief agreed to emigrate. 
He requested a visit by his son and closest friends.  During this visit, he convinced his 
son to speak to the other chiefs about a peaceful surrender.  Unfortunately, in the 
following year (1838), the chief died during his emigration trip.43   
 Caesar was regarded by Whites as “very intelligent,”  “ an active smart Negro,” 
and “next to the negro Abraham in influence & importance among the Indian negroes and 
Indians.”44   During the Second Seminole War, he was a primary instigator of plantation 
slaves, a principal leader of plantation raids,  interpreter, negotiator, diplomat, and overall 
Black Seminole leader.  His position within both communities, Seminole and Black 
Seminole, is magnified when compared to the actual amount of time in which he 
participated in the war.   
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 While Abraham is noted as the Black Seminole primarily responsible for the 
development of the secret network between plantation slaves and Black Seminoles, 
Caesar was the individual most responsible for establishing the ties between the two.  
This most likely is due to the fact that Caesar’s wife was indeed a plantation slave.  Not 
only was he known to frequently visit her plantation, but several plantations in the area.  
It has been noted that because of this close connection, it became easy for Abraham and 
Caesar to visit plantations to meet with slaves in attempts to incite them to insurrection in 
cooperation with their cause.  Plantation owners were slow to realize that “engaged in 
effecting a junction with the negroes now underarms,” “Caesar,… it was supposed … 
[has] been commissioned by the [Seminole] chiefs to hold out inducements to the 
negroes, to join them.”  However, it was believed that, “an understanding with all the 
slaves [existed] before the war, that they were to unite with the Seminoles.”45  There is 
no doubt that this “inducement” related to promises of freedom.  However, it seems that 
emphatic guarantees would not have been necessary.  Caesar himself would have been 
verification.  If slaves were doubtful about their life outside of the plantation, they would 
need to look no further than Caesar, a man who periodically visited them while seeming 
to come and go as he pleased.  If indeed they had concerns about the ideas of exchanging 
a white master for a red one, the lifestyle of Caesar perhaps enticed them to believe that 
they would still be elevating their station in life.   Furthermore, the meetings themselves 
were planned with those slaves on the plantation who were already recognized as leaders 
within their respective communities.  Influence over a number of these slaves could 
conceivably result in influence among the enslaved population in general.   
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 Caesar’s relationship with the plantation slaves represented an enormous threat to 
plantation society in the Florida Territory.  In the years just prior to the Second Seminole 
War, Whites and Blacks in Florida were almost equal in number.  According to the 1830 
population census, there were approximately 18,000 Whites and 16,000 enslaved Blacks 
in the Florida Territory.  These numbers do not include the Seminole population, nor do 
they include the Black Seminole population.46  As tensions increased between plantation 
society and the Seminole, White Floridians began to pressure the government for 
protection.  To counter Caesar’s efforts towards unification, Whites began to pass laws to 
discourage free Blacks from arming themselves and uniting with the Seminoles.  In July 
1836, a bill was passed stipulating that any free Black that aided the Seminoles in any 
way would be sold into slavery.  A massive slave rebellion within plantation society 
ultimately would have meant that Whites would have had to fight two wars 
simultaneously, a war against the Seminole and an internal war against the slaves.  As an 
ominous sign for Whites, approximately four hundred slaves fled from the plantations to 
join the Seminoles by January 1836.47   
 In December 1835, Caesar assumed a leadership position in the attacks upon 
plantations in the area located around the St. John’s River.  The first casualty of the 
plantation raids under his leadership was the house of David Dunham, located at “New 
Smyrna, south of  the mosquito inlet.”  Dunham’s house was “plundered and burned.”  It 
was a collective effort involving Chief Emathla’s Seminoles and a “number of Indian 
negroes under Caesar.”  Days later, Caesar appeared at Mr. Hunter’s house and attempted 
to "decoy him off into the woods on the pretence of selling cattle and Horses.”  Mr. 
Hunter was apparently too suspicious of Caesar’s actions and cautiously declined.48  The 
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raid at Dunham’s struck a blow at plantation society in two ways.  It destroyed a 
plantation, physically causing economic woe and aiding in the recruitment of slaves.  
Although the Hunter attempt failed, it was nevertheless deemed a success in that it 
encouraged slaves to join the Seminole effort.  It was reported that “Depeyster’s negroes 
were … in league with the Indians;  they assisted them with a vote to cross over to 
Dummetts’ .… Upwards of two hundred fifty negroes … have joined the Indians and are 
more desperate than the Indians.”  Evidently, once the slaves began to witness the 
resistance of the Seminoles and Black Seminoles, they became more keen on securing 
their own freedom.  Runaway slaves “ painted their faces” as a symbol of their allegiance 
to the Seminole cause.  The threat of unification was now a clear danger to the military as 
well as to other Whites who resided in the territory.  Brigadier General J. M. Hernandez 
candidly recognized the perils of unification, stating, “ [it] is the very worse feature of the 
whole of this war.”49  Later, he would go on to recognize the leadership of Caesar during 
the events, asserting that he had “caused so much destruction at Mosquito [inlet].”50   
 For a brief period just after the plantation raids in December, Caesar disappeared 
from public view.  It would seem that for approximately two months Caesar adhered to 
the avoidance policy.  However, this very well may have been adherence to Abraham’s 
tactics of guerilla warfare where they would attack the enemy suddenly, then retreat into 
the dense forest.  In either case, Caesar appeared at the siege of Fort Izard on March 5, 
1836.  He was an active participant in the negotiations.  That night, Caesar was said to 
have contacted General Gaines, declaring that the Indians were tired of fighting and 
wanted peace.  According to Sprague, “ intelligent Indian and negroes who were upon the 
ground at the time, state that the conduct of John Caesar was without the authority or 
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knowledge of the chiefs.  With the Indians, he was a privileged character, and from his 
age and long residence among them, he felt at liberty to do that which he conceived for 
the general good .…”  Sprague goes on to state that after learning what he had done, the 
other chiefs wanted to kill him and that his life was spared only through Osceola’s 
intervention.51    
 Caesar was negotiating with two agendas in mind.  He still adhered to the policy 
of his Seminole chief, which called for peaceful cohabitation of Whites and all Seminoles  
in the territory.  His attacks on nearby plantations in December may have been no more 
than an obligatory act of retaliation against the encroachment of plantation society on 
their communities, as opposed to a general declaration of war.  This assertion is bolstered 
by the fact that he did not participate in any other conflict outside of the St. John’s region 
for two months.  Additionally, Caesar adhered to the strategy of Abraham in regard to  
actively participating in negotiations for terms that included the Black Seminoles.  He did 
not go to Camp Izard solely as a representative of his chief.  Instead, he also took it upon 
himself to go as a Black Seminole chief representing the Black Seminoles in the St. 
John’s River region. Furthermore, it is my contention that when Osceola spoke up for 
Caesar and defended him, it was a signifying gesture that suggested that Seminole chiefs 
were now recognizing the Black Seminoles as an independent group and no longer 
merely a group of individuals under their protection.  This assertion is supported by the 
events following Osceola’s intervention on Caesar’s behalf.  The next day, two 
conferences were held at which Abraham and Caesar were present.  These conferences 
were organized to outline the future war strategies.52  The fact that neither Micanopy nor 
Emathla were present implies that they (Abraham and Caesar) were there merely as 
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representatives.  However, none of the elderly Seminole chiefs were present.  By 1836 
the younger chiefs were taking the leadership positions in the war effort and seemed to 
accept the Black Seminole as an independent equal ally.  Therefore, Abraham and Caesar 
very well may have been representing their Seminole Chiefs, but they were primarily 
there representing the interests of the Black Seminoles. 
 After the conference, Caesar once again disappeared from the public view for 
over ten months.  It is believed that he returned to the St. John’s River region.  Toward 
the end of 1836, he was recognized for aiding in the efforts of Chief Emathla to repel the 
South Carolina volunteers around the St. John’s River.  Here again, when actual warfare 
was concerned, Caesar actively maintained the policy of avoidance whenever possible.  
He continually maintained this balance between the philosophies of Abraham and Chief 
Emanthla.   
 In December of the same year, things would change in a manner that would no 
longer allow Caesar to maintain this balance.  A new Commander-in-Chief, Major 
General Thomas S. Jesup, entered Florida and zealously swept across the frontier.  
Consequently, the Alachua Seminoles and Black Seminoles were driven eastward in the 
direction of the St. John’s region.  Caesar realized the policy of avoidance would allow 
the Alachua Seminoles to be defeated and it would only be a matter of time before the 
United States military would approach the St. John’s region.  Therefore, he determined 
that intervention was the only solution.  He inaugurated a guerilla campaign primarily 
utilizing runaway slaves.  His campaign consisted of a few bands operating under his 
command.  Each band is believed to have consisted of approximately twelve men.  
Caesar’s band, at his last recorded raid, consisted of approximately eight runaway slaves, 
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a free Black, two Seminoles, and two Black Seminoles who most likely belonged to his 
group of Black Seminoles in the St. John region. 
 In January 1837, Caesar began to garner the necessities needed for the campaign.  
In mid-January, he and his band attempted to raid John M. Hanson’s plantation just west 
of St. Augustine.  There they would attempt to steal horses from the stable. In the process 
of creating a large enough opening to lead the animals out, they were discovered by a 
sentinel. Gunfire was exchanged.  Although there were no casualties, the night watch in 
St. Augustine was alerted.  Consequently, Caesar and his raiders withdrew.  The next 
day, the military followed their trail.  At approximately ten o’clock p.m., the military 
discovered the band’s encampment about thirty miles from St. Augustine on the Williams 
plantation.  The military proceeded to sneak into the encampment.  Once they got close 
enough, they opened fire and created a panic within the encampment such that many 
simply fled leaving behind ammunition, guns, and supplies.  As a result, three members 
of the band were killed while at least one other was badly wounded.  Two of the three 
killed were Black Seminoles from the St. John region.  One of them was John Caesar 
himself.  He was identified by his distinguished clothing.  The Seminole cause had lost 
one of its most outstanding warrior.  Likewise, the Black Seminole had lost one of their 
most influential and distinguished leaders.53
 The effect of Caesar’s raid was felt by General Jesup as well as white residents in 
the vicinity.  Days later, General Jesup won two major battles at Hatcheelustee and in the 
Great Cyprus Swamp.  It would seem that Jesup would view the month of January as a 
major success and therefore resolve to press harder.  However, in March 1837, Article V 
of the Articles of Capitulation was adopted.  Moreover, the makeup of Caesar’s band 
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alone demonstrated the solidarity of Seminoles, Black Seminoles, free Blacks outside the 
Black Seminole community, and those enslaved; this undoubtedly had to have had an 
enormous effect on Jesup as he began to seek out favorable terms of peace to end the war.  
As previously mentioned, the greatest fear of the military was to have to fight the Second 
Seminole War while also suppressing in a major slave insurrection.  It is my contention 
that Caesar’s raid induced General Jesup to include  Article V. Jesup undoubtedly 
understood that the relationship between Black Seminoles and plantation slaves was 
strengthening as the war progressed.  The longer the war lasted, the more slaves gained 
confidence in the Seminole cause and the more apt they were to join.  General Jesup was 
in the process of seeking a way to somehow separate the Seminoles from Black 
Seminoles.  Caesar’s band represented the very worst scenario, a unification of all groups 
in the territory against the Whites.  Therefore, despite the death of Caesar and the 
victories at Hatcheelustee and in the Great Cypress Swamp, he offered the Black 
Seminole favorable terms of peace. 
 Although the death of Caesar came as a relief to Whites in the Florida Territory, 
especially those in the St. John region, his attempted raid caused much concern.  Whites 
were alarmed by the fact that the band was almost entirely made up of Blacks.  The mere 
fact that Blacks would be daring and bold enough to attempt a deed almost entirely upon 
their own sent shock waves through the white community.  Up until this point, in terms of 
warfare, Blacks were basically believed to only be misled by Indians into calculated acts 
of savagery.  The most alarming fact about black participation in the raid was that when 
Whites searched the belongings left by the fleeing band, they discovered numerous 
articles such as calico, needles, thread, buckshot, and tobacco which were identified as 
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being purchased in the shops of Saint Augustine.  This demonstrated a relationship with 
Blacks in the city.  As a result of both fear and panic, it was believed that Blacks in Saint 
Augustine would set fire to the city enabling Seminoles to besiege it.  In response to the 
alarm, the city council was convinced that their slaves were in cooperation with the 
Seminoles against them and demanded that the military remain with them for protection 
and pursue others who may be among them.54  In light of Caesar’s raid, Whites quickly 
made a correlation between the Second Seminole War and a slave rebellion within their 
society.  In essence, the Second Seminole War convinced Whites of the  dire need to 
separate their slaves from the Black Seminoles (a majority of whom were runaway 
slaves) in hopes of not having a massive rebellion throughout the Florida Territory.   
 The most significant contributions of John Caesar were his ability to unify the 
Seminole cause with Blacks in the plantation areas and provide leadership to those who 
joined the Seminole cause.  Without the assistance of slaves and free Blacks, the 
Seminole cause would not have been as successful in garnering the necessities needed for 
fighting the campaign nor would they have been as successful in infiltrating plantations 
in the territory.  Caesar incited and inspired many slaves to no longer simply tolerate  
their station in life as oppressed servants55  He went on further to provide leadership to 
those slaves who were willing to seize an opportunity to gain their freedom. 
 Under the influence and leadership of Caesar, plantation slaves assumed principal 
roles in contesting territory from the St. John’s River region up to the city of Saint 
Augustine.  They were also responsible for keeping Whites in the region in terror during 
the early years of the Second Seminole War.  Those runaway slaves who stayed in close 
contact with Caesar (primarily those in his particular band) would go on to assume other 
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leadership positions within the slave communities.  The most notable members of those 
runaway slaves in his band were Andrew Gu’e (or Gay), Stephen Hernandez, Philip 
Hunter, John Bicente, Toney Weightman, Hector Anderson, Benet Depeyster, and 
Ormond Depeyster.  Of those listed, Andrew Gu’e and Stephen Hernandez were the most 
noteworthy.56
 Andrew Gu’e is credited with being the most prominent of runaway slaves.  He 
was described at the time of the war as “a young negro, not exceeding twenty-one years 
of age, and active and enterprising.”  It was reported that “He went off, joined the 
Indians, and after being with them for some weeks, he returned clandestinely to town and 
held a meeting with some of his friends, and encouraged some of them off.  At this 
meeting he stated that he had become high in the confidence of the Indians and he only 
wanted a white man’s scalp to make him a great man.”  The report goes on further to tell 
the story of how he was once captured with other Black Seminoles but escaped and “on 
several occasions since made his appearance in the vicinity.”  Gu’e took on an active 
leadership role in the interaction between Black Seminoles and Blacks within plantation 
society.  After the failed raid with Caesar, Gu’e was later captured and placed in United 
States military custody.  From that point on he seems to have disappeared from the 
historical record.57
 Stephen Hernandez was a slave of General Joseph L. Hernandez.  He absconded 
to join the Seminole cause while General Hernandez was commanding the Florida militia 
in the St. Augustine area.  When notified that Stephen had run away and was actively 
participating in the war, General Hernandez remarked, “Stephen ...is quite a young and 
inexperienced lad, who has always been kept up on the plantation, and I have no doubt, 
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he has been misled, by his Indian associates.”58  The information that Stephen would be 
able to give to the Black Seminoles would be instrumental in creating strategy.  His 
importance within the Black Seminole community would eventually elevate him to a 
position of leadership. 
 Caesar’s contact with free Blacks within plantation society proved to be 
instrumental to the acquisition of supplies.  Free Blacks arranged these purchases of 
supplies and provided valuable information on the movements of the military between 
various plantations.  There were two noted free Blacks who were especially crucial to 
these operations.  They perhaps should be viewed as true champions of the cause of 
freedom in that they were already indeed free but were willing to take greater risks than 
most free Blacks for the sake of liberty for their fellow Blacks in the region. These two 
free Blacks were Randal Irving and Joe Merritt. 
 Although Randal Irving never officially became a member of the Black Seminole 
community, he was quite instrumental in providing the Black Seminoles with supplies 
and ammunition purchased from Spanish traders.  Irving resided on Anastasia Island just 
off the Florida coast.  Irving’s location alone provided an ideal meeting place.  In 
preparation for Caesar’s raid, three members of Caesar’s band (John Bicente, Joe Merritt, 
and Andrew Gu’e) met with Irving.  At this meeting, Irving supplied them with 
“provisions and ammunition.”  After the failed raid, Irving was placed on trial for 
“treason against the United States.”  During the trial, he testified to the number of 
participants in Caesar’s band and that Caesar himself was among them waiting for the 
supplies.  During Irving’s arrest and trial, he became ill.59  It is not known whether he 
was executed or died in custody, but there is no record of his return to slavery.   
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 Joe Merritt was also a free Black and resident of Anastasia Island.  He was 
believed to have been a young man during the war, possibly in his mid to late-teenage 
years.  Nevertheless, Joe was became a liaison between free Blacks and Black Seminoles.  
He was directly under the mentorship of Caesar.  How he became a member of his band 
is not exactly known.  During the trials of free Blacks in the region, a story was told that 
Caesar and Joe’s father, Stephen Merritt, had quarreled over money that was supposedly 
owed by Stephen Merritt to Caesar.  As a result, the testimony stated “Caesar----- said he 
would take one of Stephen Merritt’s children.”  Whether this was indeed the case, or if 
Joe joined Caesar on his on accord, is unknown.  What is known is that Joe was actively 
involved with Caesar and participated in the meeting with Randall for supplies.  Joe also 
participated in Caesar’s raid and was with him when his encampment was discovered.  
As a result, Joe was one of the three killed along with Caesar.60   
 Although key members of the band were subdued, the Second Seminole War 
would continue for another five years after John Caesar’s death; his contributions would 
be a principal factor in not only the creation of Article V, but also its implementation in 
1842.  Caesar was the primary agent instigating a war that encompassed the regions 
outside of the plantation zone as well as inside.  By forging a union with free Blacks and 
slaves in Florida’s plantation system, Caesar incorporated a slave revolt and partisan 
warfare, as well as a significant supply line into the Seminole cause throughout the entire 
war.  Porter contends that if there was any weakness of John Caesar it was his 
recklessness, which resulted in his death.61  I contend that this “recklessness” that Porter 
refers to was not a weakness but actually the assertiveness that he pursued once he made 
a conscious decision to not adhere to Chief Emathla’s avoidance policy.  The task of 
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unification was in itself an undertaking that demanded an assertiveness unachievable 
through diplomacy alone.  In order to gain their active support, slaves needed to witness 
defiance against their masters.  Larry Rivers asserts that “murders of whites by black 
antebellum Florida did not occur with any degree of frequency [small or large] other than 
during the Second Seminole War…. Except during that  conflict [the Second Seminole 
War], few slaves tried to harm their masters physically.” Rivers goes further to state, 
“The few slaves who murdered their masters or overseers typically did so from 
premeditated planning rather than from a spontaneous act.”62  Caesar’s frequent visits 
and exhortation speeches to slaves incited them to flee to the Seminole cause.  His 
“recklessness” jolted plantation slaves into rebellion.  There was no other way for Caesar 
to incite rebellion on a massive scale than to proceed with reckless abandonment.  The 
fact that between 1835 and 1837 more than four hundred slaves fled their respective 
plantations to join the Seminole cause, with less than 50 percent ever returning to Whites, 
demonstrates both the effectiveness of Caesar’s actions.  John understood that unification 
was the only way, and for that he gave his life. 
John Cavallo 
 
 When examining the contributions of Abraham and John Caesar, one may get the 
impression that the leadership role of Black Seminoles during the war was short lived.  
John Cavallo’s leadership during the Second Seminole War represents just the opposite.  
Of all the Black Seminoles who participated in the war, no other person served a greater 
length of time, nor had more contact with Whites before, during, or after the war.  
Consequently, there is more information available on his life than on any other Black 
Seminole.  The following discussion re-examines the historiography concerning John 
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Cavallo with the purpose of gaining a better understanding of Cavallo’s perspectives and 
actions during this period. 
 John Cavallo (also known as Gopher John and John Horse) was born around  
1812. 63  He was the product of a union between Seminole Chief Charles Cavallo64 (also 
known as Imotley) and a black woman.  Given his father’s association with the Alachua 
Seminole and his relationship with Chief Alligator, it can be deduced that he was born in 
the Alachua Seminole heartland near present-day Gainesville and Lake City.  In this 
region, the Seminole primarily were agriculturalists and grazed large herds of cattle.  As a 
result of the Patriot War, Chief Cavallo moved the tribe approximately twelve miles 
northeast of present-day Tampa Bay close to Lake Thonotosassa.  It is here that John 
spent most of his youth.65
 Chief Cavallo’s settlement for the most part prospered during young John’s life.  
It was well situated in close proximity to the American Post at Fort Brooke.  In 1823, just 
after the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, the military established Fort Brooke in order to 
provide administrative assistance to Seminoles on reservations while supervising their 
activities.  An assessment by the military was then made on the Thonotosassa Village.  
“We visited Thlo-nota-ssassa Indian town fifteen miles N.E. from this [Fort Brooke] 
place .… [C]ontaing about Ten families, [it] is situated on a pine gaven bordering on two 
small ponds, both nearly covered with grass & c, around these ponds there is a narrow 
skirt of Hammock, --heavily timbered, --the greater part which is under cultivation.”66  
Existing trails allowed Seminoles to travel into the military post and prosper through 
trade.  Seminoles often sold turkey, venison, and whooping crane.67  
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 Although much is not recorded about John prior to the war, there is one story 
from his youth that offers a glimpse of his intelligence and brave demeanor.  It is also the 
story of how he became known as Gopher John.  George McCall, stationed at Fort 
Brooke in 1826, recalled: 
A long-legged lathy Black boy of some 14 years, belonging to one of the 
Thonotosassa Indians, called at its officer’s quarters and offered for sail a brace of 
gophers.  He received his quarter of the dollar, and Andrew, the cook, a black 
slave, was ordered to put them in the crawl, which at that time happening to be 
empty.  He was also charged to feed them regularly with dried beans and other 
articles of vegetable diet.  The next day the boy, John, brought another pair of 
gophers to the same officer, and received his quarter.  The next day it was the 
same, and the next and the next.  The officer was delighted with his good fortune, 
and at the end of some ten days, not having kept count strictly, he told Andrew to 
count the gophers, and let him know how many were in the crawl.  Andrew did go 
to the crawl, in one corner of which a quantity of brush had been thrown under 
which there nocturnal animals might retire during the day; and he did shale up the 
brush and toss it about very thoroughly, but he saw never a gopher but the two he 
had just put in.   
 
Andrew, naturally enough, was just amazed, then perplexed, and finally 
confounded at the discovery he had made; for he could be sworn he had daily put 
a brace into the crawl for many days in succession; and so he protested to his 
master to whom be hastened with the news.” 
 
I was no more surprised than Andrew, and in addition he was first disappointed, 
then vexed, and finally enraged at the cheat we began to suspect had been played 
upon us.  He had at once sent out his orderly to look for Master John, who was 
soon brought before him, looking as pale as a negro can look.  Under the fear of 
being well flogged if he did not confess, John let out the truth; which of course 
was, that he had leaped the paling every night and captured the gophers be had 
sold during the day before.  The joke took and John was let off without flogging, 
but with the “nomme do guerre” of “Gopher John” tacked to him for life.68   
 
From this point on, John would go on to have numerous interactions with the 
Americans becoming more acquainted with the United States military as a whole.  In 
turn, the military had no idea that the young boy they jokingly called Gopher John would 
become one of their most formidable adversaries during the war. 
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 In just a short period, the existing trails that provided the Seminole and Black 
Seminole villages access to other inhabited areas in the region became one of the primary 
focal points in the rising tensions between the Seminoles and Whites inhabiting the 
western peninsular region.  The northward extension of these trails became viewed by 
white settlers as an enticement for runaways to the peninsula.  At the same time, 
plantation society in the Florida Panhandle (primarily between the Apalachicola and 
Suwannee Rivers, commonly known as Middle Florida) increasingly encroached upon 
Seminole communities. Whites in this region were demanding the removal of both 
Seminole and Black Seminoles.  The mounting tensions caused a rippling effect such that 
more Seminoles and Black Seminoles began traveling the trails that led to Chief 
Cavallo’s settlement in search of both trade in the peninsula as well as a respite from the 
encroaching plantation society.  By the end of 1826, an army official estimated that 
Thlonotosassa’s population had reached two hundred.69
 Young John grew up in the midst of the village’s growth, and with his father’s 
ever-increasing importance, he begin to encounter and eventually develop relationships 
with key Seminole leaders.  It is certain that during this period of his life he became well 
acquainted with Chief Alligator, a principal chief who resided to the east of Thlonotossa 
on the Peace River (also known as Pease Creek).  In time, John would go on to develop a 
relationship with Chief Alligator which resembled the relationship between Abraham and 
Micanopy, as well as John Caesar’s relationship with Chief Emanthla.  It can also be 
assumed that at some point during John’s youth he resided along the Peace River, most 
likely in the company of Chief Alligator, due to the fact that during the early stages of the 
war some military officers knew him as “Pease Creek John.”70   
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 During the first year of the Second Seminole War, John Cavallo’s specific 
activities and contributions are not known.  However, the war started around the region of 
Fort Brooke and Lake Thonotassa, which suggests that he may have been involved in the 
fighting.  “The war has not been as yet carried into the enemy’s settlements the Meacca 
and Pease Creek,” General Winfield Scott declared. “That country is believed to be one 
of his strongholds, and the place of concealment for many families and negroes.”71    
Shortly after this declaration, Scott’s forces invaded the Peace River frontier destroying 
villages and encampments.  In May 1836, “one of the severest battles fought during the 
war,” occurred close to Lake Thonotossa.72  Most likely it is during this period that John 
Cavallo allied with Chief Alligator and Chief Osceola as they became the principal 
Seminole war chiefs in the regions surrounding Tampa Bay leading up to Alachua.  Also, 
John probably became the Black Seminole leader most active in efforts to unify the Black 
Seminoles and plantation slaves of the Florida Territory’s western frontier.  He is 
believed to have participated in the Dade Massacre, as well as the battles at  
Withlocoochee and Wahoo Swamp.73  It is during this period (1835-1836) that John was 
beginning to transform into an intrepid Black Seminole war chief known throughout the 
Florida Territory. 
 In the spring of 1837, John Cavallo was recognized by the United States military 
as a Black Seminole leader and references to him in a leadership capacity were 
presumably first made by General Jesup in February when he stated, “Abraham has just 
come in with a flag, accompanied by a nephew of the Indian Chief Cloud, and a negro 
chief.”74  It can  be assumed that the “negro chief” General Jesup refers to was John 
Cavallo, due to the fact that the only other Black Seminole given the responsibility of 
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participating in negotiations was John Caesar.  It could not have been Caesar, as he was 
killed the month prior to the negotiations (January).  In March, John represented Chief 
Alligator at the negotiations that resulted in the inclusion of Article V.  There he signed 
the peace treaty on Alligator’s behalf.  From this point on he would be recognized as 
Chief Alligator’s “sense-bearer” or advisor.75  In reference to the Black Seminoles, 
General Jesup recognized John Cavallo as a “principal chief.” 
 As a result of the negotiations, John Cavallo agreed to emigration and began 
preparations for departure.  On March 7, 1837, he was placed under General Jesup’s 
custody.  The next month he was relocated to an “emigrating camp” near Fort Brooke.  
During April, he was released for a short period in order to “set out to collect his people 
and cattle.”76  John would begin to assume more responsibilities, thus enhancing his  
leadership role among the Seminoles and especially the Black Seminoles. 
 In compliance with the agreement he made during negotiations to protect Black 
Seminoles from Whites trying to reclaim slaves, General Jesup barred access to any 
unauthorized Whites to “any part of the territory, between the St. John’s River and the 
Gulf of Mexico.”  General Jesup stated that he had “reason to believe that the interference 
of unprincipled white men with the negro property of the Seminole Indians if not 
immediately checked will prevent their emigration and lead to a renewal of the war.”77  
General Jesup was well aware of the rising tension between the Whites and Seminoles in 
the territory.  He was also well aware of the adamant nature in which Whites pursued 
runaway slaves.  According to Julia Smith, “many of the slaveholders in Florida were 
farmers who owned only a few bondsmen”78  The loss of one or two slaves could result 
in the financial ruin of a white farmer.  According to Smith, the Second Seminole War 
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occurred during the largest increase in the black population in Florida during the 
antebellum period.  As she explains, “The mania for buying slaves which seized Florida 
planters is evidenced by the fact that the Negro population increased from 7,587 in 1830 
to 26,526 in 1840, a growth rate far in excess of the normal increase.”79  I contend that 
the growth of the Black population during this time period was primarily due to the 
expansion of plantation society in Middle Florida and the loss of slaves during the war. 
 General Jesup’s assumptions proved to be correct.  Whites immediately began to 
swarm Fort Brooke with claims of ownership of runaway slaves.  In the midst of the 
confusion, John escaped.  General Jesup recalled, “Jumper and Abraham came in with a 
Message from Micanopy….He sent word that John Cowaya had stolen five of our horses, 
and had runaway with all his people.”80  General Jesup was enraged; he immediately 
ordered the incarceration of all Black Seminoles.  In June, John returned to Fort Brooke 
with Osceola and approximately 200 warriors.  They besieged the fort and escaped with 
approximately 700 Seminoles and Black Seminoles.  As a result of the siege and rescue, 
the Second Seminole War resumed.  General Jesup reported to his supervisor, “This 
campaign so far as relates to Indian migration has entirely failed.”81
 General Jesup’s initial reaction to the siege on Fort Brooke was that of 
disheartened despair and frustration.  His feelings quickly transformed into revenge.  His 
first tactical maneuver was to authorize the volunteer forces to capture Black Seminoles 
and retain them as slaves.  He began to consider using bloodhounds to track Black 
Seminoles.  His general policy towards Blacks involved in the war was to capture them 
and treat them all as runaway slaves.  As a tactic to sever the bond between the Seminole 
Indians and the Black Seminoles, he began to entertain the idea of offering those Indians 
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who vehemently opposed migration a reservation in the territory. “I am very sure they 
could be confined to a small district near Florida Point. and would accept peace and the 
small district referred to, as the condition for the surrender of all runaway negroes.”82  It 
is clear that General Jesup and the United States military viewed the Seminole Indians 
and the Black Seminoles as two distinct groups.  The inclusion of Article V was their first 
acknowledgement of this view.  General Jesup offered peaceable negotiation to the Black 
Seminoles in order to rupture their alliance with the Seminoles and end the war.  Now, 
General Jesup, utterly dissatisfied with John Cavallo, entertained the idea of negotiating 
with the Seminole Indians in hopes of ending the war while exacting vengeance upon the 
Black Seminoles. 
 After the siege and rescue at Fort Brooke, Micanopy led the majority of the band  
eastward to the Kissimmee River where they erected an encampment.  John was placed in 
charge of the group.  His following consisted of only fifteen Seminole Indians and an 
unidentified number of Blacks.  The division of the occupants was based primarily on the 
Indian/Black ratio.  Therefore, this division was yet another example of the military’s 
distinctions made between the Seminole Indians and Black Seminoles.  Micanopy was 
the chief in charge of the Seminole Indians, while John Horse was the chief in charge of 
the Black Seminoles.”83   
 As a response to the escape at Fort Brooke, General Jesup devised a broad 
campaign directed at the Seminole strongholds.  Jesup believed that the Black Seminoles 
were encamped west of the Kissimmee River in the upper Peace River area.  The military 
erected Fort Fraser just north of present-day Bartow to gain access to the Peace River.  
Colonel Zachary Taylor was then instructed to lead a large contingent from Fort Brooke 
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to the Kissimmee River.84  Jesup’s orders clearly identify the distinction he made 
between the two groups as different directives were given for each. 
 As it turns out, Jesup was correct in calculating the position of the Seminole 
Indians.  However, John and Chief Alligator had joined Micanopy at his encampment.  
John was ordered by both chiefs to find Chief Osceola and Coacoochee (also known as 
Wild Cat), consult with them, and serve as their interpreter if necessary.  In October, 
Coacoochee was captured by Jesup, along with others under his command.  With the lost 
of his closest ally in the region, Osceola called for a parley Jesup reported, “On the 20th 
[October], John Cavallo, a sub-chief, a hostage who had violated his parole in May of last 
year, come into Saint Augustine with a message from [Osceola] and Coa Hajo” 
“…stating that [they] had encamped near and desired to see General Hernandez.  I … 
required General Hernandez to seize them and take then to Saint Augustine.”  Jesup goes 
further to warn them, “that wherever John Cavallo was, foul play might be expected.”85
 In compliance with Jesup’s orders, Hernandez took Osceola, John Horse, and over 
seventy-two others into custody, arresting and jailing them in St. Augustine’s Castillo do 
San Marcos with Coacooche.”  Hernandez encountered Osceola and Coa Hajo standing 
under a white flag of truce.  Present at the encounter was Assistant Surgeon Nathan Jarvis 
who recalled:  
On our arrival at their camp we discovered at a short distance by a white flag 
flying the Indians immediately gathered around us shaking hands with all the 
officers.  My attention was of course first directed to discover Os-Cin-Ye-hola 
[Osceola].  He was soon pointed out to me but I could have designated him by his 
looks as the principal man among them.  Nothing of savage fierceness or 
determination marked his countenance, on the contrary his features, indicated 
mildness and benevolence.  A continued smile played over his face, particularly 
when shaking hands with the officers present.86  
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Hernandez (through an interpreter) asked them.  “Have you come to give up to me 
as your friend?”  Coa Hao replied, “No, we did not understand so: word went 
from here, and we have come we have done nothing all summer, and we want to 
make peace.”  After more conversation Hernandez gave the signal and the troops 
moved in.  Four Black Seminoles were among those taken into custody (including 
John Cavallo).  They were all marched between a double file line of soldiers in 
custody.87   
  
 This would be the second time that John was taken into custody.  Unlike the first, 
he was considered a prisoner charged with breaking a truce.  However, like the first, John 
would escape yet again.  His participation is never specifically outlined in any of the 
accounts of the night of November 29 when he and Coacooche escaped.  However, 
John’s actions can be outlined based upon available sources. 
 These are numerous conflicting accounts of the escape, including a story told by 
Coacoohee himself.  The reconstruction of events by Porter is considered to be the most 
accurate.  According to Porter, twenty Seminoles (both Indian and Black, including two 
women) were confined in a cell measuring eighteen-by-thirty-three-feet located on the 
southwestern side of the fort.  The cell had a long narrow vent approximately eight inches 
wide by five feet which provided light.  It had an iron bar that ran the length of it but 
evidently it had eroded.  The vent itself was approximately fifteen feet up from the floor.  
The room in past times was used as a bakery, therefore approximately one foot below the 
opening was a ledge that once held the ovens.  Utilizing the knives that they kept on their 
persons, they cut the materials given to them as bedding to make ropes.  They then 
hoisted themselves up to the opening and used the ropes to lower themselves down 
outside of the window.  Porter surmises John Horse’s participation by stating,  
One of the tallest and strongest of the men.—I suspect the powerful six foot 
Indian Negro John Cavallo—vaulted onto the wide platform beneath the window, 
followed by several others….Seizing one of his slighter comrades by the ankles, 
he boosted him up so that the Indian’s feet were on the Negros’ shoulders, from 
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which, working his toes into niches already carved in the hard coquina, perhaps 
stepping up to the handle of a knife wedged firmly into a crevice between the 
rocks, the Indian was able to clutch the ledge beneath the window and, with a 
spring and a wriggle, pull himself up onto it, one end of the knotted line gripped 
between his teeth.88
 
 The news of the escape spread like wildfire.  One officer reported “20 Indians 
mostly Mikisukis [Black Seminole] headed by that daring rascal Co-oor-coo-chy and 
John Cavallo escaped from Fort St. Marks.”   He went on further to state, “ If they get 
down among the Indians, good bye to peace this year at least.…General J [esup] is much 
cast down by this occurrence.”89  Jesup himself declared, “John Cowaggee…is the 
greatest rascal in the nation except Alligator.”90  For Jesup, the escape would be the least 
of his problems at the time. 
 Jesup could not have imagined the national attention that would arise from the 
arrest of Chief Osceola, who consequently from either illness, a defeated spirit, or a 
combination of the two decided not to join the escape.  Osceola had become a martyr in 
American popular opinion.  In 1838, Jesup found himself on the floor of Congress 
defending his actions with only half of the legislators supporting him.   According to 
Mahon, Jesup’s defenders “advanced reasons to justify his actions.”  They were: 
1). Osceola had not kept his word in agreement to emigrate. 
 
2). Osceola and Coa Hadjo returned to St. Augustine to rescue Chief 
Emanthla and massacre Whites. 
 
3). Osceola agreed to parley knowing that Jesup had refused further 
negotiations. 
 
4). Jesup claimed that Osceola killed a messenger under a truce flag. 
 
5). The Seminole Indians had broken the truce in August 1837 by committing 
hostile acts. 
 
6). Osceola’s arrest was warranted in the need for expediency in the war.91
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The justifications proved adequate as Jesup returned to the war with his command still in 
tact.  However, the arrest of Osceola under a truce flag would leave an indelible mark on 
his military career which he spent years trying to erase.  In 1858, twenty years after the 
affair, Jesup submitted this excerpt from a letter to a Washington newspaper. 
A matter has recently been brought into discussion which my name was 
connected some twenty years ago, and though explained at the time, seems not 
even now to be well understood.  It has been published in a neighboring print on 
the authority of a distinguished professional and public man that the Seminole 
Indian Warrior Osceola who by the murder of General Thompson and other 
atrocities started the Seminole War, “was captured by treachery and fraud.” 
In a conference which I held with the Seminole Chief … but a few weeks before, 
I had assured them that I would hold no further conferences with them except to 
receive from them the notice of their readiness to fulfill their obligations under the 
treaty of Paynes’ Landing….”92
 
 As a result of the escape, Jesup went on a relentless pursuit of John and 
Cacoochee, who were en route to join Alligator encamped around Lake Okeechobee.  In 
his bitterness, Jesup first threatened Emanthla with death if they did not give themselves 
up.  He would rescind this threat a day or two later once he calmed down.93  In order to 
pursue the escapees and confront Alligator at Lake Okeechobee, Jesup assembled the 
largest army mobilized during the Second Seminole War.  Utilizing all the available 
military aid including volunteers, Jesup marched approximately 9,000 men in pursuit. 
 On Christmas Day 1837, General Taylor received the word that John’s brother- 
in-law had been captured and had informed them “that a large body of Seminoles, headed 
by John Co-hua [John Cavallo], Co-a-coo-chee, and, no doubt, Alligator, with other 
chiefs, were encamped five or six miles from us, near the Mikasukies, with a cypress 
swamp and dense hammock between them and the latter.”94  Out numbering the 
Seminoles by a margin of about two to one, Taylor engaged them in battle.  After 
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approximately two and a half hours, the battle ended leaving twenty-six United States  
soldiers dead, and one hundred and twelve wounded.  The Seminoles suffered eleven 
deaths and fourteen wounded.95  The Seminoles would sustain the heavier overall loss.  A 
large amount of food and supplies were lost.  The combined forces of the Seminole 
Nation retreated further south and west.  Taylor withdrew northward to Fort Bassinger.  
Jesup began approaching the region from the Atlantic coast.96   
By 1838, both sides were growing weary of war.  The losses suffered during the 
battle at Lake Okeechobee by the Seminoles proved to be more than some members 
could bear.  In February, an officer reported, “The Indians are suffering for food….In all 
their camps were found they had subsisted on palmetto roots and the cabbage tree, which 
is never eaten by them except when hard rain.”  He went on further to state that “One 
hundreds and sixty Indians and negroes have come in [Fort Bassinger] since the fight, 
and they say many more will come in soon that they are tired of the war and hungry.”97  
Jesup, too, was growing weary.  In February, he took an official position to allow the 
Indians to remain in Florida and “determined to separate all the negroes from the Indians 
and send them out of the country as soon as possible.”98
 In April, Alligator and John capitulated after Jesup sent word that John was 
promised his freedom and protection. “Alligator, one of the most active and warlike of 
the hostiles, had surrendered at Fort Bassinger on the 4th of April …. He was found with 
88 of his people, among whom was John Cowaya,  and 27 blacks, to the southwest of 
Lake Okeechobee.  Alligator was to return to his party, and, by means of runners, collect 
all the scattered Indians and concentrate them at Peace Creek.”99  John arrived on April 
14. Abraham was instrumental in bringing him in under peaceful conditions.100
 162
 It was befitting that John’s departure from Florida that June took place in the 
region of his youth.  During his emigration, he first went to Fort Fraser on the Peace 
River.  He then traveled on a Seminole trail now utilized as a military road to Fort 
Brooke, passing directly through the ruins of Thlonoto-sassa.  I imagine it was a long 
disheartening trip, viewing the land in which one once prospered now lying in ruins.  At 
Fort Brooke, the insurgent spirit of some Black Seminoles revived as they urged 
Seminoles “to go off.”101  As a result, twenty Seminoles from Alligators band escaped.  
The military, fearing John might join them, hastened his departure.  On June 14, John 
was among the thirty Black Seminoles who had reached New Orleans.  Accompanying 
him was one male listed at age 1-10, two males listed age 10-25, one female under 10, 
two females aged 10-25, and his wife.102
 John Cavallo was the last significant Black Seminole leader to surrender.  
Although he was transported out of the Florida Territory in 1838, due to unforeseen 
events, he would return.  Jesup had guaranteed John his freedom, but in the west a claim 
would be made to the contrary.  John’s father, Chief Cavallo, died shortly after his arrival 
in the west.  Chief Cavallo’s widow insisted that John was her “slave” by right and not a 
designated “allie” to the Seminole Indians.  It is most likely she made this claim due to 
her reliance upon Black Seminoles for agricultural work, especially now that her husband 
was dead.  John now needed formal documentation of his freedom as well as funds for 
survival.  Therefore be agreed to work for the United States military by inducing relatives 
and friends to emigrate.  In October; General Arbuckle was given authorization to allow 
John to return to Florida “to persuade the Seminoles… To emigrate to their new homes.”  
When General Taylor was notified of John’s return he was outraged to say the least.  In 
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November, he wrote, “I regret that permission should have been given for the return to 
Florida of the Seminole Indian John Co-wia as I believe him to be one of the most artful 
and faithless of his tribe.”  Taylor went on to state, “ I cannot therefore give my consent 
to this man’s landing in the Territory, and if time allows will take the responsibility to 
order him to be halted at New Orleans.”  Taylor never assumed that “responsibility” to 
prevent John’s return.  By May 1839, John was back in Florida employed as a military 
guide and interpreter.103
 Little is known about John’s first year of service as a military guide and 
interpreter.  What is certain is that the job itself was perilous, and he was sure to have 
encountered danger. “Negro guides” became a valued tool to the military.  One account 
states, “An accident gave Colonel Harney the services of a Negro guide who carried him 
to the Everglades.… That negro was the only man in America black or white, who could 
have performed that service in a part of the country never before visited.”104  Seminoles 
also understood the value of the guides to the  United States military.  In July 1839, 
Harney and his detachment were ambushed in the camp on the Caloosahatchee River.  
According to a survivor, “The negro interpreter Sandy [and Sampson] were allowed to 
live four days.  They then tied them to a pine tree and inserted in their flesh silvers of 
light wood, setting them on fire, and at the same time placing torches at their feet.”  
Sprague, however, provides a different account in which only Sandy was murdered and 
the other guide Sampson was spared most likely due to the fact that he had “lived with 
Osceola.”105
By 1840, John was a well-paid guide of the military.  He was known to have 
visited Black Seminole encampments under military supervision.  The Black Seminoles 
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held frequent dances in which John actively participated.  It is believed that during a visit 
to attend a dance John met his wife Susan.  It appears that John had two wives, the wife 
of his youth and Susan.  According to Porter, by his late teenage years “he was married… 
and supposedly the brother in-law of Holatochee, a close Kinsman of head chief 
Micanopy.”  By the spring of 1840, John and Susan were married and remained so for 
over forty years until his death.  Susan, a Black Seminole herself, was the daughter of 
July (one of the three former sub-chief of Pelilakaha) who unlike Abraham remained in 
Florida as an interpreter.  Susan Horse was nineteen years old at the time of their 
wedding.106  The other wife is never mentioned in relation to John again. 
 By the summer of 1840, John had gained the trust of Brevet Brigadier General 
Walker K. Armistead.  This was primarily due to the fact that John Horse had 
participated in actual combat against his fellow Seminoles.  In the Withlacoochee River 
region, John accompanied Major Beall on an expedition tracking Seminoles in the nearby 
area.  In September, they encountered a Seminole village and was engaged by warriors.  
Beall directed John to talk to them; while doing so, a Black Seminole informed John that 
they did not wish to talk and immediately began firing.  John returned volley, 
subsequently fighting his own people.  There is no doubt that John was the primary 
target, given the animosity already expressed towards guides and interpreters for the 
military.  General Armistead, who replaced Taylor as Florida commander, wrote in 
reference to John,  
Gopher John….who appears honest and intelligent declares that the return of two 
or three Chiefs from Arkansas…will…[persuade] those now here to emigrate.  He 
states that …the Indians [think] that those shipped for the west were afterwards 
thrown overboard and if they can be shown that their brethren have not only been 
spared but well treated, they will be inclined to join them.107   
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Armistead took John’s advice.  On November 2, Chief Holatoochee, thirteen other 
Seminoles, and two interpreters arrived in Tampa.  It is almost certain that Holatoochee 
was chosen upon the advice of John.   
 Less than one week later, the delegates contacted the two most prominent 
Seminole Chiefs still fighting in the territory: Chief Halleck Tustenuggee, a Black 
Seminole, and Tiger Tail, a Tallahassee Seminole Indian.  During, the negotiations the 
two chiefs asked to stay in Florida.  If they could not, then they would agree to 
emigration.  Their agreement to emigration appears to have been a negotiation tactic most 
likely to ensure their safety during negotiations.  Once Armistead informed them that he 
would have to notify his superiors, two weeks later Chiefs Tustenuggee and Tiger Tail 
disappeared, and the war resumed yet again.  Holatoochee, on the other hand, continued 
to bring in Seminoles for emigration.  In March 1841, 222 members of the Tallahassee 
band gathered for emigration and were later shipped out of the Florida Territory.108  John 
was well aware of the mistrust of the Seminoles toward Black Seminole guides for the 
military.  He understood that his word would simply not be enough, especially now that 
most of his comrades had emigrated and he was unfamiliar with the majority of those 
who were still at war.  By bringing in the delegation, John demonstrated his commitment 
to the Black Seminoles as well as the Seminole Indians by trying to save as many lives as 
possible. 
 In 1841, John Cavallo was the chief interpreter for Colonel William J. Worth, 
who at the time was becoming the leader of the United States war effort.  Worth’s efforts 
at the beginning of 1841 were concentrated on bringing Coacoahe, now the Seminoles 
primary chief, in for negotiations and eventual emigration.  John, however, was becoming 
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more dissatisfied as he had yet to receive his promise of freedom in writing.  In March, 
Coacoochee met with Worth at Fort Cummings.  By utilizing John’s influence, Worth 
was able to reach an emigration agreement with Coacoochee.   Shortly afterwards, John 
would finally receive his freedom in writing, which stated. 
In execution of the promise made by a former commander of the Florida army as 
certified by his successor, Brigadier General Taylor, the Interpreter John Cohai, 
commonly called Gopher John, his wife and increase, Indian negroes, having 
complied with the terms of the foregoing recited order, are regarded as having a 
right to their freedom from all further services for their former Indian Master.”109   
 
 John would continue to provide service to the military until his departure in July, 
1842.  In mid-February, Major William G. Belknap requested John’s presence at his 
upper Pease Creek camp.  Worth obliged him; however, less than a week later he 
demanded his return.  Belknap released both John and Alligator to Worth but sent a 
message of dire requests for John’s return.  He informs Worth “the Indians who remain 
with me… Insist on the return.”  Worth declined, informing Belknap through his aide, 
“The Negro Gopher John cannot be spared….There is much dissatisfaction among some 
of the Indians [Fort Brooke], the cause & removal of which can only be affected by the 
shrewdness & management of John, and the commanding officer regards his presence at 
this post of paramount importance.”110  This correspondence demonstrates the trust that 
the Seminoles still had in John.  John, probably more so than Abraham himself, retained 
the ability throughout the war to effectively maneuver between both sides to garner a 
satisfactory position for both Seminoles and Black Seminoles alike.  John placed himself 
in whatever position that was necessary in order to accomplish his goal, including 
fighting on the side of the United States military. 
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 In April 1842, John, in the company of Worth, found himself engaged in fighting 
against his fellow Seminoles near Lake Apopka.  An officer present noted “the fire of the 
enemy was concentrated principally upon the Indian guides and negro interpreters.”  
Sprague writes: “The tall figure of the negro interpreter, Gopher John, his loud voice, and 
negro accent, the repeated discharge of his unerring rifle, well known to the Indians as he 
was made him a conspicuous object of assault.”111
      How did John Cavallo, one of the most outstanding Black Seminole leaders and 
formidable foes to the United States, transform into one of the most popular guides and 
interpreters for the military?  Why would he assist the military in any shape, form, or 
fashion?  According to Porter, “One explanation…was that he owned no allegiance to the 
bands that remained in Florida.”  I propose that the answers are much deeper than that.  I 
agree with Porter to the extent that his choice to assist the military as well as the degree in 
which he did was a reflection of self-interest much as it was an indication of his 
commitment to the cause of freedom.112  He had a desire to locate family members, and 
(as previously discussed) his freedom in the west was in jeopardy.  Nonetheless, it was 
more than that.  John accepted responsibilities for leading Black Seminoles as a matter of 
duty.  Whether he reconciled himself to the fact that he might have to fight and kill some 
of his own people in order to secure the life and freedom of others before returning 
Florida will never be known.  However, by examining the two instances in which John 
was involved in battle, it would seem as though it was a matter of self-defense.  John’s 
primary goal was to convince his Seminole comrades and fellow Black Seminoles that 
there was both a life as well as freedom in the west.  To remain in the west as a slave of 
his father’s widow was to accept failure.  Like Abraham, he understood the strength of 
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the United States military and the insurmountable odds against the Seminoles.  He 
therefore made a conscious decision that, in the end, securing his and fellow Black 
Seminoles’ freedom justified working with and for the United States military. 
 Approximately three months after the Battle at Lake Apopka, John Cavallo left 
Florida never to return.  Years later, Worth would declare that John had “aided him in 
getting five hundred and thirty five Indians.”113  That is to say 535 Seminoles that John 
Cavallo secured life and liberty from Whites.   
 John’s actions from 1838 to 1842 were a result of his vision for Black Seminoles 
in the west. Well after emigrating he would continue to have a positive relationship with 
the United States in order to secure a secure life for Black Seminoles in the west.  His 
short stint in the west before his return gave him a glimpse of the upcoming hardships 
Black Seminoles would have to face.  His status as a chief did not shelter him from the 
possibility of re-enslavement.  Therefore, as a leader, he had to have known what would 
be in store for other Black Seminoles. 
 In the west, John Cavallo would emerge as John Horse. During the war, he was 
given the war name “Hokepis Hejo or Crazy Breast,” an honorary war title meaning “his 
heart is recklessly brave.”114  John was now a seasoned leader who had been tested and 
proven as both a Seminole leader and war chief through the Second Seminole War.  His 
peers and comrades immediately began to look to his leadership during the tribulations 
Black Seminoles endured in the west.  He would again have to devote himself to securing 
the freedom of his people.  To the Black Seminoles in the west, John Horse was a leader 
in almost every conceivable manner.  He was their politician, ambassador to the United 
States and Mexican government, and doctor.  Somewhere in his illustrious career, John 
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mastered the art of tribal medicine.  He provided his people with herb healing remedies-
“a doctor, Indian style; when people were sick he’d come to see them, give them herb-
remedies, none of this stuff out of a bottle, and unless Jesus was ready for them he’d save 
them.”115  
 As a result of his leadership, Black Seminoles would receive more security in 
their freedom in Oklahoma and Texas.  He would go on to found a Black Seminole 
settlement in Nacimiento, Mexico.116  In Florida, Abraham was the principal Black 
Seminole leader, and in the west it would be John Horse. 
 John’s life represented a life of leadership and dedication.  From his youth, as the 
son of a chief, he was being prepared to take responsibility for his people.  During the 
war, his charismatic bravery would elevate him from sub-chief to war chief in just a 
year’s time.  His role as Alligator’s sense bearer and  principal advisor would gain him 
the respect of Seminoles as well as the United States government.  His accomplishments 
during the Second Seminole War as a negotiator, advisor, and war commander would 
provide the necessary skills needed to lead in the west.  This in no way belittles his 
efforts during the war; without John’s military strategy and undaunted willingness to 
wage war, Black Seminoles may very well have been returned to plantation slavery.  
 Despite seemingly insurmountable odds, Black Seminole leaders were able to 
wage war and negotiate feasible terms that eventually secured their safety and freedom 
from plantation society.  Their leadership was also responsible for inducing and aiding 
over 200 slaves to abscond from plantation society.  Although their Indian counterparts 
waged war (for the most part) in order to resist emigration west, these leaders understood 
that emigration was a feasible alternative for Black Seminoles favorable terms.  In doing 
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so, they further established an autonomy from Seminole Indians which was reflected 
outside the Seminole Nation.  The mere fact that they were able to garner their freedom 
from plantation society and emigrate west demonstrated a victory against the United 
States government.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Impact of the Black Seminoles on the Second Seminole War 
 
 
 When the war ended in August 1842, it had cost the United States over twenty 
million dollars.  This was four times the cost of what the Spanish received for the Florida 
Territory.  In all of the other Indian conflicts from 1866 to 1891, the United States Army 
lost less than two thousand men, while the Second Seminole War alone resulted in 
casualties of more than 1,500 soldiers and sailors, not including the militia.1  The overall 
impact of Black Seminoles can be measured by examining their impact on the Seminole 
Indian participation, plantation society in Florida, and negotiations with and military 
operations against the United States government. 
 The nature of the Black-Indian relationship amongst the Seminoles is undoubtedly 
the essence of their unified front during the war.  The dependence of Seminole Indians on 
Blacks for agricultural production as well as their trade ties with whites demonstrates the 
impact of Black Seminoles on Seminole Indians.  There is little doubt that this 
dependence became a factor in the Seminoles’ decision to resist white efforts to divide 
the two groups.   
 The exact number of Black Seminoles within the Seminole Nation during the war 
is unknown.  The continuous flow of runaway slaves alone makes an exact calculation 
virtually impossible.  There have been estimates ranging from 300 or 400 to as many as 
1,400.  The 1834 estimate of “more than five hundred” is considered to be a reasonable  
guess.  This wide range of numbers is perhaps based upon distinction made between 
runaways and Seminole slaves.2  Regardless of the ratio of Black Seminoles to Seminole 
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Indians, the impact of the Black Seminoles was undeniable.  One United States military 
officers claimed, 
The Negroes, from the commencement of the Florida war, have, for their 
numbers, been the most Formidable foe, more bloodthirsty, active, and 
revengeful, than the Indians .…  The Negro, returned to his original owner, might 
have remained a few days, when he again would have fled to the swamps, more 
vindictive than ever….3
 
During the battles in the Withlacoochee region, authorities confirmed that approximately 
250 Black Seminole warriors were active.  However, when General Gaines engaged the 
Seminoles, one observer stated “there might have been four or five hundred Negroes 
among them.”4  The intensity with which the Black Seminoles fought is one of the likely 
causes of the disparity in the numbers reported in the sources.  It would be difficult to not 
surmise that the intensity of the Black Seminole warriors did not impact their Indian 
counterparts. 
 The Black Seminole’s fighting intensity appealed to the more militant Indian 
leaders.  Osceola became their most trusted ally not for sentimental reasons, but because 
of their vigorous opposition to re-enslavement.  Osceola himself was not a Seminole by 
birth, but a Georgia Creek.  His rise in the Seminole Nation as a chief was based upon his 
charisma and merits.  He had no hereditary claim to the chieftaincy.  His band primarily 
consisted of those who respected his militancy, courage, and intelligence, many of whom  
were Black.  During the war, Osceola would synchronize his movements with Black 
Seminole leaders.5   
 According to General Jesup, the loss of Blacks would weaken the Indians “more 
than they would be weakened by the loss of the same number of their own people.”6  The 
influence of Black Seminoles during negotiations as well as the intensity with which they 
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fought certainly bolsters Jesup’s assertion.  From Twyman, it can be deduced that the 
Black Seminoles’ impact on Seminole Indians and the Second Seminole War is divided 
into a two-step process.  The first step was to convince Seminole Indians that their fates 
were intricately tied together.  This process began years earlier specifically with the 
negotiations involving the Payne’s Landing and Moultrie Creek treaties.  The second step 
was a transformation from interpreter/advisor to military force.7
 The lack of the Black Seminole leaders’ support after 1838 and the large 
reduction of Black Seminole involvement as a result of their agreement to emigrate 
influenced the Seminole Indian war effort until 1842.  Certainly, the loss of Seminole 
Indians leaders and warriors affected their decisions more so than the former withdrawal 
of Black Seminoles.  However, it cannot be said that the increasing scarcity of their 
erstwhile Black allies had no relevance to the Indians at all.  The Black Seminoles had 
successfully convinced the Seminole Indians that their fates were inextricably linked.  It 
is my contention that because their fates were intertwined in the minds of both Black and 
Indian leadership, the primary motive behind their struggle was to ensure that Blacks and 
Indians would continue to live together free of white control, interference, and bondage. 
 The evidence that bolsters this assertion is the general agreement of Indians to the 
Articles of Capitulation after the inclusion of Article V.  Once Jesup agreed to allow the 
Black Seminoles to emigrate with their Indian counterparts, a large number of Indians 
began to assemble for emigration.  Sprague asserts that it was not until the Black 
Seminoles agreed to emigration under the Articles of Capitulation that the Seminole 
Indians even seriously entertained the idea of emigrating.8  Furthermore, once the slave 
holders disrupted the process, both Indians and Blacks alike refused to emigrate.  Jesup 
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notified one of his lieutenants that the claims of Whites on Negroes would cause Indian 
removal to “be greatly delayed, if not entirely prevented.”9  This demonstrates to a large 
degree that at this point (1837), the desire to stay together was more important to Indians 
than the desire to remain in Florida. 
 The fact that the Black Seminoles had a significant impact on the plantation 
society in Florida is beyond question.  According to Porter, from their contact with Black 
Seminoles, plantation slaves and free Blacks within the plantation society “became well 
acquainted with the [Seminole] Indians and even learned their language.”  He goes on 
further to state, “the contrast between the free and easy life of the Seminole Indians and 
their Negro associates and labor in bondage on the sugar plantations is believed to have 
aroused discontent among the Negro slaves.”10  The feelings of “discontent” resulted in 
some slaves seeking refuge with the Seminole or fighting with them during the war. 
 The research dedicated to John Caesar clearly demonstrates the ways in which 
Black Seminoles enticed plantation slaves to runaway in the St. John’s River region.  
This enticement was definitely not limited to just this particular region.  A female 
runaway in the Alachua region who was later captured reported that “two nights before 
the attack [on a plantation in the area], a Negro house … was visited by a slave of Judge 
Sanchez accompanied by Toney Barnett and David Bowlegs [Black Seminoles] who 
informed her of the intention of the Indian to capture [colonel] Humphrey’s Negroes on 
the night they were actually taken.”11  More slaves in Florida were reported absent from 
their masters during the Second Seminole War than the thirteen years prior to 1835.  
According to Harris, between 1821 and 1834, 159 slaves were reported as runaways, 
while 185 were reported during the war.  As indicated in Table 1, 1838, the year after the 
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inclusion of Article V in the Articles of Capitulation, witnessed the second largest 
number of reported runaway slaves over a span of forty-nine years. 
The figures in Table 1 are primarily derived from Harris’ examination of the 
committed-to-jail notices and runaway slave advertisements.  Harris admits that the 
runaway notices provide “scant but invaluable” documentation on runaway slaves and 
that they also suffer from inconsistency in publication.  The fact that Florida law required 
the detainer to notify the owner by delivery, letter, or advertisement contributes to the 
inconsistencies in advertisement.  These notices contained the slaves’ name, slave master, 
physical description, and any other pertinent details that would enable the owner to 
identify them.  Since the information was obtained from the slave, false information was 
sometimes given in order to avoid their return.12
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Table 1 
Donorena Harris, “Annual Distribution of Runaway Slaves” in “Abolitionist Sentiment In 
Florida:  1821-1860,” 105. 
 
The examination of the slave advertisements consisted of surveying 354 advertisements 
from 1821 to 1860.  The decision of slave owners to use advertisements in the 
newspapers was based upon comparing the slave’s value to the expenses that would be 
incurred during their capture and return.  These advertisements ran for the most part in 
local newspapers.  On occasion they would circulate in nearby states, primarily Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, if the owners suspected the slave of trying to 
venture to these areas.13  However, due to the increased number of runaways in 1828, the 
Legislative Council began to require the advertisement of fugitive slaves by their owners. 
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The numbers presented in Table 1 do not portray the total number of runaway 
during the Second Seminole War.  This is primarily due to the fact that when slaves 
absconded shortly after a plantation raid, they were believed to be connected in some 
form or fashion to Black Seminoles.  It was automatically assumed that they sought 
refuge with the Seminoles, thus advertisement was considered futile in most cases.  Also,  
only ten percent of the slaves captured appeared in advertisements.  For the purpose of 
this study, these numbers are pertinent in that they reflect, if nothing else, the influence of 
Black Seminoles and the war on the plantation slaves’ inclination to runaway regardless 
of their destination.14
Slave violence manifested itself through stealing and the destruction of property 
and human lives.  The plantation raids, primarily under the leadership and direction of 
John Caesar, demonstrated the Black Seminoles influence upon slave resistance.  Black 
Seminoles exhorted slaves to seize their freedom by relieving themselves of their 
masters, advice which certainly did not fall on deaf ears.  Rivers’ study on slave 
resistance indicates that “except during that [Second Seminole War] conflict, few slaves 
tried to harm their masters physically as they fled for freedom.”  Furthermore, the fact 
that most individual acts of violence perpetrated against whites were premeditated 
indicates a degree of planning and perhaps fore thought regarding the possibility of 
escaping punishment.  It is therefore likely that even if the exhortations by Black 
Seminoles were not a primary factor that motivated a particular acts of violence, the 
promise of a safe haven after an escape certainly made resistance a more viable option for 
some slaves.15  It is also important to note that the impact of slave violence extended 
beyond the Florida borders.  In 1837, General Thomas S. Jesup reported, “seven 
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runaways from Georgia . . . well armed and plenty of ammunition …have left and on 
their way south [and] burned the houses in the vicinity.”  Apetheker points out that the 
slaves who took part in the Stono Rebellion of South Carolina headed for the Edisto 
River.  This river opens up directly north of Saint Augustine, “their ultimate goal.” 
 Whites were never oblivious to the growing relationship among Blacks.  Their 
concerns over slave violence were not taken lightly to say the least.  In 1824 a statute was 
enacted, declaring: 
Be it further enacted that if any slave shall consult, advise, or conspire to rebel, or 
make insurrection against the white inhabitants of this [Florida] territory, or 
against the laws of he government thereof, or shall plot or conspire the murder of 
any white person, or shall commit an assault and battery, on any white person 
with an intention to kill, he or she shall, on conviction of either of he said crimes 
suffer death.16
 
As tensions mounted between the Seminole Nation and Whites, their concerns over a 
black alliance quickly developed into apprehension.  According to Rivers, “The 
apprehension, in turn, prompted demands for harsher slave codes and enhanced day-to-
day restrictions on slave life.”17  Prior to the outbreak of war, General Duncan Clinch 
expressed the sentiment that “if a sufficient military force…is not sent…the whole 
frontier may be laid waste by a combination of the Indians, Indian Negroes, and the 
Negroes on the plantations.”  Later he would report, “Some of the most respectable 
planters fear that there is already a secret and improper communication carried on 
between the refractory Indians, Indian Negroes, and some of the plantation Negroes.”18
 Free Blacks were also watched with careful and suspicious eyes.  During the 
height of the war, virtually any non-combatant contact between free Blacks and Black 
Seminoles could result in charges of treason for free Blacks.  A Florida bill was passed 
stipulating that any free Black caught aiding the Seminole cause was to be sold into 
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slavery.  In 1836, Major Benjamin A. Putnam of the Florida militia strongly suggested to 
Governor Call a standing court martial to deal with Blacks in violation of the law.19
 Once black resistance escalated within plantation society, primarily in the form of 
plantation raids, apprehensions quickly turned into fear.  Those planters who did survive 
the raids of 1835 began to move into towns such as St. Augustine, Jacksonville, and 
Pensacola for safety, leaving their plantations, farm, and small settlements abandoned.  
As a result, plantation society’s growth, particularly in the Saint John’s River region, was 
curbed during the first years of the war.  The violence perpetrated upon plantations also 
caused a change in the production of work and work habits.  Louis Goldsborough, an 
overseer in 1835 admitted, “neither our Negroes nor others can work with the same heart 
of life they [do] other wise.”  A few years later, the ensuing threat of raids would cause 
this same overseer to declare that” if Osceola [and his band of Black Seminoles] came, 
and I find myself forced to abandon Wirt land to his mercy…I shall take all the Negroes 
to Pensacola.”20  It was not long before the United States government came to the 
realization that they were not going to simply persuade the Seminole Indians into selling 
Blacks to them. In fact, the ultimate decision to remove the Seminole Indians was 
deemed the only solution to ridding Florida of the black communities outside of white 
control.  This decision was made only after attempts to gain Blacks from the Indians had 
failed.  It appears that the Whites’ desire for cheap slaves was the driving force behind 
the separation of the Seminole Nation.21
 The impact of Black Seminoles on United States policy concerning negotiations 
with the Seminole Indians before the war officially began is duly noted in the Treaties of 
Payne’s Landing and Indian Springs.  As the Second Seminole War drew closer, White 
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dissatisfaction with the Black-Indian alliance manifested itself in almost every policy 
concerning the Seminole Indians.  In 1832, to exert more control over trade with 
Seminoles and eventually force emigration, territory officials prohibited “Indian Negroes 
bond or free” from leaving Seminole lands.22  In 1834, Governor DuVal and Indian 
Agent Wiley Thompson advised the War Department that “The Negroes are more 
provident than the Indians.  They not only often feed the hungry Indian but having the 
means they introduce by stealth into the nation sometimes considerable quantities of 
whiskey…to gratify the vitiated and imtemparate appetite of the Indian.”  That same 
year, DuVal went further to advise the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the first step 
to relocating the Seminoles west “must be the breaking up of the runaways slaves and 
outlaw Indians.”23  Once the war began, the Black Seminole impact on the United States 
military would affect both its  policies and strategies. 
 The failure of the United States to defeat the Seminoles in the first year of the war 
was evident by mid-1836.  The War Department’s order to General Scott to remove the 
Seminoles while offering no peace as long as the Blacks were with them was simply 
unenforceable.  When General Jesup replaced Scott by the end of the year, it took less 
than a month’s time for him to understand the impact and importance of the Black 
Seminoles.  On December 9, 1836, Jesup reported, “This, you may be assured, [the 
Second Seminole War] is a Negro, not an Indian war.”  In March, he would write, “The 
Negroes…rule the Indians…if they should…hold out, the war will be renewed.”24  Jesup 
would from this point until the end of his tenure as commander in 1838 develop policies 
based upon this belief because he did not understand that above all (for both sides) 
slavery was the main issue. 
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 Jesup’s declaration of the Seminole War being “Negro war” would not be 
accepted by the United States until 1841, when it officially abandoned the idea of 
recapturing all Black Seminoles and removing the remaining Blacks in custody, as well 
as those captured through the end of the war in 1842, to the west with their Indian 
counterparts.  This policy, which basically voided the policy of the Indian Springs Treaty, 
was expressed by Colonel William Worth.  In a letter dated August 19, 1841, he wrote, 
“Indians have been solemnly guaranteed retention of slaves indifferently …to the mode 
or time…they obtained possession.”25
 Jesup’s declaration, for the purpose of this study, is pertinent to the supposition 
that the war was indeed a slave rebellion.  The policy adopted in 1841 revealed the 
willingness of the United States military to embrace this idea.  The first act was the 
military’s policy of utilizing Black Seminole leaders to assure both Blacks and Indians 
that their safe passage to the west was guaranteed.  It has been noted that this policy was 
not to all the Whites’ liking, but nevertheless effective.  According to Twyman, Jesup’s 
policies of allowing Black Seminoles to go west and utilizing Black Seminoles to 
persuade them allowed him to reduce the total Seminole population in Florida by two-
thirds, particularly  after negotiations with Abraham.26   
 Sources which claim that ‘negroes rule them,” “slaves….have controlling 
influence,” and Black Seminoles “in fact govern” Indians suggest the belief of Whites 
that the Seminole Nation was highly influenced by its black members.  The presence of 
Black Seminoles within the Seminole Nation was a major cause of the war itself.  The 
Seminole Indians may have been allowed to remain in some portion of Florida initially 
had it not been for the presence of Blacks in their communities.  The decision to remove 
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the Black Seminoles from the Seminole Nation preceded the one for the removal of the 
Seminole Indians from the territory.  In 1821, an Indian agent Jean Penieres advocated 
the removal of what he called “lawless freebooters [blacks]” from Florida.  Twyman 
asserts that the war was “initiated by the slave industry.”  The ever-increasing persistence 
of Whites to place Blacks in servitude within their society was not only a primary aim, 
but the sole reason for the continuation of the war.  Thus, when the Second Seminole War 
is reconceptualized under these circumstances and premises, the conflict must be 
reconceived in light of its resemblance to a massive slave rebellion against proslavery 
interests.27
 The Black Seminole maroon society, like all maroon societies, often fought 
against Whites in a struggle for survival.  Genovese’s comparisons of the Black Seminole 
to Jamaican and Surinam maroons reveals each group’s efforts to retain African cultural 
traditions, negotiate with European powers,  and establish relationships with slaves.  The 
key feature that separates the Black Seminoles from most other maroon societies is that   
while the Jamaican and Surinam maroons existed almost solely on their own by 
negotiating and coming to terms with various Whites over a period of time, the Black 
Seminoles were able to maintain a constant Indian ally.  This afforded them the 
opportunity to resist the threat of enslavement and removal, unlike their counterparts in 
Jamaican and Surinam.28
 Taken together, the works of Eugene Genovese and Orlando Patterson have out- 
lined ten essential conditions that enhanced the likelihood of a slave revolt.  Genovese 
asserts that “the probabilities for large scale revolt rested heavily on some combination” 
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of the conditions.  Of those ten conditions, six conditions existed in Florida during this 
period: 
1. Geographical conditions favor guerilla warfare 
2. Dominance of a large-scale monopolistic enterprise.  The three primary 
regions of the Florida territory each were dominated by a primary crop. 
3. Low ratio of local slaves to foreigh-born slaves is low.  Although 
technically this was not the case, the fact that the Black Seminoles formed 
a separate culture of their  own, those runaways that joined them were 
outsiders until they were acculturated into the society.  Thus the “local” 
slaves would be the recent runaways in comparison to the Black 
Seminoles. 
4. The imported slaves, or a significant portion of them, are of common ethic 
origin.  Here, Black Seminoles would be considered those of a “common 
ethnic origin.”  The fact that the Black Seminoles created a different 
culture from those of recent runaways does not detract from the principle 
of ethnic commonality.   
5. The social structure of the slave-holding regime permitted the emergence 
of an autonomous black leadership. 
6. The formation of colonies of runaway slaves are strong enough to threaten 
the plantation regime is provided by the geographical, social, and political 
environment.29 
 
Once the war is conceptualized as a slave rebellion, comparisons to other known 
conspiracies and rebellions help to place this research in a larger context.  The 1811 
rebellion in southern Louisiana is considered the largest rebellion on North American 
soil.  It is estimated that between 180 slaves armed with axes, weapons, and a small 
number of firearms marched towards New Orleans.  They were repelled, and the 
rebellion was put down by a collective effort of slaveholders, a free black militia, and 
federal troops.  The rebellion was largely directed towards the destruction of plantations.  
Only a small number of Whites were killed.  In the end, sixty-six slaves were murdered 
while sixteen of their leaders were executed.30  The number of slave participants 
indicates the main justification for declaring this rebellion as the largest.  If this is indeed 
the case, then the Second Seminole War should actually be considered the largest slave 
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rebellion on American soil.  When compared to the Louisiana rebellion, the war involved 
as many as three times as many black participants. 
The Nat Turner Rebellion is considered the deadliest slave rebellion in North 
America.  As a result of this rebellion, approximately fifty-five Whites were murdered, 
including men, women, and children.  The shock resulting from the number of Whites 
killed propelled the impact of the rebellion far beyond Southampton County, Virginia.   
In comparison, the number of Whites murdered in Virginia represents a small fraction of 
the number of white soldiers, militia men, and members of plantation society killed 
during the war in Florida, which numbers above one thousand.  This ultimately means 
that the war was also the deadliest slave rebellion.31
The major slave conspiracies or rebellions in the United States were linked to 
larger revolutions or conflicts that involved freedom and equality.  Both the Gabriel 
Prosser conspiracy of 1800 and the Denmark Vesey conspiracy of 1822 were inspired by 
the belief that broader conflicts of the period would bolster the rebellion’s chances of 
success.  For example, an undeclared war between the United States and France, along 
with French revolutionary ideology, made Prosser confident that the French would help 
his cause.  Unfortunately, both the Prosser and Vesey conspiracies would never develop 
into rebellion.  Nat Turner was partially inspired to instigate rebellion shortly after a 
Virginia Constitutional convention sided with the slave owners and upheld slavery 
throughout the state.  Black Seminoles were no different in taking cues from public 
discourse about liberty.  They immediately began to incorporate themselves within the 
Seminole removal debate once it appeared to offer them better protection against (re-) 
enslavement.  Black rebel leaders realized that their stance against slavery, at this 
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particular time, was not strong enough to support a slave rebellion when initiated by only 
Blacks.32
The similarities between Prosser, Vesey, Turner, and Abraham reveal 
prerequisites for leadership among rebellious slaves.  All of these men had some mastery 
of the English language.  Prosser, Vesey, and Turner were able to both read and write 
while Abraham was able to translate English into the Seminole language.  They all also 
received privileges that derived from their special talents.  Prosser, a skilled blacksmith, 
Turner, a Christian minister, and Abraham, a chief counselor, were able to attract more 
followers by being in an elevated position and having more freedom to travel and meet 
potential allies.  Denmark Vesey and Abraham were able to gain their freedom as a result 
of their special talents.  The average field-hand slave who had limited contact with those 
outside of their plantation was far less likely to acquire a large following.  These 
particular men were leaders among their respective black communities before they 
embarked upon rebellions.33
These rebel leaders understood the importance of religion and spirituality to their 
respective Black communities.  They were able to incorporate these appeals as a way to 
justify the act of rebellion.  When necessary, they would stress Christian doctrine or 
African spiritual exhortations to their followers.  For Prosser and Turner, Christian 
ideology was primarily utilized while Abraham relied on a more African-centered 
spirituality.  Vesey utilized “radical Christian” doctrine in his attempts to garner support 
while at the same time employing Jack Pritchard, an African mystic, to influence slaves 
who were not Christian.  Thus, Vesey utilized a combination of Christian and African 
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centered doctrines.  Regardless of the leader, the African influence of “conjuring” 
appears to be a distinctive influence in all four cases.34
The similarities between the Black Seminoles during the Second Seminole War 
and three of the largest slave conspiracies and rebellions highlight salient characteristics 
of collective slave resistance.  The impact of the Black Seminole on the Florida Territory 
suggests that the issue of slavery was not only as important as the Seminole Indian 
Removal, but at crucial points during the conflict, more important.  The circumstances 
that were both surrounding and intrinsic to the development of war demonstrated several 
pre-existing conditions necessary for a rebellion.  The involvement, leadership, and 
impact of the Black Seminoles caused the Second Seminole War to become a Situational 
or Opportunistic slave rebellion.  Furthermore, it was the largest, longest, deadliest, and 
by far the most successful slave rebellion in the United States.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Spanish sought to control Florida in 
order to maintain a foothold in the New World.  Free Blacks formed militias as early as 
1683 and agreed to help defend St. Augustine from outside European invasion in 
exchange for certain liberties.  The Spanish provided food until the first crops were 
harvested, a priest for religious instruction, and established a military presence at Fort de 
Mose.  Spanish officials also encouraged both runaway slaves and Native Americans 
from nearby English colonies to settle in Florida.  As early as 1739, fugitive slaves were 
settling in and around Fort de Mose.  Although a precise date as to when other free 
Blacks, runaway slaves, Black slaves owned by Seminole Indians, and the Seminole 
Indians formed a bond is not known, 1763, the year Florida was ceded to the English, is 
the year they became a recognized community by those outside the area. 
 As a result of the decrease in the number of Spaniards in Florida, Seminoles 
began to acquire more Blacks from European settlers (both Spanish and English).  The 
Seminoles, unlike their English counterparts in the area, were not interested in the 
complete control of Black lives.  Also, because the Seminoles did not have the same 
pressing needs for agriculture, the work requirements on Black slaves were vastly 
different. 
 Over a period of time, Blacks began to prosper and increase in numbers.  They 
either lived in separate communities, establishing their own towns and villages near 
Seminole Indians, or joined Indians by cohabitating or intermarriage.  Through this 
cohabitation, Blacks became an integral part of Seminole society, assuming positions as 
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trusted interpreters to the English, advisers, and counselors.  Thus, they became known as 
the Black Seminoles.  By taking these positions, they were afforded the opportunity to 
identify themselves as Blacks in the company, but not the same as, Seminole Indians. 
 African retentions appear to have been a driving force in the perceptions of the 
Black Seminoles.  Because they were allowed to form their own identity and culture, 
Black Seminoles were able to retain a strong tie to African cultures.  In their case, as with 
most maroon societies, freedom was not only an escape from enslavement, but also a 
chance to continue their own Africa-inspired way of life in a manner of their own 
choosing with minimal outside interference.  By incorporating Spanish, Indian, English, 
and American plantation cultures into their own African culture, Black Seminoles were 
able to produce an identity much to their own choosing.  This is not to say that they were 
not deeply influenced by these outside cultures; however, the magnitude of these 
influences did not completely overwhelm their Africa-derived sensibilities. 
 The relationship between Seminole Blacks and Indians began with a basic 
empathy for one another.  They both understood each other’s desires to maintain their 
freedom and a life of their own choosing.  The intermarriage and cultural exchange 
between the two resulted in a durable relationship.  That bond was strengthened through 
the codependency that developed.  White settlers’ resentment and ill sentiments towards 
their alliance also strengthened their bond in that if the common Black Seminole and 
Seminole Indian had nothing else in common, they at least had a common foe.  For those 
Blacks who were slaves to Seminole Indians, their relationship resembled more of a 
landlord/client relationship.  Generally, the term slave became more of a negotiating 
reference with Whites. 
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 By the 1820’s the Black Seminoles were down to their last and most trusted ally, 
the Seminole Indians.  Up to this point, Blacks were able to maintain their existence 
through alliances with Spanish and British authorities in exchange for their military 
contributions to protecting the respective European interests in the Florida territory.  
However, by 1821 both the British and Spanish governments had relinquished their 
claims to Florida.  The Seminole Indians had also come to rely on their military 
contributions.  Thus, by the end of the decade when the United States ordered the 
removal of the Seminoles west of the Mississippi River, Blacks would again be called 
upon for military service. 
 The Black Seminoles knew that their plight was tied to that of the Seminoles.  
Prior treaties between Indians and the United States basically eliminated all claims of the 
Seminole Indians on the Black Seminoles and made Blacks susceptible to slave-catching 
expeditions.  It was clear that the United States intended to destroy Black Seminole 
society and enslave Blacks on white plantations.  In fact, the decision to move the 
Seminole Indians westward was based upon, to a large degree, the need to separate 
Indians from Blacks.  Their separation would cause Black Seminoles to become 
irresistibly vulnerable to capture and enslavement.   
 During the first three years of the war, Black Seminole warriors were highly 
visible during combat.  They participated in every major battle during this period.  Their  
destruction of plantations in remote areas caused panic along the Florida frontier.  Their 
intimate knowledge of the Florida wilderness enhanced their ability to successfully 
execute guerilla tactics against the United States military.  The success of the Seminoles’ 
 200
military efforts heavily relied upon the success of these guerilla tactics.  Black Seminole 
warriors were regarded as the fiercest opponents of the U.S. military during the war. 
 The Black Seminoles’ struggle for freedom played as much a role in the 
development of their society as anything else.  Their military strength allowed them to 
forge alliances, increase their numbers, and sustain their way of life.  Their military 
strength defined their society in a way that distinguished them from Indians.  Unlike their 
enslaved counterparts on the plantations, they did not to wait for particular incidents to 
incite them to violence.  Politically, the Black Seminole leaders’ participation in 
negotiations as translators and counselors afforded them the ability to become more vital 
members of the Seminole Nation while pursuing the interests of their own communities.  
Their active roles during negotiations also created a dependency on the part of both 
Whites and Indians alike. 
 Once this dependency was created, Black Seminole leaders began to execute 
plans different from the objectives of Seminole Indians during the war.  As Seminole 
Indians were still fighting against removal from 1838 to 1842, Black Seminole leaders 
were actively working with the United States military to secure their people’s safe 
passage westward. 
 Black Seminole leaders also actively led bands of warriors that consisted of both 
Blacks and Indians.  They became known as war chiefs due to their military fortitude and 
prowess in combat.  Each of the three primary Black Seminole leaders instituted a 
dimension of the war that only a Black Seminole could.  Abraham, the primary Black 
Seminole leader during the war, eloquently negotiated favorable terms for Blacks that 
allowed them to emigrate westward.  By recognizing the dependency of both Whites and 
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Indians, he was able to garner support from both sides in his endeavor to secure the Black 
Seminoles freedom.  John Caesar wreaked havoc on the white community of East Florida 
by destroying plantations during the first year and a half of the war.  He also was the 
primary intermediary and instigator of plantation slaves.  His actions alone increased the 
likelihood of a mass slave insurrection within Florida more than any other single 
development during the war.  John Cavallo’s character and high position within the 
Seminole Nation allowed him the opportunity to ensure the freedom of more Blacks than 
any other person.  From 1838 to 1842, John Cavallo was responsible for securing the safe 
passage of approximately five hundred Blacks and Indians to the  west.   
 It would not take Whites long to understand that the actual number of Black 
Seminole participants certainly in no way reflected their importance or impact during the 
war.  Their influence on the disruption, damage, and destruction of plantation society 
increased white Floridians fear and apprehension.  Black Seminoles’ heavy influence on 
both plantation slaves and Indians alike caused Whites to believe that their presence was 
the most pressing concern in reference to the attainment of their goals.  Whites quickly 
realized that the most formidable foe of their efforts to enslave the Black Seminoles was 
the Black Seminoles themselves and not the Indians.  They would go on to declare the 
Second Seminole War a war with Blacks.   
 Black Seminole participation during the war would cause the United States to 
redirect its military operations, institute a separate policy concerning Black Seminoles, 
and ultimately abandon their objective to place Black Seminoles within their society as 
slaves.  Black Seminole villages became the targets of the United States military’s 
operations after several embarrassing conflicts.  There was simply no conceivable way to 
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explain to the rest of the country, and especially to those in Washington, how a force so 
small could resist their military might.  Despite the arrogance of Whites in their beliefs of 
racial  superiority, the military was forced into diplomacy with a race of people whom 
they had little regard for a human beings.  In 1841, when the United States officially 
abandoned their efforts to reduce Black Seminoles to slavery and allowed them to 
emigrate westward, it was tantamount to accepting defeat.   
 By reexamining the Second Seminole War from the Black Seminole perspective, 
this study frames the war primarily as a slave rebellion and not as an Indian War.  There 
is no question as to the validity of the belief that Black Seminole society in Florida was a 
maroon society.  However, when examining the context of the United States 
government’s actions  from 1821 to 1842 concerning the Black Seminoles, a unique case 
develops unlike the situation of other maroon societies.  What this study has 
demonstrated is that during this period a maroon society exploded into a mass rebellion.  
The fact that there were more Seminole Indian participants does not overshadow the 
essence of the war. 
Attitudes which belittled the Black Seminole involvement in the war in the 
nineteenth century writings are still reflected in the latest historiography concerning the 
Second Seminole War.  Although the issue of slavery has been ably dealt with by 
scholars in recent years, those who were most affected by the issue have not.  Black 
Seminoles, for the most part, are still being relegated to the position of Blacks in the 
company of Indians.  Names such as Micanopy, Wild Cat, and Osceola have become 
synonymous with the war while names such as Abraham, John Caesar, and John Cavallo 
are at best secondarily considered.  The present study is designed to challenge this 
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particular characterization of the historical record and to foreground the significance of 
the Black Seminole experience in Floridian and American history. 
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